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AN INSTRUMENT OF COMMUNICATION
FOR A NON-DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT
UNO STRUMENTO DI COMUNICAZIONE
PER UNO SVILUPPO NON DIPENDENTE
UN INSTRUMENTO DE COMUNICACION
PARA UN DESARROLLO NO-DEPENDIENTE

INTERNAZIONALE INTERNACIONAL INTERNATIONAL INTERNAZIONALE INTERNACIONAL IN

Il sistema razziale del Sud Africa rappresenta per la nazione Afrikaner bianca un quadro di valori radicato nella cultura, nella lingua, nella religione, nelle istituzioni sociali e politiche, nella nuova Costituzione del paese. «Afrikanerdom», la maggior parte dei bianchi sudafricani, anche se di origine inglese, è consapevole che un Sud Africa non razzista non sarebbe più il «suo» Sud Africa: il paese si trova di fronte ad una rivoluzione. Tale appare ai loro occhi ogni strategia per un mutamento, seppure non violento, mentre l'intransigenza del regime si «giustifica» per il fatto che il sistema è assolutemente non riformabile.

South Africa's racial system represents for the white Afrikaner nation a value system embedded in culture, language, religion, social and political institutions, and in the country's new Constitution. «Afrikanerdom», the great majority of white South Africans, even of English origin, is aware that a non-racist South Africa would no longer be «their» South Africa: the country is facing revolution. The leaders of non-violent change in South Africa stand for nothing less but this, while the regime's intransigency is «justified» in that the system is radically irreformable.

El sistema racial del Sudáfrica representa para la nación Afrikaner blanca un conjunto de valores radicados en la cultura, lengua, religión, instituciones políticas y sociales, y en la nueva Constitución que rige el país. «Afrikanerdom», la mayoría de los blancos sudafricanos, aunque sean de origen inglés, comprende que un Sudáfrica no racista no sería más «su» Sudáfrica. A sus ojos, cada estrategia de cambio, aunque sea no-violenta, conduciría a la revolución; mientras la intransigencia del régimen se «justifica» por el hecho que el sistema es absolutamente irreformable.

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IL SUDAFRICA È OGGI,

sotto gli occhi del mondo intero, un'attenzione nuova che è costata sangue e molte vite umane.

Ogni giorno i notiziari televisivi ci inviano immagini di funerali, di arresti brutali, di poliziotti che picchiano coi manganelli, carriarmati pieni di soldati e ogni tanto appare il volto immobile di Botha che assicura determinazione nel mantenimento della legge e dell'ordine del razzismo e dell'apartheid.

In questo autunno 1985 la presunta politica di pacificazione e di buon vicinato di Botha si è rivelata un insieme di vuote chiacchiere disoneste. Nel settembre 1985 il Sud Africa riconosce ufficialmente di avere proseguito nel suo sostegno alla guerriglia antigovernativa del MNR in Mozambico, malgrado gli accordi di Nkomati. Allo stesso tempo, le truppe sudafricane sono penetrate di nuovo in Angola ed occupano militarmente buona parte del suo territorio meridionale, ed il Generale Malan, ministro della difesa, dichiara ufficialmente al mondo che il Sud Africa sostiene l'UNITA, la guerriglia antigovernativa in Angola.

Il protettorato sudafricano sulla Namibia è stato imposto con le armi alla popolazione dalle forze d'occupazione. Nessun altro stato al mondo sta conducendo azioni di guerra contro così numerosi stati vicini contemporaneamente quanto il Sud Africa oggi.

La situazione interna è praticamente di guerra civile, sebbene con fronti ineguali: il possente apparato militare e poliziesco del regime contro i pugni nudi, le pietre, le canzoni e le marce degli oppressi.

Ma la posizione del regime non è mai stata minacciata come in questi giorni. La crudeltà e brutalità delle forze di sicurezza durante gli ultimi mesi è un segnale di paura e di debolezza da parte del governo. Oltre mille arresti arbitrari, colpi di fucile ed uccisioni indiscriminate testimoniano della bancarotta della politica riformista.

La situazione economica del paese non è mai stata tanto negativa per decenni: il prezzo dell'oro è al suo livello più basso; il Rand al suo più basso tasso di scambio col dollaro USA (US$ 0.38); l'inflazione circa del 15%, la disoccupazione prevista in 2,4 milioni nel 1986, quasi un decimo della popolazione totale; i lavoratori neri, meglio organizzati che in passato, in agitazione costante; lo sciopero del sindacato nazionale dei minatori in agosto è stato solo un assaggio. In novembre, la costituzione di una grande federazione sindacale unirà circa 400.000 minatori neri. I colloqui ufficiali degli uomini d'affari sudafricani con l'ANC in Botswana, severamente condannati dal Primo Ministro Botha, sono stati un chiaro segnale: la realtà economica è totalmente fuori dal controllo del governo che, ad onta delle sue chiacchere di riforme, non capisce niente delle esigenze di un'economia moderna, e cerca invece di imporre all'economia oscure priorità dettate da ideologie.

Il mondo internazionale degli affari, d'altra parte, comincia a vedere più chiaro. Il Wall Street Journal dell'11 marzo 1985 parlava di nervosismo e preoccupazione nel mondo degli affari americano rispetto al clima esistente intorno agli investimenti in Sud Africa; le borse registrano il calo delle azioni delle società che operano in Sud Africa, in particolare nel settore delle miniere d'oro (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung del 25 luglio 1985). Indubbiamente dopo gli scontri e lo stato di emergenza del 1985, il clima per gli investimenti si è raffreddato fino al livello del 1976, dopo i fatti Soweto. Un titolo dello stesso giornale tedesco - di orientamento padronale - dava il 23 luglio un chiaro messaggio: «Il comandante supremo della polizia è ora il numero due: il Sud Africa diventa ingovernabile».

La minaccia di sanzioni selettive è fonte di grandi preoccupazioni per gli economisti sudafricani. Il colpo peggiore per il regime sarebbe l'embargo sulle vendite di computers e di tecnologie avanzate degli Stati Uniti. Il regime poliziesco razzista ha bisogno di basarsi sempre più su di un sofisticato schedario computerizzato per tutte le necessità di sicurezza, e su rapidi sistemi di informazione e comunicazione. E se il presidente Reagan adotta l'embargo sulla vendita di Kruger Rands negli Stati Uniti, questo può danneggiare, per una percentuale dell'8%, l'attuale esportazione di oro del Sud Africa, un danno serio alle entrate dello Stato.

Questo numero di «IDOC Internazionale» propone alcune analisi tese a dimostrare con maggiore chiarezza le crepe esistenti nella fortezza sudafricana ed a suffragare la speranza espressa da una militante sudafricana del movimento antiapartheid durante una sua recente visita in Europa: «Siamo ormai nel pieno di una guerra civile, caratterizzata da grande squilibrio, ma insieme da grande chiarezza dei fronti contrapposti. Questo mi fa sperare che il nostro regime non avrà più di un anno o due di sopravvivenza».

Il dipartimento documentazione dell'IDOC dispone di ricco materiale relativo agli ultimi quindici anni della lotta dell'Africa australe per la liberazione e la costruzione di una società non razzista.

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BAJO LOS OJOS DEL MUNDO

entero, Sudáfrica atrae una inaudita atención a costa de la sangre y muerte de innumerables vidas. Cada día, los noticiarios de la televisión nos entregan imágenes de funerales, brutales arrestos,policias que agreden con bastones, carros blindados repletos de militares y, de vez en cuando, aparece la pétrea figura de Botha que asegura - con determinación - el mantenimiento de la ley y del orden del racismo y apartheid.

En este otoño de 1985, la supuesta política de pacificación y buena vecindad de Botha se ha revelado como un conjunto de deshonestas palabras vacías. En septiembre de 1985, Sudáfrica reconoce oficialmente que continua sosteniendo a la guerrilla antigobernativa del MNR, en Mozambique, a pesar de los acuerdos de Nkomati. Al mismo tiempo, las tropas sudafricanas penetran de nuevo en Angola y ocupan militarmente una buena parte del territorio meridional, mientras el General Malan, ministro de la defensa, declara oficialmente al mundo que Sudáfrica sostiene la UNITA, guerrilla opuesta al gobierno de Angola.

El protectorado sudafricano sobre la población de Namibia ha sido impuesto por las tropas de ocupación con la fuerza de sus armas. Ningún otro estado en el mundo está conduciendo acciones de guerra contra tantos estados vecinos, al mismo tiempo, como lo hace actualmente Sudáfrica.

La situación interna es prácticamente de guerra civil, aunque las fuerzas provienen de frentes desiguales: el potente aparato militar y policial del régimen, contra los puños desnudos, las piedras, canciones y las marchas de los oprimidos.

No obstante, la posición del régimen nunca ha estado más amenazada que en estos días. La crueldad y brutalidad de las fuerzas de seguridad, en los últimos meses, es una señal de miedo y de debilidad por parte del gobierno.

Miles de arrestos arbitrarios, disparos de fusiles, asesinatos indiscriminados, dan muestra del fracaso de la política reformista.

La situación económica del país desde hace decenios no era tan negativa: el precio del oro a su nivel más bajo; el Rand a la menor tasa de cambio, con respecto al dólar, que se tenga noticia (US$ 0.38); la inflación cerca del 15%; el desempleo previsto en 2,4 millones para 1986, casi una décima parte de la población total; los trabajadores negros, mejor organizados que en el pasado, en agitación constante; la huelga del sindicato nacional de mineros fue sólo una prueba. En noviembre, la constitución de una gran federación sindical unirá a cerca de 400.000 mineros negros. Las conversaciones oficiales de los hombres de negocios sudafricanos con el ANC en Botswana, severamente condenadas por el Primer Ministro Botha, han sido una señal clara: la realidad económica está totalmente fuera del control del gobierno que, a pesar de lo vergonzoso de su palabrería reformista, no comprende para nada las exigencias de una economía moderna y busca, en cambio, imponer a la economía oscuras prioridades dictadas por una ideología.

El mundo internacional de los negocios, por otra parte, comienza ver más claro. El Wall Street Journal, del 11 de marzo de 1985, hablaba de nerviosismo y preocupación en el mundo de los negocios norteamericanos respecto al clima existente en torno a las inversiones en Sudáfrica; la bolsa registró una caída de las acciones de las compañías que operan en Sudáfrica, en particular en el sector de las minas auríferas (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung del 25 julio 1985). Indudablemente, después de los enfrentamientos y el estado de emergencia en 1985, el clima para las inversiones se ha congelado casi a niveles de 1976, después de los hechos de Soweto. Un titular del mismo periódico alemán - de tendencia empresarial - entregaba el 23 de julio un claro mensaje: «El comandante supremo de la policía es ahora el número dos: Sudáfrica se transforma en ingobernable».

La amenaza de sanciones selectivas es una fuente de gran preocupación para los economistas sudafricanos. El peor golpe para el régimen sería el embargo a la venta de computadoras y tecnología avanzada por parte de Estados Unidos. El régimen policial racista tiene necesidad de basarse, cada vez más, sobre un sofisticado fichero computarizado para todas sus necesidades de seguridad y rapidez en las informaciones y comunicaciones. Y si el presidente Reagan adopta la prohibición de comercializar Kruger Rands en los Estados Unidos, puede dañar en un 8% las actuales exportaciones de oro del Sudáfrica, un castigo serio a las entradas del Estado.

Este número de «IDOC Internacional» entrega algunos análisis tendientes a demostrar - con mayor claridad - las trizaduras de la fortaleza sudafricana y sostener la esperanza expuesta por un militante sudafricano del movimiento anti-apartheid durante una reciente visita a Europa: «Actualmente estamos en medio de una guerra civil, caracterizada por un gran desequilibrio, pero también de una gran claridad respecto a los frentes antagónicos. Esto me hace esperar que nuestro régimen no tendrá más de un año o dos de sobrevivencia».

El departamento de documentación de IDOC dispone de un amplio material relativo a los últimos quince años de lucha en Africa austral por la liberación y la construcción de una sociedad no racista.

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SOUTH AFRICA HAS COME

to the attention of the whole world. This new attention has been paid for by blood and many human lives. Day by day, the TV news in the world show funeral celebrations, brutal detentions, batonswinging policemen, hippos (armoured cars) full of gunmen, every once in a while the immobile face of Botha promising to be determined to keep law and order of racism and apartheid.

This fall 1985 shows that Botha's policy of appeasement and peaceful neighbourhood in Southern Africa was vicious empty talk. In September 1985, South Africa recognises officially to have penetrated again into Angola and keep great parts of the south occupied militarily, and Defense Minister General Malan tells the world officially that South Africa supports UNITA, tha anti-government guerrilla in Angola.

The South African caretaker government in Namibia has been imposed on the population at gun point by the occupation forces. No other state in the world is waging wars simultanously against so many neighbouring states as is South Africa.

The internal situation is like a civil war, although with unequal frontes: the huge military and police machine on the side of the regime, bare fists, stones, songs and marches on the side of the oppressed.

But the position of the regime has hardly ever been more menaced than in these days. The cruelty and brutality of the security forces during the last months was a sign of dear and weakness on the side of the government.

More than thousand of arbitrary detentions, the indiscriminate shooting and killing show the bankruptcy of the reform policy.

The economic situation of the country has not been so bad for a decade: the gold price at its lowest level, the Rand on its lowest value ever compared to the Dollar (US$ 0.38), inflation around 15%, unemployment to reach 2,4 million by 1986, that is almost one tenth of the total population, the black labour force, organised better than ever before, in constant agitation, the strike of the National Union of Mineworkers in August was only a test. In November, the foundation of a great Trade Union Federation will unite about 400.000 black mine workers. The official talks of South African businessmen with representatives of the ANC in Botswana, severely condemned by Prime Minister Botha, were a clear signal: the economic reality is totally out of the control of the government, which despite all its talking about reforms, has no understanding whatsoever for the demands of the modern economy, trying instead of imposing on the economy obscure priorities dictated by ideologies.

The international business community, on the other hand, begins to see clearer. The Wall Street Journal (11-3-1985) speaks about US business getting afraid and nervous about South Africa's investment climate, there is a loss on the international stock market regarding shares in corporations operating in South Africa, with particular regard to gold mines (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - F.A.Z. 25-7-1985). No doubt, after the 1985 unrests and state of emergency, the investment climate has cooled down to its 1976 level in the Soweto aftermath. A heading in the business-oriented F.A.Z. from 23-7-1985 rings the message home: «The supreme police commander now second most powerful man: South Africa has become ungovernable».

The threat of selective sanctions are causing greatest concern to South African economists. The greatest blow to the regime would be a US ban on computer and high tech sales to South Africa. The racist police state has to rely ever more on a sophisticated computerised register for all civil and security purposes and on rapid information and communication systems.

And if President Reagan decides for a ban of Kruger Rand sales in the USA, this would affect 8% of South Africa's present gold export, a serious damage to the revenue of the South African state.

This issue of «IDOC internazionale» wants to present some basic studies which evidence more clearly the cracks in the South African fortress and justify the hope expressed by one South African anti-apartheid militant during her recent visit in Europe: «We are definitely in the middle of a civil war, on unequal terms, but with very clear fronts. And this gives me the hope that our regime has not much more than a year or two to survive».

The IDOC documentation department has rich material on the last fifteen years of the Southern African struggle for liberation and a non-racist society.

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Treason against apartheid

SOMMARIO

Il volumetto, qui quasi integralmente riprodotto e pubblicato dal Catholic Institute for International Relations di Londra, è una preziosa documentazione sul processo in corso in Sudafrica contro sedici dirigenti del Fronte Democratico Unito (UDF) accusati dal governo di alto tradimento per la loro campagna contro il regime dell'apartheid.

La prima parte descrive rapidamente il formarsi dell'UDF da formazioni politiche precedenti (1983). Nella seconda parte, gli eventi e le accuse che hanno portato alle imputazioni e agli arresti (1985). Nella terza parte (che segue in corsivo) rapide biografie degli imputati, in buona parte ecclesiastici.

RESUMEN

El volumen, casi enteramente reproducido en este número, fue publicado por el Catholic Institute for International Relations de Londres. Documenta acuciosamente el proceso que se está llevando a cabo en Sudáfrica contra dieciseís dirigentes del Frente Democrático Unido (FDU), acusados por el gobierno de alta traición, a raíz de su campaña contra el apartheid. La primera parte describe sucintamente como se formó el FDU a partir de agrupaciones políticas anteriores (1983). En su segunda parte describe los hechos y acusaciones que condujeron a las imputaciones y arrestos (1985). Finalmente presenta (en cursiva) una breve biografía de los acusados que son en su mayor parte eclesiásticos.

THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF)

On the 22 January 1983, at a Transvaal Anti SAIC Committee rally, Dr Allan Boesak, President of the World Reformed Alliance, called for a united front to fight against the government's proposals. He described P. W. Botha's plans as a sham that entrenched White domination. By now the Coloured Labour Party, led by Allan Hendrickse, had accepted the proposals. Dr Boesaks response was clear-sighted: «We must reject the proposals aimed at drawing in so-called Coloureds and Indians and alienating Blacks from the new system. We ought not to play around with the evil. The situation calls for vigilance.» The gathering decided to from a United Democratic Front to oppose the new constitution, and establish a steering committee. The conference also decided to dissolve the Transvaal Anti SAIC Committee, which had by then outlive its usefulness, and to revive the Transvaal Indian Congress, last active in the 1950s. The United Democratic Front had as its mandate the campaign against the new constitution and the Koornhof bills. On 18 May 1983 the Natal Region of the UDF was formed with the Pinetown lawyer Archie Gumede (one of the treason trialists) as President, Professor Jerry Coovadia as Chairman and Vigil Bohomme as Vice-Chairman. The formation of the Transvaal Region of the UDF followed immediately on 23 May with the election as President of Albertina Sisulu, famous campaigner for women's rights, leader of the Women's Federation, and wife of African National Congress leader Walter Sisulu. (Albertina Sisulu is also facing charges for treason.) Just a week before the national launch of the UDF on 20 August 1983, the security police began harassing UDF activists, confiscating thousands of pamphlets. Misleading pamphlets were substituted in their place, dubtless by security police, to confuse participants. But the upwelling of popular feeling was far too great to be deflected by police «dirty tricks». Huge nembers of people converged on Mitchell's Plain and the mood was euphoric. There were rapturous receptions for old campaigners like Helen Joseph, and the gathering captured a mood of hope and expectation missing from South Africa since the 1950s. One consequence was to establish Dr Boesak as a national leader. But, more important, it demonstrated the mass support for the UDF beyond doubt or question.

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The spectacular national launch of the UDF took place in a mass rally near Cape Town (where parliament was sitting to finalise the new constitution. International messages of support were received from the Irish Labour Party, the Norwegian, Council for Southern Africa, the Holland Committee for Southern Africa, SWAPO and a number of other organisations. But just as the UDF was gaining strength, so police harassment was becoming increasingly intense. The launch of the Border region of the UDF was banned by an East London magistrate on 25 September 1983 and on successive weekends. Early in October 1983 a meeting of the national secretariat was banned by the govenment. The national publicity secretary, Patrick Lekota, now in prison, remarked on the meeting, which was held despite the ban: «It was a succesful meeting, but even more significant, it went on without any threats to peace which the banning notice alleged would result from the meeting. «He identified the continued ban on UDF meetings as a crude attempt by the government to suppress any opposition to its proposals. In October 1983 the UDF won an appeal in the Supreme Court against a Wynberg magistrate who had banned its meeting. Patrick Lekota again commented: «Not a single meeting of the UDF had resulted in a fracas, yet meetings had been banned.» He warned that any attempt to ban further meetings would be met with further court applications.

A further peaceful attempt to halt the government's implementation of the new constitution was made by the UDF in a letter to the Prime Minister. The letter pointed out that the new constitution was being imposed without consultation with the people most intimately involved in its implementation. It also protested against the continual bannings of UDF meetings. The UDF's fight against the new constitution reached a climax in early 1984 when the million signature campaign against the new constitution was launched, with door-to-door canvassing against the elections to the proposed tricameral parliament. The resulting poll showed the success of the campaign: there was a dramatic boycott of the election by both the Coloured and the Indian communities. Of those eligible to vote, less than 18% of the former and 16% of the latter went to the polls.

The important point to note about the UDF as a mass national movement, therefore, is that is has, from the beginning, adopted peaceful means of protest. Hardly a single instance of violence from UDF supporters during the period leading up to the August election was substatiated. In contrast police made violent attacks on. UDF supporters during, and in the days leading up to, polling. But, because of the effectiveness of UDF campaigns, the government reacted with continual harassment, including the banning of the meetings, manipulation of state radio and television (SABC) for blatant propaganda against the UDF, and repeated attempts to sabotage UDF conventions.

The power of the UDF comes from the over 640 organisations and bodies affilated to it, from sports clubs to Muslim associations. it draws on support from the Major Churches, all of which, except the Dutch Reformed Church, opposed the new constitution. It has grassroots support throughout South Africa. Only in rural Natal, where Inkatha holds sway, can the UDF not hope for some interest and local support. it is organised regionally, with regional executives as well as a national one, and perhaps two million support it. Its democratic structure gives it an additional strength. Its affiliated organisations strive for a high level of participation, whether in women's, community, youth or worker organisations.

Two of the most important groups that joined the UDF were the Eastern Cape union, SAAWU, (South African Allied Workers Union), which had massive popular support in the East London/Mdantsane area, and the RMC (Release Mandela Campaign). The latter, organised regionally by 1984, as its name implies, seeks the release of Mandela, and provides a political cutting edge with its goal of a united South Africa led by a man seen by the majority of South Africans as their leader. But although some of the groups affiliated to the UDF have political goals, like the RMC, many are professional, business and interest groups.

On the eve of the elections to the Coloured chamber of the tricameral parliament, on 21 August 1984, the government detained all key members of the UDF under Section 28 of the Internal Security Act of 1982. This followed threats by the Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grange, that «any interference with the elections» would not be tolerated. The Natal Indian Congress noted that this was again a tactic to clamp down on organisations using peaceful means to bring about change. The NIC further added: «The detentions are part of sustained and escalating campaign against people opposed to the new constitution.» Other parts of the campaign against opponents of the constitution included the blatant misuse of the SABC and some elements of the press to suggest by innuendo that the UDF and its affiliates supported violence. A UDF demand was made that the state release the UDF leaders, that the Coloured Labour Party and the Indian National Peoples' Party withdraw from the elections, and that alla the countries that supported South Africa, notably the USA, change their attitudes.

The Progressive Federal Party (PFP) accurately predicted: «This shaking of the first is likely to be counterproductive. It is the democratic right of the people to protest peacefully.» Through its Minister of Law and Order, the government replied: «The reason why the government has acted yesterday to detain a number of poeple throughout the country is because a potentially revolutionary situation has been created in certain areas on the eve of the election for the new Coloured House of Representative.» The Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC) then issued a statement: «The Board felt deep dismay at the action taken by the government in detaining UDF leaders...the decision is an admission that the new constitution and elections are a poor substitute for genuine democratic evolution in South Africa. The detention of UDF leaders must be creating a deplorable impression on overseas opinion. South Africa continues to be its own worst propagandist. Despite such unfortunate setbacks, we continue to hope and pray that under God's guidance South Africa may yet embark on a path of recognition of human rights and participation of all in the processes of government.» However, Minister of Law and Order Louis Le Grange was unabashed and said he was satisfied that the police action against «potential agitators» during the week was essential and warned that further action would be taken by the police «if necessary.»

In early September 1984 the Natal detainees brought an action in the Supreme Court for their release. Justice Law granted their application, declaring the detention orders signed by Louis Le Grange invalid. The action against the Minister was brought by Edith Gumede, wife of UDF president Archie Gumede. Commenting on the favourable outcome of the application, the Natal Indian Congress said that the succes of the application showed that the Minister had used arbitrary and unlawful powers. In reply Minister Louis Le Grange's press officer announced that the Minister would effectively close the door for the release of other detainees by issuing a fresh order. Only hours after the court had ordered the release of the UDF leaders, the Minister issued new orders fo their detention. Meanwhile a bid was

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made in the Supreme Court of the Transvaal to secure the release of eight UDF leadrs detained in the province. Justice Nestadt ruled in favour of the state.

By 10 September 1984 the Natal police were already on the hunt for the seven leaders previously freed by Supreme Court Order, with a veiw to redetaining them. According to Professor John Dugard, Director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of Witwatersrand, Mr Le Grange had abused his powers by signing the new detention orders. Helen Suzman, PFP Member of Parliament for Houghton, accused Le Grange of defying the laws it was his duty to uphold. «If the Minister is not prepared to obey the law, why should anyone elese obey any laws? The very man who has been put in charge of the job of law and order is himself defying the law.» Mr Le Grange's action in seeding to redetain released people had removed the scant protection given to detainees by the Rabie Commission of Inquiry into Security Legislation.

Legal experts describe key provisions of the Internal Security Act, under which the UDF detainees were held, as «banning orders without restriction on mobilily.» Section 28 of the Act provides that all people detained under this section are automatically added to the consolidated list of restricted persons who cannot be quoted in the media. Section 22 of the Act gives the Minister the power to prohibit alla persons whose names appear on the consolidated list from:

- being or becoming office bearers, officers or memebers;
- making or receiving contributions of any kind for direct or indirect benefit;
- in any manner taking part in any activity of any particular organisation or organisations of a nature, class or kind specified in such Notice except by written consent of the Minister.

In what was popularly termed a «Decree of Silence» the Minister banned UDF meetings in a large number of areas in the country until the end of September 1984. The ban included all meetings «which discuss any government or any actions of the government.» Exempt from this order were meetings held by the political parties as defined in the Electoral Act of 1979 or a meeting of local authorities as defined in the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982.

THE BRITISH CONSULATE SIT—IN

On 13 September 1984, six of the UDF former detainees who were being sought by the police arrived at the British Consulate office in Durban, asking for Mrs Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minsiter, to intervene on their behalf with the South African government. The men sent Minister Le Grange an open letter in which they informed him that they were prepared to discuss their release, and pointing out that they had committed no offence. Meanwhile the British government demanded that the six leaders leave the consulate. A terse reply came from the Natal Indian Congress: «Here is a government which talks of democracy and condemns detention without trial. And when a request of this nature is made it refuses to act.»

Meanwhile international reaction critical of the redetention orders flowed fast into the country. The European Economic Community expressed their deep concern at the government's decision to overrule the Supreme Court judgement and a letter of protest to this effect was sent to Foreign Minister Pik Botha by the French Ambassador to South Africa. The United States Congress Foreign Relations Committee condemned the arbitrary arrests and detentions of political opponents of the South African government and urged their release. The US Congressional Committee also expressed dismay at South Africa's decision to defy and bypass legal rulings of its own High Courts in order to suppress lawful political opposition. «The South African government should immediately terminate its practices of arbitrary arrest and detention and should release those men and women who have been arbitrarily imprisoned for having expressed publicly and peacefully their political preferences», it said.

The British Labour Party intervened by urging the British government to accede to the request of the six UDF leaders for protection and mediation. Neil Kinnock, leader of the British Labour Party, wrote to Margaret Thatcher: «I urge you to ensure that the government responds positively to this by communicating urgently with the South African Government and by instructing the British Consul to provide protection until a satisfactory reply is received. There can be no doubt that, if denied the protection and assistance of her Majesty's Government, they will be rearrested and detained without trial for an indefinite period. I am certain that you would not wish to be directly or indirectly responsible for the renewed detention without trial of people whose only crime is to seek basic freedoms for their people.» At the same time interventions from the Catholic Church resulted in a letter from Cardinal Hume to the British Foreign Secretary with a similar plea. The Cardinal had seen the Natal Indian Congress lawyer Mr Zac Yacoub during his visit to England on the six's behalf. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office had been notably unwilling to grant and interview at a high level.

On 17 September 1984 the six filed a Supreme Court action against Le Grange's detention orders, asking the court to declare them invalid. Archbishop Denis Hurley of Durban, president of the SACBC, in an affidavit supporting this application, stated: «No reasonable person could have concluded that the six men were attempting to create a revolutionary situation or endangering the maintenance of law and order. I attended a number of their meetings and read various literature which was generated in Durban by the Natal Indian Congress and certain other bodies with which it worked. I saw constant emphasis on the impracticability and danger of the new constitution; in particular I was struck by the repeated warnings that the new constitution was dangerous because it alienated the majority of the population from the State and carried the risk of violence and breakdown of law and order. I have not the slightest doubt that the persons who advocated this view were sincerely concerned about what they perceived to be the undesirable consequences of the new constitution.»

The application was heard on 21 September 1984 and counsel for the six leaders submitted that the detention orders be declared invalid on several grounds: the Minister had given no reason for his view that the disclosure of further information about the reason for his decision would not be in the public interest; so he had failed to put the Court in a position to assess whether he had good grounds for his decision. The lawyer concluded: «No reasonable person, honestly and properly applying his mind to the facts disclosed in the Minister's statements, could have concluded that he was satisfied that the men were endangering law and order.»

On 29 September 1984 the lawyers for the six sent a telex to Minister Louis Le Grange challenging him to arrest the men if they had committed any offence. «Our clients categorically deny all the allegations made in your notice. They state that they have been engaged in lawful activity in the best traditions of democracy. If you dispute this, the onus rests on you to furnish concrete proof

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and reasons so that our clients can make more substantial representation. You will appreciate that without such information and reasons there can be no basis for any representations. We would therefore urge you to furnish such reasons and information urgently.» Shortly afterwards, three of the six, M.J. Naidoo, G. Sewpersadh and M. Ramgobin, left the consulate and were arrested.

Finally, on 8 October 1984, the full bench of the Supreme Court, consisting of Judges Van Heerden, Kriek and Broome, rejected the application by the six to have their redention orders set aside. Van Heerden's judgement in part read: «The Minister was fully entitled, in the exercise of his discretion, to regard what he considered to be an attempt to create a revolutionary climate in South Africa as endangering the maintenance of law and order.» The six responded through their spokesman Paul David that the judgement had not come as a surprise to them and that they would fight it in the Appeal Court. Paul David said he believed the Minister of Law and Order was still obliged to provide them with full information about the reasons for the detention orders. «We conducted a peaceful public campaign against the constitution. Rendering the constitution a shambles is not an offence.»

Professor A.S. Matthews of the Faculty of Law at the University of Natal, Durban, had this to say about «the creation of a revolutionary climate»: «A revolutionary climate is a nebulous phenomenon which is nowhere referred to in the Internal Security Act. That Act requires that the detainee be a threat to security or law and order, not that a «climate» which he allegedly created be the cause of the alleged breakdown in law and order. Arguably the government itself has created a revolutionary climate by its various actions over the years and the Minister's «reasons» might well justify and order for his own detention, or that of his colleagues.

On 18 October 1984 Archie Gumede, Billy Nair and Paul David set out conditions for leaving the consulate. They wanted: all Section 28 notices under the Internal Security Act withdrawn; Mr Le Grange to remove all the names placed on the consolidated list in terms of Section 16 of the Internal Security Act to agree not to invoke Section 34 of the Internal Security Act to ban attorneys from practising and to give full and proper reasons why he wanted the three and their colleagues to be banned. They wanted the government to guarantee in addition that they would receive passports and be allowed to go to the United Nations in New York to appear before the Special Committee on Apartheid.

On 13 December 1984 Billy Nair, Paul David and Archie Gumede left the British consulate. Archie Gumede and Paul David were immediately arrested. Billy Nair, who had spent the last few years on Robben Island, and could not plausibly be accused of «crimes» against the state, went free. From the first day, when the British consul had exerted considerable pressure to get them to leave — pressure which was to continue intermittently to the day of their departure — the role of the British authorities has been less than glorious.

THE 1985 ARRESTS

In February 1985 a fresh wave of detentions started which included Albertina Sisulu, UDF president, Cassim Saloojee, National Treasurer of the UDF, Frank Chikane, Transvaal Vice President of the UDF, Curtis Nkondo, Aubrey Mokoena and prof Ismail Mohamed. Sisa Njikelana, Sam Kikine and Esaac Ncgobo form SAAWU were also detained. On 21 February 1985 they all appeared briefly before the Regional Magistrate in Durban. Thozamile Gqweta was also arrested later in the week, bringing the group charged with treason to sixteen.

In March 1985 Attorney-General Michael Imber announced that he had decided to prohibit the Court from granting the sixteen accused bail in terms of Section 30 of the Intenal Security Act. The United Democratic Front responded by announcing that it would ask for increased foreign pressure on the government. In a statement the UDF accused the government of achieving the same effect as detention without trial by refusing bail, delaying the appearance of charge sheets, and dragging out the start of the trial. In doing this the government had unjustly deprived the accused of freedom and hampered the work of democratic organisations. The UDF's response was echoed by that of the administrative board of the SACBC, which described the process as using Justice to perpetuate injustice.

Their trial, like that of the eight previously arrested on the same charge, is likely to be a protracted one, which means that whether innocent or guilty the are effectively removed from active life and involvement for a lengthy period. Is this a repetition of the tactics of 1956 and 1961 when 156 persons were arraigned for treason and none found guilty? I this turns out to be the case, and there is the strongest expectation that is will, the South African government will have proved itself guilty of using the process of justice to perpetuate injustice. Talk or reform has little meaning when brave men and women are prevented in this way from striving for freedom. The crime attributed to them becomes the crime of all who share their hopes and endeavours.»

Arguing in Durban for the granting of bail, the defence lawyers made the following points. Firstly, all the accused were South African citizens, and, if granted bail, they would be willing to report twice daily to the South African police and also to surrender their passports. They agreed that the accused would be liable to have their bail cancelled if they infringed any of the bail conditions set out by the Court. They would not interfere with state witnesses. Until their guilt was proved they were entitled to their liberties, and, as no charge sheet had even been put to them, they ought not be punished before they were convicted. Bail was refused in the Durban Magistrate's Court on the basis of a certificate issued by the Attroney-General.

By now the treason trialists were feeling severe financial strain, particularly those who had been in prison over six months, as most of them were self-employed professional people. The UDF President, Archie Gumede, had had his business in Pinetown closed and so had his fellow detainees M.J. Naidoo, also a legal practitioner, and Essop Jassat, a doctor. The date for the commencement of the trial was set for 20 May 1985 with the accused remanded in custody until that day. Mr Mahommed, counsel for the UDF leaders, argued that the Court was the proper place to decide on the issue of bail, not the office of the Attorney-General. He further argued that the Attorney-General's certificates prohibiting the Court from granting bail were vague in the extreme.

On 9 April 1985 an appeal to the Natal Supreme Court was made against the Attorney-General's refusal of bail. The appeal was made on grounds that the Durban Magistrate, Mr X. Odendaal, had erred in finding that the certificates issued by the Attorney-General were valid and constituted a lawful bar against the Court granting the UDF sixteen bail. Justice Friedman of the Natal Supreme Court commented that if bail was not granted the appellants faced the prospect of several years in custody before the conclusion of their trial. He further pointed out that there was no doubt that Section 30 of the Internal Security Act made severe inroads into the liberty of an individual. All possible solutions should have been canvassed when dealing with a subject as important as the liberty of an

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individual who faced the prospect of awaiting trial for one or two years.
By the time the hearing was resumed on 11 April, it was apparent that the bail issue had become almost a pre-trial test of strength between the executive and the judiciary. The South African bar association and a number of distinguished lawyers had expressed grave disquiet at the action of the Attorney-General. Their position was strengthened by an international campaign for the UDF sixteen that brought together antiapartheid groups around the world, NGOs and governments. The bishops of England and Wales in a statement made at their Low Weed Meeting specifically called for the sixteen to be released on bail and called for international standards to be observed by the South African judiciary. The apparent destruction of the relative independence of the judiciary was likely to have serious repercussions in the USA, where the disinvestment lobby was making startling and rapid gains. The defence lawyers were thus able to speak with the international community as audience. Mr Mahommed's argument was that the Attorney-General had not applied his mind properly in the exercise of his discretion and that the Court was entitled to interfere with his decision. Within two weeks, two other leading members of the UDF national executive, Popo Molefe and Patrick Lekota, were arreste, with Moss Chikane, and subsequently charged with treason, terrorism and alternative charges of murder in Pretoria magistrate's court. UDF offices were repeatedly raided by security police looking for «evidence». The bail decision was referred back and forth between the Supreme Court and Durban Magistrate's Court. The state was obviously in trouble.

Bail was finally granted for the UDF sixteen under stringent conditions by the Natal Supreme Court on 3 May, overturning the Attorney-General's ruling, barely three weeks before the trial was due to begin. It was and historic decision in a trial for high treason, and reflected both the continuing — relative — independence of the South African judiciary and the pressure of international opinion. The sixteen had to report twice daily to the police, were confined to their home from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. and were not allowed to participate in any meetings of their respective organisations. They appeared in court on 20 May, when the case was adjourned to 11 July.

Biographies of the accused

FRANK CHIKANE

Rev. Frank Chikane was born in Johannesburg in 1951 and was ordained a pastor of the Apostolic Faith Mission in Krugersdorp, during the most volatile period of South Africa's political history. Responding to the situation around him, he was first detained in January 1977 and has been detained and tortured on a number of subsequent occasions. From November 1981 until July 1982 he was detained and kept in solitary confinement. As a result of his work for social justice, he was increasingly at loggerheads with his mission Church and now works as a pastor in Soweto for the independent Apostolic Faith Church.
He is active in Soweto community life as deputy president of the Soweto Civic Association and was a past vice-president of the Transvaal region of the UDF. Since 1982 he has been working as the general secretary of the Institute of Contextual Theology in Johannesburg, an institue which attempts to develop a theology relevant to the context of South Africa. This has involved him in writing theology with young blacks and meeting with a range of community organisations and independent «Spirit» churches in Soweto.
Married with two sons, Aluta and Otlile, Rev. Chikane was arrested on 19 February 1985 and his house was petrol-bombed shortly after he was released on bail in May. He has become one of South Africa's most respected Christian leaders.

PAUL DAVID

Paul David was born in Pietermaritzburg in 1940 and is a lawyer by profession, practising at Verulam, near Durban. In 1959 he became the secretary of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and has been an active member for the past fourteen years. In 1970 his home was raided and searched, and in 1976 he was interrogated in his office. In June 1980 he was detained for seven weeks during a period of school boycotts.
A member of the UDF since 1983, and of the Release Mandela Campaign since 1980, he was on the list of those to be arrested when security police swooped on opponents of the new constitution in August 1984. He joined the other UDF leaders in the British Consulate in Durban and was arrested on leaving it.
Married with three girls, Jolene, 15, Jazmin, 13, and Lisa, 11, he has been active in local community organisations: the Stanger Ratepayers Association, Verulam Civic Association, Verulam Housing Action Committee and the Durban Housing Action Committee. He has been equally involved in the struggle for non-racial sport, and is well known as a sportsman. The list of his sports commitments includes: Silvan's Football Club, Southern Natal Soccer Board, South African Soccer Federation, Natal Cricket Board, Lower Tugela Football Association, Natal Council of Sport (President), South African Council of Sport (Delegate), Verulam Football Association (Patron), Verulam Sports Ground Association and the Stanger Recreation Ground Association.

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THOZAMILE GQWETA

Thozamile Gqweta was born in East London in January 1952 and took up employment as a furniture salesman. Many of his customers were black workers in the East London area and he became aware of arbitrary dismissals and the range of problems facing non-unionised labour. In 1978 he joined the Black Allied Workers Union (BAWU), which broke away from its mother body in 1979 to follow a policy of non-racial unionism as the South African Allied Workers Union, SAAWU.

His work for SAAWU resulted in a string of detentions, torture and suffering at the hands of the security police. In April 1980, he was first detained by Ciskei police for a month, appeared in court, but was never charged. In August 1980 he was held for two weeks by the South African police, appeared in court, and charges were again dropped. In November 1980 the Ciskei police detained him again and released him after he had gone on hunger strike. He was detained by the SAP for three months in 1981, released and redetained. During this latter detention, in a three month period from December 1981, his girlfriend and mother of his child was shot dead by the Ciskei authorities, and his mother and grandfather were burned to death in a mysterious fire at their home. He was admitted to hospital from detention suffering from deep depression and severe disorientation. In May 1982 he was detained by the SAP and released only in November of that year, and again detained for two weeks by the Ciskei police in March 1983. After this he went temporarily into hiding.

In February, he was allegedly detained by the Ciskei security police and then «handed over» to the SAP to stand trial for high treason. Once a secretary to the non-racial Mdantsane Rugby Union from 1977 to 1979, Thozamile Gqweta has suffered from the most brutal psychological pressure perhaps ever before visited on any South African. He has withstood it and now has been released on bail. He is a member of the UDF's national executive committee and works for SAAWU full-time.

ARCHIE GUMEDE

Archie Jacob Gumede was born in New Scotland, Pietermaritzburg, in Natal in March 1914. He went to the famous Lovedale College in Alice and finally matriculated at the South African Native College. With a father who was president of the African National Congress, travelling extensively, he was unable to finance the medical studies that he wanted to pursue. He enrolled for an attorney's admission diploma at the University of South Africa, and started his legal practice in the early 1960s as an attorney and conveyancer. He was a member of the Democratic Lawyers' Association in Durban and was elected its president in 1979. During the British Consulate sit-in in 1984 he was made an honorary vice-president of the International Democratic Lawyers' Association. His practice finally collapsed in March 1985 as a result of prolonged periods in prison.

While still in Pietermaritzburg he was a deacon in the Presbyterian Church but later joined the United Congregational Church of South Africa (UCCSA) when he moved to his present home in Clermont in the early 1970s. As a congregationalist he has been appointed preacher and then deacon. He was the UCCSA representative on the board of the Durban ecumenical centre, Diakonia, until the time of his recent arrest. As a Clermont resident, he has played a leading role in community politics as an executive member of the Isolumuzi Clermont Residents' Association and the Joint Commuters' Committee that was formed during the bus boycott waged in Clermont, Lamontville, Chesterville and St. Wendolins around Durban in December 1982. The boycott has continued in lamontville until 1985.

Born into one of South Africa's famous political families, in 1944 Archie Gumede joined the ANC Youth League and was involved in the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s. As a result he was one of the 156 charged in the marathon treason trial that lasted from 1956 to 1961. While out on bail in 1960, he was detained for five months and was arrested for 120 days in the 1963 State of Emergency. After his release he continued to play an important supportive role in democratic politics. At the age of seventy, he was arrested on 28 August 1984 and later sought refuge in the British Consulate in Durban. He was charged with high treason in March 1985.

The current attempt to curb his political work stems probably from 1980 when he was a key member in the formation of the Release Mandela Committee. At the same time, he was a central figure in the anti-election campaign conducted by the Anti SAIC committee. He was a founding member of the United Democratic Front and was elected president of the Natal region of the UDF. Subsequently, he was made a national president. Married with five sons, two daughters and two grandchildren, Archie Gumede, son of James Gumede, represents a generation of struggle against apartheid. As president of the Release Mandela Campaign and one of the three National Co-presidents of the UDF, he has been accorded the highest offices in black democratic organisations in South Africa, and remains at 71 years old a revered and respected nationalist leader.

SAM KIKINE

Samuel Bhekuyise Kikine was born in august 1948 and is married with three children, two of them adopted. He was formerly Natal branch General Secretary of the South African Allied Workers Union, SAAWU, but was suspended from SAAWU in April 1984 by the SAAWU national executive as the result of an unresolved leadership dispute. Like many SAAWU unionists, he has been detained frequently in the last ten years. In November 1981 he was detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act and brought to court eight months later. After thirty minutes of court hearing, the charges against him were dropped. During this prolonged period of detention he was hospitalised for psychiatric care, as a result of the treatment he had suffered. On leaving court he was immediately redetained and, only a month later were charges finally dropped.

On 21 August 1984 he was detained under Section 28 of the Internal Security Act, but on 7 September the notice was set aside by the Natal provincial division of the supreme Court of South Africa. On his release on a technicality, he went into hiding for a period to avoid redetention. He was arrested again on 19 February 1985 during nationwide swoops and was charged with high treason. Like the other treason trialists, he was released on bail again in May.

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ESSOP JASSAT

Essop Essak Jassat was born in October 1932 in Vrededorp, Johannesburg. He completed his matriculation at the Johannesburg Indian High School in 1951 and gained a B.Sc. in zoology and botany at the University of Witwatersrand in 1954. From 1949 until 1960, he was a member of the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress, in the last five years its chairman. In 1960, he qualified from Wits. as a doctor and began an internship at Baragwanath Hospital in late 1961. From 1955 to 1960 he was on the executive of the Transvaal Indian Congress, and in 1959 represented Wits. at the National Union of South African Students Congress (NUSAS). At the same time he was chairman of the Students Liberal Association at the Medical School, a member of the student Representative Council and of the Student Medical Council.

His political and medical internship led him in early 1962 to start up in private practice in Bree Street, Fordsburg, and, in 1964 to detention in Marshall Square under the 90-Day Act. From 1964-1969 he was banned, resulting in the shutting of his part-time practice in Germiston and Muldersdrift that could not be reached under a magisterial order limiting him to the Johannesburg magisterial district. After forgetting to report to the police in 1965, and losing an appeal in the appellate division of the Supreme Court, he was jailed in 1965 for ten days. He was banned again from 1969 to 1974.

After 1974, Essop Jassat was able to participate more fully in medical work as a member of the Wits. Clinical Study Group and as an executive member of the General Practitioners' Group of the College of Medicine of South Africa. At the same time, he joined the Johannesburg Indian Social Welfare Association (JISWA), becoming chairman of its board of management in 1980. From 1976, he was chairman and trustee of the Wits. Education Committee and Unviersity Bursary Committee, providing scholarships for African students.

In June 1981, he was elected chairman of the Anti SAIC committee in the Transvaal. A year later he became a member of the board of management of the Central Islamic Trust, a Muslim welfare and religious body in the Transvaal. His standing as a Muslim in the Transvaal Indian community led to his being elected president of the Transvaal Indian Congress, TIC, when it was resuscitated in May 1983. He was elected patron of the UDF at its August 1983 launch. In December 1983 he addressed the first congress of the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA) of which he is an executive member.

Married to Shireen Patel, he has three children, a son, Aadil aged 19, a daughter Yamna aged 12, and a daughter named Zaheera aged 11. He was arrested on 21 August 1984 under Section 28 of the Internal Security Act. After being charged with treason, he was transferred to Durban Central Prison and released on bail in May 1985.

ISMAIL MOHAMED

Ismail Jacobus Mohamed was born in June 1930 in Barkly East in the Cape Province. He matriculated at the Eurafrican Training School in 1949 and majored at the University of Witwatersrand in mathematics and physics. He was awarded a doctorate in algebra from the University of London in 1960 after getting an M.Sc. in group theory from Wits. From 1959 to 1960 he was an assistant lecturer at the University of Wales, and at Queen Mary College of the University of London from 1960 to 1961. He is today an associate professor of mathematics at the Unviersity of Witwatersrand, having lectured from 1964 to 1976 at Birkbeck College, University of London.

An internationally known teacher of mathematics, Professor Mohamed has published in a number of learned journals on topics of group theory and algebra. On returning to South Africa, he quickly became involved in community organisations. From 1979 to 1981 he was a chairman of the Dorcas Creche in the western township of Johannesburg and a member of a Johannesburg Child Welfare project in 1984-1985. He has retained his membership of the London and American Mathematical Societies.

Shortly after his return to South Africa, he was detained in the wake of the 1976 uprisings, from September to December 1976. He became chairman of the Transvaal ad hoc *anti-President's Council Committee in 1983 and chaired the committee from that date. When the Transvaal Indian Congress was re-formed in 1983 to combat the new constitution, he became a member of its council. In 1981 he was active in the anti-Republic Day Campaign.*

His family have also had their fair share of security police attention. In 1980 his daughter was briefly detained for questioning by Johannesburg security police in the infamous John Vorster Square station, during the period of school boycotts. His son Andrew fled South Africa as a result of repeated security police harassment and threats made to his sister. His eldest daughter, Elaine, was detained incommunicado from August to November 1981 and then remended in custody for trial in 1982 accused of producing illegal posters. In March 1982 she was sentenced to ten days in prison for the offence. His wife was also briefly detained for questioning. Following his daughter's detention, Professor Mohamed became a leading member of the Detainees' Parents Support Committee, formed in 1981 by parents and friends of detainees drawn from alla South Africa's communities. The DPSC has since its inception acted as a voluntary human rights commission monitoring detentions and pressing for more humane treatment of detainees.

On 19 February 1985, Professor Mohamed's house was raided and he was arrested on a charge of treason. At the time, he was on the executive committee of the Transvaal region UDF. In March, while in prison, he was elected vice-president of the Transvaal region UDF. After major heart surgery in 1983, there is some concern for his health during a prolonged trial. He was released on bail in May.

ISAAC NGCOBO

Isaac Duze Ngcobo was born in 1947 in Inanda and is married with three girls and two boys aged between 15 months and 15 years. He worked in the Durban branch of the South African Allied Workers Union, SAAWU from which he was suspended in April 1984 as a result of a leadership dispute involving Sam Kikine. He was detained in Durban in January 1982 and again in August 1984 as a result of his union activities. On 19 February 1985 he was arrested and charged with treason, the fourth SAAWU unionist in the treason trial.

M.J. NAIDOO

Mooroogiah Jayarajapathy Naidoo was born in Mount Edgecomb, Natal, in 1931 and matriculated from Sastri College in Durban. After studying at the University of Natal, he became a lawyer and practises today as an attorney in Durban. He is a member of the Democratic Lawyers Association. After joining the Natal Indian Congress in 1955 he was active in the Student Representative Council at the University of Natal, and was its

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president in 1956-57. From 1973 to 1978, he was president of the NIC and since then vice-president. His first major detention was during the 1980 school boycotts when he was chairman of the Anti SAIC committee. In 1981 he was chairman of the anti-Republic Day Campaign. He was banned in 1982 and arrested in a demonstration outside City Hall in Durban in 1983.
He has had wide community interests. He was president of the La Mercy Ratepayers Association, vice-president of the Tongaat Civic Association, and has served on the Durban Housing Action Committee, Support Housing Action Committee, Natal Commuters Association and he is a trustee of the Gandhi Memorial Trust. He is married with two boys and two girls, Ravi, 14, Melanie, 17, Kamille, 21 and Jay, 25, and two grandchildren. He was detained on 21 August 1984 and joined the sit-in in the British Consulate, Durban. Arrested on leaving, he was released on bail in May pending trial for high treason.

AUBREY MOKOENA

Aubrey Dundubela Mokoena was born in 1948 in Johannesburg. He first became active politically in the student representative council at Turfloop University where he was one of the co-founders of the South african Students' Organisation (SASO). Expelled from Turfloop in 1972 as a resul of his work in the black consciousness organisation, he obtained a B.A. from the University of South Africa in 1975. From January 1974 untill October 1977 he was project director for Black Community Programmes for the Transvaal Province. An adult education programme begun by him in 1974 in Soweto that gathered some 2,000 adults was stopped by the government. The programmes aimed to foster a spirit of self-reliance amongst balcks and set up home industries. After the 1976 upheavals, he continued this project work by setting up mobile health clinics in Soweto and the sprawling shanty town region of Winterveldt north of Pretoria, and became secretary to the Black Parents' Association.
His detentions began in November 1974 after a pro-FRELIMO rally organised by SASO and the Black Peoples Convention. He was released in June 1985. In the wake of the 1976 uprisings, he was also detained for eight months in solitary confinement, and was held for over a year in 1977 after the 19 October arrests. When he was released in November 1978 he was banned until June 1983. During this period he gained a higher education diploma from the University of South Africa in 1978 and a B.A. degree in education in 1982. He currently pursuing a management development programme run by the University. In 1982 he set up a Community Development Agency called Human Resources Development Programmes which is planning to set up a clinic in Winterveldt, and he has set up a mobile laboratory for schools in Soweto which lack these facilities. After employment for four years as a teacher in a government school, he was sacked for his political views and he is now a marketing director of DTZ Construction Company, a building contractor putting up housing in Soweto. He is a trustee of his local church, the African Methodist Episcopal Church (Africa), where he is choirmaster, and he is also trustee of the African Independent Church Association. A resident of Orlando East, he is married with a 5 1/2 year old son.
His present positions that have drawn on him state repression are Publicity Secretary of the Transvaal branch of the Release Mandela Committee, and a member of the national executive or the UDF. He was detained from 21 August 1984 under Section 28 of the Internal Security Act and charged while in detention on 10 December with treason.
Aubrey Mokoena was released in May 1985 and shortly afterwards his house was petrol bombed. His political career, spanning the rise of the black consciousness movement in the 1970s, has been typical of the generation of democrats who followed the generation of Archie Gumede.

SISA NJIKELANA

Sisa Njikelana was born in August 1955 in Kieskamma Hoek in the Ciskei. He is general secretary of the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) based in East London. He joined SAAWU in 1979 whilst working for the Tek Corporation, formerly known as SATV Manufacturing Company, and was fired in July 1980 for recruiting union members. He rose quickly within SAAWU from chairman of a workers committee to East London branche chairman and, in 1981, national vice-president. A full-time union official since 1980, he was elected general secretary of the union in 1984.
SAAWU union work has brought him at least seven major periods of detention since 1980, four times by South African police and three times by Ciskei police. On the eve of «Ciskei independence» he was detained for 39 days in late 1980, then in late 1981 for five months during a country-wide clamp-down. He was charged with treason in 1982 though charges were later dropped, then detained during the Ciskei bus boycotto fro three months. Suffering ill-treatment at the hands of both police forces, he was held in solitry confinement from December 1981 until May 1982.
Sisa Njikelana is single and lives in Mdantsane when he is not travelling for SAAWU. Respected by union leaders from a range of unions, he was arrested and charged with high treason in the national swoop on 19 February 1985.

CURTIS NKONDO

Curtis Nkondo was born in Johannesburg in January 1928. He began teaching as a history and geography master in Pimville High School in 1953, and went on to Orlando High School in Soweto where he taught matriculation candidates in English, drama and poetry. In 1975 he was appointed head of the Lamula Secondary School at Meadowlands, where he had a running battle with the school inspectors because of his refusal to use Afrikaans as the medium of instruction. In September 1977, as a result of leading a campaign against Afrikaans and bringing high school teachers to resign, he was suspended from teaching and barred from entering any school premises under the Bantu Education Department. He was elected chairman of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee that spearheaded action against Bantu education.

As part of the swoop against black consciousness groups, he was arrested on 19 October 1977 and detained for seven and a half months at Modderbee Prison under the then Section 10 of the Internal Security Act. Two days after being released, he was re-arrested, detained at Ermelo police station under Section 6 or the Terrorism Act and held in solitary confinement for about four months. On being released, he was elected president of the Azanian Peoples' Organisation (AZAPO), but left in 1980 after disagreeing with AZAPO policies on grounds of non-racialism. He was made an honorary vice-president of the «white» National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) that year. In April 1980, he was detained at Mondeor police station under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, tortured and released after a month, whereupon he was served with a three-year banning order. In this period he played a part in forming the Congress

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of South African Students (COSAS), the Azanian Students Organization (AZASO) and the Soweto Youth Congress (SOYCO) together with some of the Vaal civic associations. From the begining of the Release Mandela Campaign in 1980, Curtis Nkondo became an active member, speaking for NUSAS on its behalf in English-speaking universities.
He is now chairman of the Transvaal region. Active in the school boycotts, he was later appointed president of the National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA). In May 1983, he was elected a vice-president of the Transvaal region of the UDF. He was detained in Johannesburg prison under Section 28 of the Internal Security Act on 21 August 1984 and was transferred to the central prison in Durban on 10 December 1984 after being charged with treason. A Roman Catholic, he is married with three sons and one daughter, living in Kliptown. Between 1975-1979 he was secretary of the famous Orlando Pirates Football Club.

«MEWA RAMGOBIN»

Melalall Ramgobin was born in Inanda, Natal, in November 1932 and studied at the universities of Natal and South Africa. He has a degree in political science and works as an insurance broker and insurance consultant. In 1971 he was the chairman of the ad-hoc committee for the revival of the Natal Indian Congress, and has since been co-opted onto the executive committee of NIC. In consequence he has suffered two periods of bannings, 1965-1970 and, with house arrest, 1971-1983. He was arrested in November 1983 during a demonstration at City Hall, Durban.
His political work has been extensive. In 1970, he established the Committee for Clemency for Political Prisoners and became its chairman, and in 1981, on the 10th anniversary of the Republic of South Africa, he launched a campaign against the Republic Day celebrations that proved nationally effective and mobilised many groups. He is both on the executive committee of the Natal region of the Release Mandela Campaign and a national co-treasurer of the UDF.
His wife is Ela Ramgobin, a grand-daughter of Mahatma Gandhi, and he has two boys and two girls aged between 14 and 22. In 1973 two of them were injured by a parcel bomb sent to him. His links with the Gandhi tradition are also shown in his commitment to the Phoenix Settlement founded by Mahatma Gandhi, of which he is a trustee and organising secretary; he is also secretary to the Mahatma Gandhi Clinic Committee.
After being freed from detention in September 1984, «Mewa» Ramgobin took refuge in the British Consulate in Durban. He was arrested on leaving and released on bail in May 1985 to await trial for high treason.

CASSIM SALOOJEE

Cassim Saloojee was born in 1936 and is married with two children. A director of the Johannesburg Indian and Social Welfare Association, JISWA, he is one of the few members of the treason trial without previous experience of detention or imprisonment. He is publicity secretary of the Transvaal Indian Congress, TIC, which he joined in May 1983. He is also one of the two co-treasurers of the national executive committee of the UDF, a role which doubtless accounts for his detention on 19 February 1985 and subsequent charging with high treason. He has been in charge of fund-raising and disbursement of funds for the UDF since 1983. His wife Khatidja is active in TIC; their son Riaz left the country in 1981.

«GEORGE» SEWPERSADH

Born in October 1936, Chanderdeo Sewpersadh grew up in Durban where he gained a B.A. and LL.B. at the University of Natal. He joined the Natal Indial Congress (NIC) in 1956 and has been its president since it was revived in 1971. He was first detained in 1965, and again in 1980 during school boycotts for period of seven weeks. He also suffered two periods of banning, 1973-1978 and 1981-1983, the latter resulting in partial house arrest.
He joined the Release Mandela Committee in 1980 and was active in the Anti SAIC committee. In 1983 he was arrested at a demonstration at Durban City Hall and he was detained again before entering the British Consulate, from where he returned to prison to await trial for high treason. A lawyer, with a practice at Verulam near Durban, he was elected vice-president of the natal region of the UDF.
George Sewpersadh has had an active involvement in community organisations and campaigns: demanding housing and calling for and end to evictions at Cato Manor, in the Sell Economic Houses at Cost Campaign in Chatsworth, in the 1980 Reduce Rents Campaign, and the recent anti-local affairs committee campaigns. He is on the committee of Durban Housing Action, Chatsworth Housing Action and Democratic Lawyers Association. He is unmarried.

ALBERTINA SISULU

Albertina Nontsikelelo Sisulu was born in Chamama, a village in the Cofimvaba district of Transkei in 1918. Both her parents died when she was very young and, the second in family of five, she was brought up by and uncle in Tsomo.
Rebelling against strong pressure to get married after completing her Standard 6, she accepted a mission school bursary to continue her education at Mariazelle convent school in Transkei. With the responsibility of the other children on her shoulders, she changed from her chosen career in teaching to nursing, and trained at the then Non-European Hospital (NEH) in Johannesburg alongside Rosabell Sisulu, the sister of Walter Sisulu whom she married in 1944. With Walter Sisulu an active member of the ANC youth League, she joined the ANC's Women's League at its inception and later became a member of the Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW). As a result of her political work, she was one of the first people to be detained under the then 90-day detention law. After the arrest and imprisonment of Walter Sisulu on Robben Island with Nelson Mandela, she was banned and placed under house arrest in 1963. She was to remain banned for 17 years, and under restriction for 15 years. For a brief period in 1981-1982 she experienced some months of freedom from banning, but, in May 1982, she suffered a new period of repression, in custody for six months during a trial at which she was found guilty and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, two suspended, for «furthering the aims of the ANC». She was released on bail pending appeal.
While in prison, she was elected one of the three UDF national co-presidents, and was re-elected for a second term of office while awaiting trial on the current charges of high treason. The

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

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L' ideologia del Boero Sudafricano

Heinz Hunke

RESUMEN *Sólo a quien no conoce la ideología de los boeros sudafricanos —cultura, lengua, religión— le puede impresionar el famoso discurso de P.W. Botha a Durban (15/8/'85). Una ideología totalizante y sacral, muy diversa de aquella colonialista (inglesa) y empresarial con raíces en la Europa occidental del 800.*
Esta ideología — originada en la Europa del 600 — se compone actualmente de racismo, capitalismo, nacionalismo cristiano, doctrina de la seguridad del estado. Su actual formulación se puede considerar como un darwinismo vulgar (la ley de la superioridad), mezclado con capitalismo y un cierto calvinismo tambien de cuño vulgar (el progreso mesiánico del elegido). Todo esto motiva e incentiva la doctrina dominante de la seguridad nacional.

SUMMARY *In order to understand the total deafness and blindness of the South African regime regarding «the signs of the time», it is absolutely indispensable to know the underlying South African, better: Boerish or Afrikaner, ideology, manifest in culture, language, religion, national symbols.*
This ideology is a complex concocture of fundamentalist christianity, totalitarian nationalism, vulgar Darwinism, growing state capitalism, and state security militarism. Within this ideological framework, there is not much space for «democracy» as understood in the Western world, to which South Africa pretends to belong.

Il discorso di P.W. Botha a Durban, il 15 agosto 1985, tanto aspettato dal mondo intero nella speranza di un decisivo cambiamento della politica razziale sudafricana, ha, secondo quanto espresso dalla stampa europea e nordamericana "profondamente deluso le capitali occidentali". Questa delusione ha odore di ipocrisia e di ignoranza. Ipocrisia che pretende di essere veramente interessata ad un cambiamento radicale in Sudfrica, mentre lo status quo è appoggiato a Washington, Londra, Bonn, e anche a Parigi, per non parlare di Roma. Ignoranza che non tiene conto dell'ideologia boera sudafricana che è letteralmente materializzata nella costituzione, nella legislazione, nella cultura, lingua, religione del popolo boero. Come si può sottovalutare questa idelogia totalizzante (per la quale anche la parola stessa "totale" è fra le più importanti e più usate), per la quale anche molte centinaia di neri uccisi dalla polizia in qualche mese sono delle realtà "effimere", mentre la purezza della cultura boera è un valore eterno, per la preservazione del quale qualsiasi mezzo deve essere usato con sacra giustificazione.

Come tutte le ideologie, un insieme di pensieri e valori che sono normativi per "vedere" e manomettere la realtà, l'ideologia del nazionalismo bianco sudfricano boero o "Afrikaner" è un intreccio troppo complicato per rendergli giustizia in un breve articoletto.
Qui parliamo soltanto dell'ideologia boera, che è già abbastanza differente da quella sudfricana "inglese", tipicamente coloniale, imperiale, imprenditoriale, radicata nell'Europa occidentale dell'800.

La cultura e l'ideologia boera non sono coloniali nel senso che non guardano all'Europa o a una patria-centro, punto di riferimento. I boeri hanno lasciato l'Europa come gli ebrei lasciarono l'Egitto, e presero possesso del Sudafrica come Israele prese possesso della Terra Promessa: era la "loro" terra per sempre destinata per volere divino. Gli abitanti originali, i nomadi (Nama, bosciamani) si erano intrusi solo perché — da pagani — non conoscevano il piano di salvezza di Dio per il suo unico popolo eletto. Quelle popolazioni non erano da colonizzare (come per i colonialisti britannici), ma erano da scartare, da

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mettere fuori, non avevano diritto di esistere entro le repubbliche di diritto divino.

La cultura e l'ideologia dei boeri non era imperiale, era il contrario.
La monarchia cristiana a carattere sacramentale tipica della vecchia Europa era vista come diabolica invenzione: Yahweh ed i profeti avevano ragione di diffidare dei re, e i boeri ugonotti, e non solo loro, ricordarono che un re è sempre capace di dire: "Parige val bene una messa". La nazione boera è profondamente repubblicana, anti-monarchica, fa "lager", fortezza, intorno al capo nazionale carismatico. Quando nel 1961, il Sudafrica lasciò il commonwealth, staccandosi definitivamente dalla corona britannica, non lo fece solo per influsso dei più violenti leaders neo-indipendenti all'interno del commonwealth, ma per un rifiuto viscerale verso l'impero della corona, la cui sudditanza era stata imposta alla nazione boera dalla forza militare degli inglesi.

CONTRO IL VIRUS DEL LIBERALISMO

L'ideologia boera non è una ideologia borghese o imprenditoriale. La nazione boera è profondamente agricola, terriera, patriarcale. Insieme con la terra, il bestiame, anche gli indigeni appartengono alla famiglia: sono sfruttati ma anche intesi come proprietà, per volontà di Dio, da trattare come "creature", mai come uomini liberi.

L'ideologia boera, degli Afrikaner, affonda le sue radici nell'Europa del '600, nel secolo delle guerre religiose, nella notte di S. Bartolemeo. I settlers olandesi e ugonotti che s'insediarono dopo il 1953 nelle vicinanze del Capo di Buona Speranza erano sfuggiti a queste guerre fra cristiani che si accusarono a vicenda di eresia. Si consideravano la parte sacra, gli eletti salvati, destinati a fondare una cristianità vera, pura, in una terra di infedeli. Il Capo di Buona Speranza proteggeva questa cristianità sicura della propria missione divina dalle tempeste che devastarono la cristianità divisa della vecchia Europa: la cultura boera degli Afrikaner non ha mai conosciuto l'infezione del virus dell'illuminismo, le ribellioni del razionalismo ed il trionfo delle scienze naturali ed umane. I vari virus di queste malattie, contro cui l'uomo Afrikaner deve essere vaccinato dalla primissima infanzia, si chiama nel linguaggio ideologico "liberalismo". Tutto ciò che è "liberale' è nemico della nazione, nemico della tradizione, della cultura boera, ed anche dello stato. Dal 1948 in poi, il virus "liberalismo" ed il virus "comunismo" non sono mai totalmente isolabili l'uno dall'altro.

UN DARWINISMO VOLGARE

L'ideologia di stato del Sudfrica di oggi si compone di almeno quattro elementi: il razzismo, il capitalismo, il nazionalismo cristiano, la sicurezza dello stato.
L'anima comune che regge e tiene insieme i quattro elementi potrebbe essere descritta come un darwinismo volgare (prima di ed indipendente da Darwin): sopravvivenza del più forte, del più idoneo.
Per l'elemento razzista, la certezza di essere superiore, più umano, ha le sue radici nella coscienza occidentale, che dopo le scoperte dei continenti passò da una coscienza di superiorità culturale antichissima (sia i Greci sia i Cinesi considerarono tutti gli altri popoli dei "barbari") ad una superiorità anche biologica, genetica, razziale.
Per i settlers del Capo di Buona Speranza, questa "sopravvivenza del più forte" si abbinò alla necessità di conquista. ("A country born of conquest" dice Alan Paton). La legge della superiorità esige la scelta ultima: o voi o noi. Non c'è via di mezzo. Conquistare il paese, conquistare l'indipendenza politica: il 1948 fu il punto culminante di questa conquista. Quest'ultima consentì di realizzare il sogno dell'ideologia boera: un paese pulito, bianco, con delle demarcazioni chiare, dove "la nostra nazione abita nel nostro paese non contaminato". Di questo disegno, Verwoerd divenne il grande ideatore: e tutti i suoi successori hanno sempre cercato di aggiungervi correzioni e ritocchi.

CAPITALISMO APPRESO

Questo darwinismo volgare si traduce in termini economici nel modo capitalistico sudafricano. Se l'ideologia boera originaria non era capitalista, ma agricola, terriera, quasi-feudale, la colonizzazione britannica forzò sul paese l'industrializzazione, la speculazione finanziaria, il capitalismo colonialista.
I boeri capirono che per conquistare il loro paese e per uscire dalla "cattività babilonese" dei britannici, non era loro permessa la via di regressione all'"innocenza" della campagna, ma l'unica soluzione era l'infiltrazione nel mondo capitalistico le cui regole primitive erano facilmente assimilabili all'ideologia di base dei boeri.

Viene molto più tardi, nel mondo di oggi, col capitalismo "illuminato" degli Oppenheimer e degli Afrikaner "verligtes" (= illuminati) nelle Camere di commercio, la contraddizione fra un capitalismo avanzato in cerca di lavoratori stabili, specializzati, salarialmente pacificati, sindacalmente disciplinati, e l'ideologia retrograda del purismo boero dei "verkramptes" (= irrigiditi) che non concepiscono un nero con diritti civili all'interno del territorio bianco.
Questa contraddizione in campo politico corrisponde alla politica "riformista" di P.W. Botha e il "lader" di destra estrema intorno alla HNP.
Questa contraddizione non è risolvibile attraverso una "terza via" alla Sudafrica, come tanti se la sognano. Sono due esigenze contraddittorie: razzismo e capitalismo sono ineluttabilmente intrecciati in Sudafrica, ma ciascuno va in direzioni totalmente opposte. Tutti i tentativi di suddividere il sistema boero in "petty" (piccolo) e "grande" apartheid sono

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clamorosamente falliti: "petty" apartheid riguarderebbe le esigenze del capitalismo illuminato: togliere di mezzo la separazione razziale per locali pubblici, l'esclusione dei neri da lavori specializzati, il diritto a sindacati propri, etc. Mentre il grande apartheid sarebbe il modello di un Sudafrica esclusivamente bianco, con tutti i neri appartenenti ad una delle etnie ufficiali e "cittadini" di uno dei bantustan. La legislazione relativa a questi problemi negli ultimi anni si è moltiplicata, moltiplicando particolarmente le contraddizioni (p.e. fra libertà di domicilio, diritto al lavoro, diritto all'iscrizione al sindacato).

UN CALVINISMO VOLGARE

In campo religioso, questo "darwinismo volgare" si abbina ad un calvinismo volgare: "il progresso dell'eletto". Il nazionalismo cristiano boero ha le sue radici nella coscienza primitiva dei "salvati" delle guerre di religione, dei settlers nella terra promessa, del grande esodo (groot trek) verso la conquista sotto la guida "del Signore, nostro Dio", che alla sua nazione eletta ha affidato la missione di fondare una cristianità nuova.
La nazione boera non è da comprendere senza questo grande Esodo, che, come l'esodo di Israele, lascia scoprire tutta la "genetica" del Popolo che nasce, mentre la sua ideologia viene scritta su tavole di pietra, e queste tavole dell'Alleanza del popolo col suo Dio sono la meta di pellegrinaggi ancora oggi nel monumento dei Voortrekker (Pionieri dell'Esodo) sulla montagna presso Pretoria, l'Altare della Patria.
Questa religiosità messianica vetero-testamentaria (Gesù di Nazareth rimane in uno strano oblio) non è contaminata dalle scienze storiche, letterarie che hanno condizionato la riflessione teologica occidentale di questo secolo. Per il nazionalismo cristiano boero, la separazione fra politica e dogmatica religiosa o istituzione ecclesiastica è difficile da comprendere. Questo fondamentalismo trova un certo parallelo nell'ideologia del nazionalismo islamico come in quello sionistico. La collaborazione del Sudafrica con Israele non è un caso delle costellazioni politiche, ma ha delle affinità elettive millenarie.

L'IDEOLOGIA DELLA SICUREZZA NAZIONALE

In campo ideologico, la strategia globale per la sicurezza dello stato comprende, quindi, l'insistenza sulla religiosità ed i valori cristiani, i quali secondo la propaganda sudafricana riguardano la famiglia, la proprietà, la legge e l'ordine, il benessere materiale e spirituale, la bandiera e l'inno nazionale ed i simboli della nazionalità sudafricana. (Secondo il "Credo" per il ventesimo anniversario della Repubblica nel 1981).

L'ideologia della sicurezza dello stato è il quarto elemento dell'ideologia boera. La sua teorizzazione è moderna, ma le sue radici vanno profondamente nella storia del nazionalismo cristiano boero. Il "piccolo resto" dei salvati e degli eletti, circondati dalla marea dei pagani, indigeni, incivili, preumani, progettava tutti gli sforzi individuali e collettivi per la difesa, la sopravvivenza della nazione, della cristianità. Circondata, "piccolo resto degli eletti", la nazione boera si era sempre sentita, faceva parte dell'ideologia del "piccolo resto salvato" la coscienza di dover "fare da solo", di stare soli, di non avere alleanze o amici affidabili. La famosa frase di Vorster, sfidando gli sforzi dell'amministrazione Carter per un distacco dal sistema razzista sudafricano, esprime il motto di questa coscienza dei "messi-da-parte" per divina provvidenza: "We got to go it alone": dobbiamo farcela da soli.

Dopo il 1961, con l'era delle prime indipendenze sul continente africano, sentendo quel "vento di cambiamento" del quale parlò McMillan proprio a Città del Capo, questa preoccupazione di sopravvivenza e di sicurezza divenne paranoia. Gli sforzi di investire nella industria bellica, di modernizzare l'esercito, l'aviazione e la marina, l'enorme sistema telematico di sorveglianza oceanica che copre l'Oceano indiano e sudatlantico, il puntare sull'industria energetica sia negli impianti convertendo il carbone in carburante sia nel programma nucleare, sono in corso da vent'anni. Negli anni '70, l'ideologia della sicurezza nazionale è stata sistematizzata.
Certi elementi sono stati importati dall'America Latina, da regimi dittatoriali come l'Argentina, l'Uruguay ed il Paraguay.
Secondo questa ideologia, lo Stato è assoluto e supremo, viene identificato con la nazione e con tutti i valori della collettività. La sua sopravvivenza e la sua sicurezza diventano il valore ultimo in assoluto a cui tutto il resto deve essere subordinato e, se necessario, sacrificato. A questo scopo, lo Stato deve avere il controllo di tutto, avere potere diretto e illimitato, anche sull'economia, sulla legislazione e sulla magistratura.
Poiché le forze armate sono il primo garante della sicurezza dello Stato, tutto deve essere subordinato al comando militare, perfino le imprese multinazionali devono accettare un piano che prevede in caso di emergenza una rapida conversione degli impianti secondo esigenze militari.

Il parlamento, anzi dopo la riforma di Botha i tre parlamenti ed i gabinetti dei ministri, sono istituzioni simboliche di una oligarchia razzista. L'unica vera autorità nel paese è il consiglio di Sicurezza Nazionale, ripristinato da P.W. Botha quando, da Ministero della difesa, passò alla carica di Primo Ministro, e nella quale il suo successore alla Difesa, il Generale Malan, ha una posizione strapotente da ideologo e da stratega.

Il Consiglio di Sicurezza dello Stato (State Security Council, SSC), di per sé solo uno dei comitati di gabinetto, è in verità il nodo del potere in Sudafrica. Il controllo generale stà con le Forze di Difesa del Sudafrica (SADF), ma fanno anche parte del Consiglio il National Intelligence

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Service (NIS), la polizia segreta, la polizia, il Dipartimento di controspionaggio Militare (DMI), i Centres for Strategic Studies, ditte per la ricerca su metodi di sicurezza e strategia, l'industria degli armamenti.

Le sedute di questo Consiglio di Sicurezza precedono le sedute dei gabinetti dei ministri.

Mentre la stampa ha una libertà relativa di criticare i politici, i partiti, il parlamento, lo Stato non scherza quando la stampa o altri criticano le forze armate, la polizia, i servizi segreti. Varie leggi con pene severissime consentono agli organi di sicurezza nazionale una protezione assoluta.

La propaganda di Stato presenta alla nazione lo spettro dell'"aggressione totale"(total onslaught). Il nemico è dappertutto, il paese è circondato, il paese è infiltrato, il paese è minacciato. Dietro tutto, il comunismo, che come un cancro ormai invade tutti gli organismi internazionali, anche il Consiglio Mondiale delle Chiese, ma in particolare i gruppi d'opposizione interna: i "liberali", l'ANC, il Consiglio sudafricano delle chiese, i sindacati neri, il Fronte Democratico Unito, certi vescovi cattolici. Il nemico (cioè il marxismo-comunismo) prepara l'attacco totale. Per questo il paese deve rispondere con la "strategia totale", una strategia elaborata e controllata dal centro del potere, il Consiglio di sicurezza nazionale, che si ramifica in tutti i settori della vita pubblica: l'esercito e polizia, le fabbriche, le scuole, i mass media devono essere in sintonia e devono fabbricare quel consenso nella popolazione bianca per assicurare la coesione ideologica e permettere al potere di colpire duramente ogni dissenso.
All'interno dell'ideologia della Sicurezza nazionale richiamarsi ai diritti umani significa già accusare i sintomi del liberalismo e del comunismo. Ed i richiami di alcune chiese "liberali" al governo di rispettare i diritti fondamentali e di protestare contro degli abusi del potere e casi di brutalità poliziesca partono dal presupposto totalmente falso che un regime basato su tale ideologia sia compatibile con l'idea dello stato di diritto. "Strategia totale" per combattere "l'aggressione totale" presuppone l'ideologia dello stato assolutamente totalitario. La magistratura è un organo esecutivo delle leggi di sicurezza che dichiarano esplicitamente l'incompetenza dei giudici dinanzi a certi poteri discrezionali degli ufficiali degli organi di sicurezza. E l'opinione pubblica accetta perfettamente la necessità della tortura per il bene della sicurezza nazionale.
Come gli altri elementi dell'ideologia boera, anche quello della Sicurezza nazionale viene nella scuola, dove la storia della conquista, i giuramenti collettivi di fedeltà al Signore Iddio delle vittorie sui nemici "kaffirs", e l'inaffidabilità di ogni altra nazione per una alleanza duratura, l'aggressione totale del nemico in assoluto sono elementi d'insegnamento in varie materie. Per quel che riguarda la Sicurezza nazionale, già il bambino della scuola diventa un "kadet", entra nelle unità paramilitari della suola, impara il linguaggio dell'annientamento (*unitwis, vernietig*) si abitua all'uso delle armi, si sente parte e pezzo del sistema di vigilanza per assicurare la *baaskap* (dominio dei bianchi), e ripeterà come i suoi nonni dinanzi a qualsiasi rivendicazione di diritti dei neri "Ons sal skiet" (Noi spariamo). Oggi, però, c'è questa novità: sotto questa *sicurezza* apparente c'è la certezza che non ci sarà una piccola sparatoria, ma un terribile bagno di sangue, e che dopo tutto, l'avvenire sarà *nero*.

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(fonte: "Repubblica")

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Disinvestment and black worker "attitudes" in South Africa: a critical comment

Michael Sutcliffe
Paul Wellings

SOMMARIO *Il ritiro degli investimenti esteri dal Sudafrica, sia da parte delle compagnie multinazionali che delle grandi banche è stato, a partire dagli anni settanta, uno dei maggiori temi di dibattito dei movimenti anti-apartheid in Gran Bretagna in particolare, ma anche Olanda e Germania, e più recentemente Stati Uniti.*
Ma è solo da un anno che se ne comincia a discutere anche in Sudafrica e questo avviene in un momento di grave recessione economica e di sconvolgimento politico, per cui l'idea del ritiro degli investimenti esteri non suona più solo come un appello al boicottaggio ideologico (anche se sotto forme economiche) di un regime razzista, ma come vera e propria ipotesi economica che corregga un'errata impostazione economica dannosa al paese.
Quanto sia acceso il tono di questo dibattito risulta dal saggio qui pubblicato. Si tratta di una critica a un rapporto del prof. Lawrence Schlemmer dell'università di Natal, che, l'anno scorso, ha elaborato un questionario, complesso e articolato, in cui si dimostrerebbe che solo il 25% dei lavoratori neri impiegati nell'industria, sarebbero in favore del ritiro degli investimenti. Gli autori del saggio smantellano questa conclusione sia da un punto di vista puramente metodologico che da quello economico e politico attraverso l'analisi delle varie domande e risposte. Ne risulta un interessante insight del livello e della sensibilità politica della classe operaia nera sudafricana e allo stesso tempo emerge con forza il peso della presenza del capitale americano in questo paese.

RESUMEN *El retiro de las inversiones extranjeras de Sudáfrica, ya sea por parte de las compañías transnacionales o de la gran banca, ha sido — a partir de los años setenta — uno de los mayores temas de discusión al interior de los movimientos anti-apartheid, especialmente en Gran Bretaña, Alemania, Holanda y recientemente en Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, sólo en estos últimos años, se comenzó a discutir sobre este tema en Sudáfrica, justo en un momento de grave recesión económica y desorden político. Por ello, a los grupos de oposición al apartheid dentro de Sudáfrica, la idea de un retiro de las inversiones extranjeras no suena solamente como llamado al boicot ideológico (aunque sea bajo forma económica) contra un régimen racista, sino como una verdadera arma económica que corrigiría un modelo de desarrollo gravoso para aquellos sectores que no tienen acceso al poder.*
Este encendido debate se perfila del ensayo que publicamos. Se trata de una crítica a un estudio elaborado por el profesor Lawrence Schlemmer, de la universidad de Natal, que hace un año elaboró un cuestionario que demostraría que sólo el 25% de los trabajadores negros, empleados en la industria, estarían a favor de un retiro de la inversiones. Los autores del ensayo desmantelan esta conclusión, ya sea desde el punto de vista estrictamente metodológico como del económico y político, a través del análisis de la preguntas y respuestas. Es una interesante mirada al nivel y sensibilidad política de la clase trabajadora sudafricana de color y, al mismo tiempo, surge con fuerza el peso de la presencia del capital norteamericano en este país.

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Less than a year ago disinvestment appeared very much a non-issue in South Africa. Claims that disinvestment could be implemented on a scale sufficient to seriously damage the South Africa economy and hence force the South African government to dismantle its apartheid policies were considered extravagant by most observers. Tony Koenderman, for example, argues that the Western powers would not be prepared to engender economic collapse in South Africa (alleged to be the inevitable outcome of disinvestment) in the cause of black liberation simply because an economically strong South Africa would better protect their strategic interests in the region and strengthen their important trade and investment links with the Republic.

Latterly, however, there has been a dramatic reversal in perceptions of the disinvestment threat within South Africa. The intensification of the disinvestment campaign in the United States, notwithstanding assurances that the Reagan Administration is still committed to its policy of "constrictive engagement", has been one cause of this. But more important perhaps has been the fact that these events coincided with an escalation of Township and worker unrest and that they attracted the attention of the media just as the South African economy was plunging yet further into recession. It was quickly realised, therefore, that the declining profitability of South African investments, together with the mounting strength of the Independent trade union movement and the fiscal incompetence of the South Africam government, might convince American interests that disinvestment is not only politically expedient but economically sound.

As a result, the South African diplomatic corps as well as high-profile representatives of local capital, while careful not to encourage the disinvestment lobby with signals of unease, have mounted a propaganda drive aimed at countering arguments in favour of disinvestment. Prominent here has been the use of a report on the attitudes of black workers based on a questionnaire survey conducted by Professor Lawrence Schlemmer of the University of Natal in Durban. The most significant finding of this survey was that only 25% of black were in favour of disinvestment as a form of pressure against the South African government, while the majority supported a policy of conditional investment on the lines of the Sullivan Code. This simple conclusion, is of immense propaganda value since it undermines the legitimacy of the disinvestment campaign by questioning the assumption that it enjoys a popular mandate from centre-stage in the propaganda war by interest groups opposed to disinvestment.

But although this report has very serious implications for the disinvestment lobby its advocates have not responded with anything that approaches a serious critique of the survey itself. Rather, they appear content to confine their attack to dark mutterings about the fact that the survey was financed by the America State Department. However, we would argue that a very effective critique of the survey can be mounted on methodological grounds. This is documented in the following section where the discussion focusses upon the many sampling problems and irresponsible statistical errors that the report contains. The inadequacies and ambiguities of the questions and the questionnaire procedure are also examined in some detail. In particular, we draw attention to the weaknesses of a methodology which reduces the analysis of complex and highly sensitive political opinions to a patronising multiple-choice examination. Our conclusion is that the report suffers from major methodological weaknesses and is of little value as an indicator of political attitudes.

More important, perhaps, we also argue in the second section that the questionnaire was designed in a manner which subtly invites respondents to consider disinvestment in terms dictated by the South African government; for example, that disinvestment will lead to large scale retrenchments of black workers. It is suggested here that this is not necessarily correct, and that any responsible analysis of attitudes towards disinvestment should proceed from a balanced discussion of the issue, not from the various fictions propounded by the Pretorian propaganda machine.

METHODOLOGICAL CRITICISMS OF THE SCHLEMMER SURVEY

The Schlemmer study undertook to investigate the attitudes of black industrial workers in South Africa towards a range of political issues. These issues reflected three basic themes which determined the direction of the survey:
"One is the extent to which political factors have penetrated the conciousness as regards industrial relations among black workers. Another is to what extent political issues have caused black workers to question the capitalist system. A third major issue, related to the others, is whether black workers support disinvestment and boycotts as external methods of opposing apartheid" (p. 2).

In order to achieve these ends, a questionnaire was devised and administered to a sample of black male production workers in several industrial centres. An analysis of the responses led Schlemmer to a variety of conclusions in respect of workers' political consciousness. In addition, certain variations in responses within the sample generated a series of observations concerning the different positions assumed by sub-groups such as the "young" and "better-educated". The viability of these results is never questioned nor is there a discussion of their statistical significance.

In our view, however, the survey is seriorsly flawed. The most obvious of these flaws is sit analysis of the data but problems relating to questionnaire design and administration may be indentified from a careful reading of the report. The conceptualization of the

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disinvestment issue is also inadequate and since this is reflected in the questionnaire design the results are highly questionable if not invalid. We will deal with each of these points in turn.

(i) Analysis

The method of analysis provided in the report is along conventional lines: overall responses to questions are presented and then an attempt is made to identify sub-groups whose responses differ significantly from the group as a whole. These sub-groups are distinguished on the basis of: age, socio-economic status, location, education, whether employed with a multinational or not, whether a member of a union or not, and "worker militancy". What we have done in Table 1 is to document each instance where a sub-group is identified in the report as having a significantly different response to that of the sample as a whole, and then arrange the sub-groups according to the way in which they are supposed to have differed. From this it would appear that young workers, unionists, the better educated and those living in Pretoria, Soweto and the Vaal area are more disillusioned with capitalism and more militant. On the other hand, those working for multinationals. The less educated and older workers would appear to be less militant. This leads Schlemmer to a number of conclusions concerning the characteristics of a minority black worker constituency which (he claims) displays "... a consistent militancy which covers both labour, community and political issues" (p. 43). Schlemmer is also at pains to stress "...the outstanding reputation that US companies appear to enjoy among black production workers" (p. 38) on the basis of comparisons between the opinions of those employed by American firms and the rest.

Table 1: Alleged differences between the sub-groups in the Schlemmer

	anti-capitalist Pro-Disinvestment Militant	Pro-capitalist Anti-Disinvestment Less Militant
Age — 16-24 years	3	1
— » 25 years	1	5
Area — Pretoria	8	0
— Soweto	3	0
— Vaal	3	0
— W. Rand		1
— E. Rand	1	3
— P.E	0	1
Ses — High	1	0
Employment — Mnc's	0	6
— S.A. Cos.	1	0
Unskilled	2	0
Union Members	6	1
Education — Stds. 1 to 4	0	3
— Middle and High	5	1
Worker radicals	2	0

Note: The figures refer to the number of times that the report indicates "signicant" differtences between the sub-groups.
Source: Compiled from Schlemmer (1984).

Table 2: Tables used in the statistical analysis of the survey data

	N
Those referring to differences between sub-groups	11[1)]
Those referring to differences between U.S. and South African companies	7[2)]

Sources:
1): p. 12; p. 13; p. 17; p. 18 (a); p. 18 (b); p. 25 text); p. 27 (text); p. 30; p. 32; p. 35; p. 37.
2): p. 21; p. 29; p. 33; p. 34; p. 36; p. 37; p. 39.

Note: One table (p. 15) could not be included in the analysis because actual response rates were not cited. A further eight tables (p. 11; p. 14; p. 16; p. 23; p. 25; p. 26; p. 27; p. 31) did not refer to differences between sub-groups or American and South African companies, and were therefore irrelevant to our analysis.

However, one searches in vain for any statistical analysis in support of these observations. As a result, we decided to run our own analysis of the data. Eighteen tables cited in the report were used for this analysis, eleven of which referred to differences between sub-groups, the other seven referring to attitudinal contrasts between employees of American and South African companies (see Table 2). The analysis proceeded as follows. For each occasion where the report cited the difference in responses to individual questions between sub-samples as significant, standard errors were computed to determine the *statistical* significance of the differences. For example, the report states that while 66% of the full sample of black production workers (N = 451) were "unhappy and angry" about life in South Africa, the sub-group aged between 35-39 (N = 121) emerged as "markedly more" "unhappy and angry" with 74% of their responses categorised this way (pp. 11-12).

From these figures, the standard errors may be calculated as 2.23 for the entire sample and 3.99 for the sub-group. The 95% confidence limits are therefore 66 +/- 4.37 (i.e. 61.63 to 72.37) and 74 +/- 7.82 (66.18 to 81.82) respectively. Because these ranges overlap, the conclusion is that the differences between the two samples are *not* significant. What we have done in Table 3, then, is to document the number of times the report correctly or incorrectly suggested that the sub-groups referring to age, location, socio-economic status and employment (with multinationals or not) differed from the sample as a whole. Unfortunately, there is insufficient information about the sample size of the union, "militancy" and education related sub-groups to check the conclusions drawn about their results. Nevertheless, the results are quite extraordinary; in short, they indicate that 38 out of 39 so-called "significat" differences are *not* significant at the 95% level of confidence. Table 4 repeats the exercise for differences between American and South African companies and again the overwhelming majority of these (37 out of 42) are not significant.

Table 3: Analysis of the statistical basis for conclusions that a sub-group differed significantly from the sample as a whole

SUB-GROUP	CORRECT	INCORRECT
Age	0	10
Location	0	21
Socioeconomic status	0	1
Employment (multinational or not)	1	6
Totals	1	38

Table 4: Analysis of the statistical basis for conclusions that the attitudes of employees of American companies differed significantly from those held by employees of South African companies

Correct	5
Incorrect	37
Total	42

At one level, these results evidence a sloppiness which is inexcusable in a major report. To suggest that significant differences obtain between certain sub-samples when in fact there is no statistical evidence on which to base such conclusions is irresponsible social science. But it may also indicate a conscious attempt to create results which support some "hidden agenda". For example, the report is keen to emphasise that employees of American companies appear more happy with their lot, less militant, more pro-capitalist and so on — observations which appear to endorse a policy of "constructive engagement" — when there is no statistical basis for conclusions of this kind. Similarly, the survey incorrectly reinforces "the old National Party line that it is the young, the unionists, and so on who are unreasonable and revolutionary. Such thoughtless (deliberate?) reiteration of conventional wisdoms is not only irresponsible but suspicious.

(ii) Sampling Problems

The survey was based on a sample of 551 black male production workers in seven industrial centres in South Africa; Durban-Pinetown, Port Elizabeth and another five centres (Pretoria, Vaal, East Rand, West Rand and Soweto) located in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area. Dur chi-square analysis demonstrates that the regional distribution of the sample is significantly different from the distribution of the population of black production workers, primarily because no workers were polled in the Western Cape (which accounts for 12% of black manufacturing employment) and in other areas outside the major industrial centres (20%). Hence, as Schlemmer admits (p. 10), the survey is not representative of *all* black factory workers. This is worth stressing since it appears to have been ignored in media broadcasting of the results.

However, Schlemmer goes on to say that the sample *is* representative of "black employees in the major industrial centres in which multinational investment is

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concentrated'' (p. 10). Unfortunately, there is no basis upon which this statement can be made since data relating to the location of multinational companies within South Africa is not readily available. The most recent and comprehensive attempt to compile this information was undertaken by Chris Rogerson and refers to the situation in 1978. But if this is anything to go by, the regional distribution of the sample is statistically invalid. According to Rogerson, 50% of manufacturing employment in multinational companies was located in PWV and Port Elizabeth in 1978. In contrast, the Schlemmer survey allocates 82% of the sample to these two areas. Our point is not so much that the regional distribution of Schlemmer's sample is necessarily incorrect, but that a statistical framework for the allocation of sampling quotas between categories (such as employment in multinational companies) is not provided, and in the absence of this the representativeness of the sample remains questionable.

It is also worth drawing attention to a peculiar argument which is used to justify the ''deliberate over-representation'' of the Port Elizabeth and Durban-Pinetown sub-samples. This was done ''...so as to allow adequate assessments to be made of regional variation in attitudes'' (p. 10), and Schlemmer goes on to argue that because ''...the differences according to area were generally not significant the results could be conbined'' (p. 10). the strange thing about this is that Schlemmer's later analysis contradicts this statement as in many instances he claims that there are significant differences in the attitudes of workers in different industrial centres.

More importantly, however, the reasoning is tautological since, having created a biased sample, he then claims that the bias is insignificant on the basis of results obtained from the biased sample. In other words, to say that there are no regional differences in the biased sample is no proof that regional differences would not have been present in an unbiased sample. In fact, the only way to check the validity of a biased sample is to compare its results with those of an unbiassed control group. This is yet another example of what appears to be a very weak understanding of simple statistical theory and survey methodology.

Finally, it is useful to note that this is a survey of black *male production workers,* not ''black male workers'', not ''black workers'', and not blacks in general. Anti-disinvestment lobbyists have tended to gloss over this point as indeed does Schlemmer in his conclusion (pp. 42-46) where he tends to generalise for *all* black workers. This fact is, though, that only 20% of black workers are employed in the manufacturing sector (and 38% of these are women), so the survey focusses on the attitudes of a group which accounts for 16% of black workers, a figure which can be reduced to about 12% if unemployed workers are included.

The stated rationale for confining the survey to male production workers is that they ''...are the people most intimately involved in the capitalist system and (they) participate in the sector in which most multinational companies operate — the manufacturing sector'' (p. 9). Intuitively, though, one feels that this selection was also determined by the assumption that disinvestment will affect black production workers most of all, an assumption which is clearly reflected in the design of the questions relevant to this issue. But if one challenges this assumption (the subject of our final section) then the assertion that the opinions of production workers are to be given priority becomes groundless. In other words, if one's conception of the disinvestment issue is broadened then there is no *a priori* reason why a survey should be confined to one relatively small black constituency. The attitudes of any black worker and indeed any voting-age black person may therefore be considered equally valid.

(iii) Administration and questionnaire design

The report implies that the validity of the responses is ensured by the length of the interview (approximately 110 minutes) and the careful training that the interviewers undertook (p. 9). But there are two major problems with survey research of this kind, neither of which are acknowledged or discussed in the report.

The first of these concerns the difficulty of exacting truthful responses to the questions. What must be taken into consideration is that many of the issues examined in the survey are highly sensitive. For example, it is a treasonable offence in South Africa to openly advocate disinvestment and one should remember that the government has taken every opportunity to stress this fact in the media. It is understandable, therefore, that blacks are suspicious of surveys of this type even when they are conducted by independent institutions with some credibility, like the University of Natal. Hence, it is clearly naive to assume that assurances of anonymity will guarantee that responses are genuine. The decision to interview workes *in their homes* (having first made contact at the worplace) will have compounded this problem. Interestingly one gets no idea as to the degree to wich workes may have refused to co-operate. Similar questions are asked by Sam Nolutshungu in his review of an earlier survey of black attitudes conducted by Theo Hanf and his colleagues where this research problem is well summarised as follows:

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"Some of the in-depth interviewers are reported as representing the ANC or the PAC, their left and moderate wings, and so on. The groups for skepticism are, surely, self-evident. Very few people who are actively involved with subversive political organizations will proclaim that to market researchers. Similarly, given the nature of the South African regime, one cannot trust African respondents to say truly what they feel especially if that is known to be beyond the bounds of official tolerance. That there were as many candidly militant statements made as are reported is in itself outstanding, but it does not rule out, as the authors too sanguinely hope it does, the environment of state terror as a factor in the formulation of responsens".

The second, and perhaps even more fundamental, problem, lies in designing questions wich generate meaningful responses. A common problem is ambiguity. A good example of this is the statement "Whites are strict but honest and fair - blacks would not be happier under their own people" to which respondents were asked to agree or disagree (p. 32%). For a variety of reasons, this statement makes no sense whatsoever. In the first place, it consists of four separate statements ('Whites are strict'; 'Whites are honest'; 'Whites are fair'; 'Blacks would not be happier under their own people') to wich responses may differ. Theoretically, then, there are 16 possible responses to this question whereas only one composite result is permitted. Secondly, the statement is invalid because there is no obvious relationship between the two halves of the statement; that is, it cannot be assumed that a person who agrees with the statement 'Whites are strict but honest and fair' will necessarily support the contention that 'Blacks will not be happier under their own people', or vice versa. Thirdly, the question does not allow considerations of whether 'Blacks would be happier under their own people' to be made independently of

Swedish Parliament sharpens law against investments in South Africa and Namibia

In order to show solidarity with the black population in South Africa and Namibia, and to augment pressure against the racist government, the Swedish parliament has legislated against investing in these countries.
The old law that forbade investing in South Africa and Namibia has been in force since 1 July, 1979.
On the 30 October, 1980, an inquiry was launched with the objective of charting out implementation of the law, and to examine possibilities for expanding sanctions against South Africa.
On 10 December, 1981, The Swedish Government resolved that the task be commended to a committee (Sydafrikakommittén), that presented its report on 1 June, 1984.
On 27 February, 1985 the Swedish parliament passed the new law, extending sanctions against South Africa. The principal change enacted by the new law is that it henceforth covers even Leasing. Other important changes in the law are mentioned hereunder:
— Swedish legal entities representatives are forbidden from extending loans or other credits with a maturity of more than two years, to the South African state or its legal representatives, or to guarantee debts with a maturity of more than five years.
— Swedish legal entities representatives are also forbidden to facilitate such transactions by their foreign subsidiaries.
— Swedish legal entities representatives are further forbidden to facilitate the hiring out of property by those subsidiaries to the South African state through financial leasing.
— Swedish legal entities representatives that transfer patents or manufacturing rights to South African or Namibian companies are required to inform the supervisory authority.
— Applications for dispensation from the law forbidding investments, may be made only once a year and the application should cover all investments.
— The Swedish Government may make exemptions from these rules under special circumstances such as the replacement of plant machinery and hired property, and to make investments or rent property with the aim of ameliorating the working environment and conditions of the employees on the condition that these measures do not augment their involvement in South Africa and Namibia. The purpose of this exemption is not to soften the law but rather to simplify handling of applications for despensations with the objective of enticing other nations to follow suit.
The Swedish parliament further made provisions for one million Swedish crowns to be put at the disposal of the political parties, trade unions and other popular movements, for information on the new law, with the aim of stimulating public opinion and exercising pressure on the apartheid-regime.

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the first half of the statement which is loaded in favour of whites. Hence, the result may be biased towards an 'agree' response.

A further difficulty stems from inviting respondents to answer against hypothetical conditions and alternatives which, as Nolutshungu puts it, may "at present only be vaguely, and subjectively, imagined". For example, the respondents were confronted with one statement which supports disinvestement on the grounds that it will "...frighten the South African Government into getting rid of apartheid" (p. 34). Schlemmer argues that this provides a "... built-in incentive to support the disinvestment" position (p. 35), but one may equally argue that this is just as likely to diminish support in a context where international pressure has never appeared to 'frighten the South African government', in which case the proposition may seem unrealistic and therefore meaningless. This process of rationalisation explains why, for example, surveys of 'felt needs' in impoverished rural communities in South Africa invariably generate a list of priorities on the lines of 'water supply', 'health clinic' and so on rather than 'black majority rule'. A more legitimate exercise would therefore be to design some means of monitoring attitudes towards disinvestment once the issue has been given a comprehensive political hearing in collective forums recognised by workers such as the independent unions.

Related to this is the problem of collapsing complex political opinions into multiple-choice or Yes/No categories. There are two dangers here. The first results from a biased or inadequate misconceptualization of the issues at hand which 'forces' response to assume a certain shape. This is evident in Schlemmer's treatment of the disinvestment issue and we discuss this in the following section. The second is a problem of incorporating a range of opinions into one or two statements or questions. Pre-coded structured questionnaires with prepared 'probes' are quite unsatisfactory means of analysing opinions, when such opinions are rich in their complexity and diversity. The usual result is to tie responses to pre-selected categories which are not exhaustive of the alternatives and then make the assumption that responses within categories are homogeneous. In consequence, surveys of political attitudes are rarely good predictive devices. Thus, for example, only a few weeks after publication of the study in which Schlemmer concludes that the "... major pattern is for black workers to separate political issues from the industrial sphere" (p. 42), workers in the Transvaal came out in massive support of calls for a work stay-away.

In summary, we feel that this survey is basically bad social science. There are too many administrative, sampling and design problems to find the results convincing. Yet there will be many inclined to accept the general conclusion of the report on disinvestment. If one forgets about all the other problems, then the proportion of workers opposed to disinvestment (25-26%) may appear significant, particularly since Schlemmer is quick answer critics who may doubt the political maturity of the respondents (p. 44). However, we also suggest that the design of the questions relating to disinvestment reflect a biased and inadequate conceptualisation of the issue, one which favours a more 'conservative' response. It is to this that we now turn.

CONCEPTUALISING THE DISINVESTMENT ISSUE

A total of four questions were asked relating to disinvestment (see pp. 33-41). In the first of these, respondents were asked; "Which one of the following is true. When American companies build factories in South Africa, who do they help *most?*". The possible responses were limited to 'Help the African people to progress', 'Help the Whites, and 'Help the South African Government' (p. 33%. The results (38%, 16% and 46% respectively) are considered "inconclusive" (p. 34). However, the question is badly designed because the negative view of American investment is split between two categories as against one for the positive opinion. The responses to the second and third options could therefore be combined to give 62% of the sample holding a negative view of investment, a result which *is* statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence.'

Nevertheless, the next three questions generate consistent results which suggest that majority opinion is against disinvestment. Only 25% of the overall sample supported a pro-disinvestment position in Table 14 (p. 34), 26% in Table 15 (p. 36), and 9% in Table 16 (p. 37). But let us look more closely at how those three questions were phrased.

Table 14; *«One man,* Samuel *says: "Overseas people and banks and companies must stop buying South African goods and stop sending money to build factories in South Africa so as to frighten the South African government into getting rid of Apartheid".*

Another man Joseph *says: "People and banks and companies overseas should continue to buy South African goods and send money to build factories because it makes jobs for all people in South Africa".*

Which man would you agree with, Samuel or Joseph?
Support for Samuel 25%, for Joseph 75%.

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Table 15: *"There are groups of people in America and England who try to encourage banks and organisations* not to invest *money in South Africa - not to put their money in factories which are in South Africa. Do you think this is a good thing or a bad thing?*
Good thing (Disinvestment) - 26%
Bad thing (Engagement)- 74%

Table 16: *"Which of the following would you prefer to see happen - What is best?"*
"American companies should build as many factories in South Africa as they can, making as many jobs for blacks as they can" - 59%
"American companies should only run factories in South Africa if they can pay blacks high wages, give good pensions and help with housing, even if they make fewer jobs" - 32%
"American companies should not *run factories in South Africa because they make the government of South Africa stronger" - 9%.*

Note, therefore, that in each statement investment is equated with the building of factories and, inversely, that disinvestment implies the closing down of factories or an inability to build new ones. It is hardly surprising then, that production workers — as rational human beings — did not come out in solid support of a strategy which they are told will lead to retrenchments. For workers this obviously has more serious implications then frightening the South African government. What is remarkable, therefore, is that *as many as* 25% of workers advocated disinvestment in a context where an open declaration of support for this strategy is illegal and where an open declaration of support for this strategy is illegal and where the manufacturing sector is presently retrenching workers in face of a severe recession.

The important point, though, is that the disinvestment issue was presented to workers in terms which are both misleading and unbalanced, and which in fact bear close resemblance to the government's own propaganda. For example, the impression given in the survey was the contribution to jobs locally by *direct* foreign investment is quite considerable and that the involvment of American capital in South Africa is almost exclusively in the private manufacturing sector. However, an evaluation of American foreign investment in South Africa indicates otherwise. In the first place, American direct foreign investment in South Africa has, over the past decade, been shrinking. The major proportion of new American investment in South Africa comprises a re-investment of locally generated profits. There is also some evidence that during the early 1980's there was a fairly considerable divestment of mining equities by American capital. Secondly, much of the American investment is in mining equities and not in factories as the report appears to indicate. For example, American capital holds approximately one-quarter of all gold shares in South Africa. Interestingly, the report failed to address this point and ask black workers how tehy felt about American 'muscle' bein used to improve the living and working conditions of black (mainly migrant) miners.'

Equally, it is important to recognise that most of the recent direct American foreign investment in South Africa has not been directed towards the construction of factories, but comprises loans to the South Africa Government and its parastatals. In fact, the vigour with which the present disinvestment campaign is being pursued is in large measure due to the 1982 decision by the IMF to loan R1240 million to the South Africa government. This, together with smaller loans to parastatals and the decision to allow U.S. corporations to service South Africa's nuclear prower plant, clearly had an impact on the mobilisation of a variety of groups against the Apartheid state. It appears, therefore, that the assumption that American investment in South Africa necessarily leads to the building of factories and the creation of jobs in the manufacturing sector cannot be sustained.

Finally, one can question the assumption that disinvestment necessarily implies large scale retrenchments of black production workers. One obvious point is that the divested stock can and will be bought up by other capitalists, particularly in situations where divesting companies are forced to off-load stock at prices below its true market value. Alternatively, if one considers that over the past decade South Africa has been a net exporter of capital and that larger South African companies have become increasingly interested in directing investments overseas, then it is possible to argue that restrictions on such flows of capital (which may comprise part of a disinvestment campaign) could lead to increased support for local job-creating investments.

Overall, these observations underscore Schlemmer's very poor conceptualisation of the implications of disinvestment on the South African economy. In the report the disinvestment campaign is presented as a simple either/or dilemma: either one frightens the South African government or there are more jobs for black workers. It therefore fails to recognise the strategic and symbolic value of the campaigne and the fact that it incorporates a wide variety of options. For example, disinvestment may involve any combination of the following policies: (i) sanctions on all firms investing in South Africa; (ii) sanctions on firms if they do not comply with certain codes of conduct; (iii) a reduction of American exports to South Africa (involving restrictions on the sale of certain types of goods or services to particular customers); (iv) a reduction of South African exports to the United States; (v) restrictions on South African investment in the United States; (vi) restrictions on loans to the South African government and its parastatals; and (vii) restrictions on South African firms applying for loans on overseas capital markets. And, of course, there is no need to confine the debate to economic sanctions since sanctions can be enforced in a variety of ways

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and at a variety of levels which may be equally or more effective.

Hence, the survey could have presented the disinvestment issue in quite different terms to those used in Tables 13-16. One wonders, for example, what the response might have been if workers had been asked their opinion of the sale of computer technology to the South African police or restrictions on loans to the South African government. In summary, then, what we are arguing is that the disinvestment campaign is a good deal more diverse and sophisticated than Schlemmer implies, and that his investigations into attitudes towards this issue are therefore based on a misrepresentation of the facts. Consequently, one must reject his conclusion — that disinvestment is a 'no-go' for black workers — as worthless or at best an indication of how 'social science' can be abused for conservative ends. We look forward to a more rational interpretation being offered of the progressive implications and possibilities that a disinvestment campaign may hold for the emergence of a nonracial democracy in South Africa.

SA PROVISIONAL BUDGET 1985

Here follows the table of departmental spending in this year's budget compared to last year.
The government stresses in the proposals that «due to structural changes resulting from the implementation of the Constitution Act, 1983, as at 3 September 1984, figures are not fully comparable.» (Figures in Rands)

	1985	1984	
1. State President	R11 174	R11 782	(-R608)
2. Parliament	R31 772	R15 739	(+16 033)
3. Transport	R503 340	R243 893	(+R259 447)
4. Constitutional Development and Planning	R5 336 502	R4 597 037	(+R739 465)
5. Foreign Affairs	R1 168 316	R772 144	(+R396 172)
6. Home Affairs	R46 174	R522 288	(-R476 114)
7. Commission for Administration	R63 702	R46 329	(+R17 373)
8. Improvement of conditions of service	R235 000	R267 000	(-R32 000)
9. National Education	R107 336	R535 033	(-R427 697)
10. Police	R954 709	R795 640	(+R159 069)
11. Public Works and Land Affairs	R1 119 001	R1 106 569	(+R12 432)
12. Health and Welfare	R1 326 840	R1 331 668	(-R4 828)
13. Administration: House of Assembly	R2 163 781	R1 007 801	(+R1 115 980)
14. Co-operation and Development	R2 348 373	R1 924 428	(+R423 945)
15. Education and Training	R917 486	R709 257	(+R208 229)
16. Defence	R4 274 108	R3 754 667	(+R519 441)
17. Manpower	R102 973	R92 285	(+R10688)
18. Trade and Industry	R949 137	R559 611	(+R390 526)
19. Justice	R186 454	R146 020	(+R40 434)
20. Prisons	R358 798	R311 592	(+R47 206)
21 Agricultural Economics and Marketing	R576 959	R422 397	(+R154 562)
22. Water Affairs	R248 030	R239 000	(+R9 030)
23. Mineral and Energy Affairs	R627 553	R557 637	(+R69 916)
24. Finance	R5 471 739	R4 332 675	(+R1 139 064)
25. Audit	R11 986	R10 883	(+R1 103)
26. Environment Affairs	R121 428	R158 248	(-R36 820)
27. Administration: House of Representatives	R1 323 781	R623 486	(+R700 295)
28. Administration: House of Delegates	R558 463	R262 703	(+R295 703)
TOTAL	R31 144 915	R25 356 812	(+R6 766 170)

(Source: RDM Business Day, 19.03.85)

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5° CONGRESSO DELLA CONFEDERAZIONE SINDACALE EUROPEA

Milano, maggio 1985

RISOLUZIONE SUL SUDAFRICA

Il V° Congresso della Ces:
— ribadendo la sua più severa condanna della politica di apartheid del Sudafrica come un crimine contro l'umanità e una minaccia incombente sulla pace nel mondo;
— considerando critico l'attuale momento per l'evoluzione democratica nel Sudafrica;
— confermando la sua solidarietà con i lavoratori sudafricani oppressi, con i loro sindacati indipendenti e con le altre vittime dell'apartheid;
— confermando la risoluzione adottata dal Comitato esecutivo nel giugno 1983;
— rispettando gli orientamenti della Cisl internazionale, della Cmt e i punti di vista dei sindacalisti africani in materia;
— salutando le attività e i programmi delle organizzazioni affiliate o dei gruppi sindacali regionali nella lotta contro l'apartheid;
— sottoscrivendo le azioni intraprese dall'Oil contro l'apartheid e le proposte da essa sviluppate in questo campo;
— sottolineando l'impegno di tutte le organizzazioni sindacali per l'isolamento economico e politico del Sudafrica;
— salutando le recenti risoluzioni adottate dall'Assemblea comune Acp-Cee e dal Parlamento europeo nell'aprile 1985;
— considerando che la Comunità europea e i suoi Stati membri hanno una responsabilità comune nella situazione del Sudafrica;
— deplorando l'inadeguatezza del codice di condotta della Cee, sia per i suoi limiti di impegno effettivo, di procedure di informazione e di sanzioni, sia per i suoi limiti di efficacia rispetto all'eliminazione dell'apartheid nella società sudafricana;
chiede *alla Commissione europea e al Consiglio dei ministri della Cee e dell'Efta, nonché ai governi nazionali europei di adottare le misure più incisive e di predisporre un'azione coordinata per esercitare una pressione economica sul regime d'apartheid del Sudafrica;*
chiede *con forza che sia intrapresa un'azione immediata che comprenda:*

1) l'estensione e il controllo più rigoroso dell'embargo decretato dalle Nazioni Unite sul commercio delle armi e di altri embargo in altri campi;

2) misure volte a porre termine alle garanzie agli investimenti, ai crediti all'esportazione e a tutte le misure di promozione degli scambi commerciali;

3) l'interdizione di nuovi investimenti nel Sudafrica;

4) un'azione per bloccare le forniture e il trasporto di petrolio e di prodotti petroliferi verso il Sudafrica, nonché l'importazione di carbone sudafricano;

5) una legislazione che impedisca prestiti bancari al Sudafrica e alle imprese pubbliche di quel paese, e che impedisca altresì dei nuovi prestiti da parte del fondo monetario internazionale;

6) il rifiuto di riconoscere l'occupazione illegale della Namibia da parte del governo di Pretoria, e delle misure per impedire che quest'ultimo continui a sfruttare illegalmente le risorse naturali della Namibia;

7) l'interdizione dell'importazione e della vendita delle monete d'oro sudafricane (Krugerrands);

8) delle misure di interdizione e di blocco di ogni contatto sportivo e culturale e la cessazione di accordi internazionali culturali stipulati con il Sudafrica;

9) delle misure energiche per scoraggiare il reclutamento di emigrati bianchi e per impedire il turismo nel Sudafrica;

10) il rafforzamento del Codice di condotta dei governi Cee nel senso di prevederne l'applicazione reale in Sudafrica, anche per via legislativa se ciò risulta necessario e appropriato.

chiede *con forza che essi realizzino delle azioni concertate in questa direzione, nel quadro della Cooperazione politica europea nonché delle Nazioni Unite e delle sue agenzie specializzate, per garantire che delle azioni coordinate siano adottate ogni volta che ciò è possibile;*
chiede *al Comitato esecutivo, alle Confederazioni affiliate ai loro sindacati (di categoria) e alle loro organizzazioni internazionali:*

a) di esercitare pressioni ulteriori sui governi dell'Europa occidentale affinché accelerino un coordinamento crescente di sanzioni economiche nel senso prima descritto;

b) di esercitare delle pressioni sui governi e sulle società multinazionali al fine di incoraggiare un disinvestimento selettivo nelle multinazionali che operano in Sudafrica nei settori «a tecnologia di punta», in quelli dell'energia e della produzione di armi, comprese quelle che lavorano nei «bantustans» e che sono state identificate dal movimento sindacale nero indipendente per aver violato le norme di lavoro internazionale riconosciute;

c) di individuare — in consultazione con i sindacati multirazziali dell'Africa del Sud che cooperano con la Cisl internazionale, la Cmt e gli Spi — un certo numero di aziende che hanno stabilimenti in Africa del Sud per farne l'oggetto di pressioni sindacali concertate;

d) di sviluppare l'attenzione e l'informazione tra i sindacati sulla situazione in Africa del Sud, nonché la necessità di intensificare le sanzioni contro il regime d'apartheid.

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Il Sudafrica e l'occidente: l'esempio italiano

Giancarla Codrignani

SOMMARY *Insecurity and ambiguity of the Western governments in taking position when confronted with South Africa's brutal racism, are the greatest asset of Pretoria. Deeds (and omissions of necessary deeds) are in contradiction with sacred pledges. Italy is allegedly, among all European countries, the one with the most blatant contradictions in this regard, collaborating with the apartheid regime, in utter contrast with the verbal condemnations of it in solemn statements by the heads of Italy's foreign office and other government leaders.*

RESUMEN *La incerteza y ambiguidad de las decisiones políticas occidentales representan —hoy en día— un apoyo concreto al régimen de Pretoria, a pesar de las declaraciones que se hayan firmado. El artículo sostiene que Italia es, bajo este aspecto, el país europeo que más ha solidarizado con el racismo a través de sustanciales y repetidas contradicciones en las grandilocuentes declaraciones de los responsables de la política exterior italiana... hoy como en años pasados.*

La tesi di questo articolo non è particolarmente originale, ma vale forse la pena di ripetere che l'incertezza e l'ambiguità delle scelte politiche occidentali rappresentano oggi, nei fatti, il più concreto appoggio al regime di Pretoria, a prescindere da qualunque dichiarazione di principi sottoscritti. L'Italia è, sotto questo aspetto, il paese che in Europa ha più solidarizzato con il razzismo nel disimpegno sostanziale dalle dichiarazioni fatte. Se si volesse essere soltanto polemici basterebbe ricordare, nella lunga serie delle astensioni italiane in tutte le sedi internazionali l'ultima - fortemente traumatica perché non rispondente a quel che è dato conoscere delle tendenze e dell'*animus* delle delegate italiane - data dalla rappresentanza ufficiale del nostro governo alla mozione sul Sudafrica votata dalla Conferenza delle N.U. sulla condizione delle donne tenutasi a Nairobi lo scorso luglio.

Le ambiguità italiane sono, tuttavia, omogenee alle tendenze politiche dell'Occidente: esso rappresenta ancora, per il Terzo Mondo, - e *pour cause* - l'ipocrisia elevata a categoria politica per giustificare la doppia morale della propaganda sui principi e dell'incoerenza nella prassi.
Prendiamo, per esemplificare, la questione dell'embargo alla vendita di armi. Il consiglio di sicurezza delle N.U. adottò questa misura nei confronti del Sudafrica nel 1963, ma il modo con cui fu applicata dai paesi fornitori di armi la rese inoperante e furono necessari anni di discussioni perché - nel 1977 - diventasse vincolante ai sensi dell'art. 7 della Carta delle Nazioni Unite.
Ma anche questa nuova risoluzione rimase senza effetti decisivi non solo perché sono gli stati membri a decidere che cosa è, o non è, materiale bellico, o perché il Comitato sull'embargo delle armi non ha oggettivi poteri di controllo, ma anche perché giungeva tardiva.

Partendo dal dato macroscopico, infatti, dobbiamo riconoscere che, se il Sudafrica è una potenza nucleare, la responsabilità è tutta dell'Occidente che ha accettato come affidabile l'impegno del regime di Pretoria per l'uso esclusivamente civile dell'energia atomica.
Su questa base non solo la collaborazione dei paesi occidentali è stata costante, ma è stata anche legittimata dall'interesse a far sottoscrivere anche al Sudafrica il trattato di non proliferazione, cosa che il governo di Pretoria non si è mai sognato di fare così come non ha mai pensato di consentire sul suo territorio ispezioni da parte dell'Agenzia internazionale sull'energia atomica (IAEA), organismo di cui il Sudafrica fa tuttora parte nonostante le iniziative per una sua espulsione e le risoluzioni sull'urgenza di controlli (risoluzioni rispetto alle quali, secondo il solito, gli USA e i paesi occidentali europei o votarono contro o si astennero).

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Eppure pare chiaro che, anche se si fosse dovuto dare credito alle dichiarazioni con cui il governo sudafricano ha sempre smentito di volersi servire dell'energia nucleare a fini bellici, la potenzialità insita nella qualità delle cooperazione nucleare avrebbe di necessità comportato, in assenza soprattutto di ispezioni e controlli, il rifiuto della collaborazione.
Le considerazioni possono essere ripetute per il commercio delle armi: infatti non tutti i paesi che hanno sottoscritto l'embargo lo hanno interpretato in senso rigoroso. Fatta eccezione per gli scandinavi, gli altri governi o si sono riparati dietro il segreto militare sulle commesse belliche o hanno addotto pretestuose giustificazioni sull'uso non esclusivamente militare delle forniture.
L'Italia si è in qualche modo distinta, anche se non proprio nello stesso senso della Svezia o della Norvegia, perché, quando fu accertato che materiale bellico italiano aveva violato l'embargo, il rappresentante del nostro governo si difese ricorrendo allo stesso alibi di cui il governo si serve tuttora nel rispondere a interrogazioni in materia presentate in Parlamento: negando di essere a conoscenza di scorrettezze perché, «per quanto era in grado di sapere» le licenze concesse all'esportazione sono sempre in regola. Accade, infatti, che la materia sia coperta da segreto e che consenta di conoscere solo quello che conviene: le censure delle Nazioni Unite furono dunque subite con vittimismo. D'altra parte la copertura del segreto rende difficile trovare le prove di quei fatti che generano qualcosa di più del sospetto.
In Italia in questi ultimi tempi è emerso un caso che dovrebbe ricevere motivate smentite del governo perché si fonda su atti processuali che un paese straniero ha trasmesso al governo italiano per i provvedimenti di dovere. Il caso è quello di tale Peter A. Getterman, cittadino danese, che è stato condannato dalla magistratura di Copenhagen per esportazione illegale di materiale bellico in Sudafrica. Dagli atti si apprende che in tre successive spedizioni tra il gennaio e il luglio del 1979 tre navi del Signor Getterman (la Hanne Trigan, la Pia Fren, la Walwis Bay), imbarcarono forniture di materiale bellico (626 tonnellate di granate, spolette e detonatori la prima, 20 tonnellate di mine e detonatori la seconda, 6 tonnellate sempre di mine e detonatori la terza) destinate al Sudafrica. Dove furono imbarcati questi materiali? a Porto Talamone. Come è stato possibile in un paese in cui, in assenza di pirati, solo i servizi di sicurezza possono avere fatto superare gli sbarramenti della capitaneria di porto e della guardia di finanza?
La magistratura danese ha trasmesso all'Italia gli atti del processo in data 11 aprile '85 chiedendo un'inchiesta; sono seguite interrogazioni parlamentari, ma il governo tace né si ha notizia che la magistratura italiana sia stata attivata. Mentre su altre e ben più consistenti forniture (p.es. aerei P-166 della Piaggio, elicotteri A-205 dell'Augusta, aerei Aermacchi e Aeritalia di varia natura) non si ha molto più delle notizie e dell'opposizione del segreto, questa - che è, tutto sommato, una partita poco rilevante - resta una storia sulla quale il governo avrebbe il dovere di andare fino in fondo, per correggere la tradizionale prassi di evitare la trasparenza e la verità anche quando il negarla è più stupido che cinico. Infatti i nostri governi brillano - si fa per dire - per episodi di questo genere, mentre altri cercano almeno di salvare le apparenze pur non avendo mea culpa da recitare per le violazioni di ieri.
D'altra parte, nonostante i limiti indicati, l'embargo sulla armi ha impedito al Sudafrica di diventare in toto militarmente autosufficiente; per questo il blocco economico, anche quando fosse ridotto a solo segnale politico, è una delle misure più importanti e fattive. Peraltro, la *souplesse* con cui l'Occidente ha affrontato anche in questi ultimi mesi il tema delle sanzioni economiche è significativa. Anche se Mrs. Thatcher ha dato vedere, con la solita cruda nettezza, che agli affari il mercato non rinucia, i governi europei si sono ritrovati alla destra di Reagan.
Gli Stati Uniti, infatti, hanno limitato il loro intervento ai computers e al nucleare e, giustamente, il vescovo Tutu ritiene che abbiano aiutato in sostanza il regime di Pretoria (e il rito del forse-che-sì, forse-che-no da parte del Consiglio economico sociale delle N.U. a New York sembra confermarlo), ma un segnale concreto lo hanno dato.
L'Italia non è il primo partner del Sudafrica, ma non è neppure l'ultimo. A chi scorra le pagine di «Realtà Sudafricana» - pubblicazione edita a cura dell'Ambasciata SA. di Roma - non sfuggono le ricorrenti segnalazioni e le foto-ricordo che vedono esaltati managers pubblici e privati o politici, da Prodi a De Benedetti, da Carli ad Altissimo, ai rappresentanti della Montedison e della SNAM-Innocenti presenti a «difendere» i nostri interessi. Il mercato *non olet?*
Può essere; ma chi lo pensi dovrebbe avere il brutale coraggio di Mrs. Thatcher e dirlo chiaramente.
Anche perché le misure economiche sono funzionali alla difesa del diritto all'autodeterminazione se vengono caricate di significato politico da parte dei governi; suscitano atteggiamenti conflittuali negli stessi popoli viciniori che fanno parte della SADCC o di un Mozambico costretto all'accordo di NKomati. Si conta, infatti, sulla possibilità di ridurre anche i popoli di nuova indipendenza a calcare le orme dell'ipocrisia occidentale, esprimendo solidarietà verbale e cercando la sopravvivenza con accordi separati.
Qualcuno potrebbe, per esempio, sorprendersi vedendo che i rappresentanti delle multinazionali, a partire dall'Anglo American Company, hanno preso contatto con l'ANC; ma, a prescindere dalle esasperazioni del settore iperrazzista, il mondo degli affari dimostra solo di essere più reattivo e di volersi difendere: la situazione attuale non può continuare e lo stesso espediente di Botha di creare ambiti parlamentari separati per meticci e indiani e, in prospettiva, per neri, rivela la debolezza di un regime che, quanto a forza, ha solo quella della repressione violenta, debole mezzo quando gente che ha coscienza profonda dei propri diritti e altrettanto profonda disperazione accetta la sfida dell'oppressione.
Per questo, se il mercato lascia capire

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che la prova di forza sarebbe distruttiva e che il popolo nero è a tutti gli effetti un cliente e un operatore da salvaguardare, occorre domandarsi se le cautele dei politici occidentali non siano complicità.
L'interrogativo è preciso: perché non rivolgere le attenzioni di cooperazione e commercio a Lesotho, Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Mozambico tenendo conto anche del fatto che i nove paesi della SADCC sono firmatari della III Convenzione di Lomé? Occorre infatti rovesciare urgentemente il gioco di chi, fingendo preoccupazioni umanitarie, stigmatizza le sanzioni perché penalizzano più i neri dei bianchi e insidiano la stabilità delle economie circostanti, non dice che è la destabilizzazione organizzata ed esportata dal regime di Pretoria che mina la sicurezza e condiziona l'autonomia delle società povere.
Sono altissimi i costi che esse pagano per i danni della guerra alimentata dai razzisti, delle distruzioni di raccolti e del conseguente calo produttivo, così come delle spese per la difesa, delle perdite dovute al contrabbando, ai boicottaggi, alle imposte sui trasporti, alla mancanza di energia. Le aggressioni sudafricane di questi ultimi cinque anni hanno prodotto perdite equivalenti a tutto l'aiuto internazionale dello stesso periodo o ai due terzi di tutte le esportazioni dei paesi della SADCC.
Il dato comparativo dimostra che è il Sudafrica a danneggiare, obiettivamente, lo sviluppo dell'economia dell'Africa Australe: il non progettare inversioni di marcia rappresenta, allora, un'effettiva complicità. Un paese come l'Italia, che sta sviluppando interventi di aiuto al terzo Mondo tardivi ma del tutto privi di confronto per imponenza nel resto dell'Occidente (anche se di fatto opera a sostegno della propria industria) dovrebbe dare valenza politica alle proprie operazioni. La cooperazione mirata con Lesotho, Mozambico, Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland annullerebbe, tanto per cominciare, la minaccia di rimpatrio dei lavoratori immigrati che il Sudafrica utilizza anche per dividere e reprimere la manodopera di colore. Analogamente l'abbandono del partner fin qui privilegiato avrebbe effetti non mediocri e non va sottovalutato il fatto che, anche se il Sudafrica ricava il 90% degli investimenti dall'impiego dei propri capitali, il ministro delle Finanze Barand du Plessis ha ammesso che la via d'uscita dalla peggior recessione degli ultimi cinquanta anni dipende fondamentalmente dal mantenimento del 10% degli investimenti esteri. Si prospetta così, anche nel settore bancario, la sfacciata solidarietà di certo «occidente».
Nonostante il boicottaggio a rovescio dichiarato dal governo sudafricano che si è dato una moratoria di quattro mesi al rimborso dei debiti (il Sudafrica ha un debito globale di circa 22 miliardi di dollari, la metà del quale va in scadenza entro l'anno), il presidente dell'Unione delle Banche Svizzere ha dichiarato che gli istituti non prevedono alcuna misura coercitiva e che pertanto i crediti continueranno ad essere concessi. È tuttavia sintomatico che diverse banche statunitensi che hanno investimenti in Sudafrica non abbiano rinnovato le loro linee di credito.
L'Italia, si avvale per i propri rapporti di complicità economica di diversi istituti finanziari (Banca Commerciale, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banco di Roma, Banco di Sicilia, Banco del Gottardo - Ambrosiano, Credito Italiano, Istituto San Paolo, Cariplo, Generali Assicurazioni, Euromobiliare s.p.a.), mentre il Vaticano è impegnato attraverso il Banco di Roma per la Svizzera, che è lo strumento dell'Istituto per le Opere di Religione (IOR). Per il nostro paese si tratta di una partecipazione di notevole interesse, collocata com'è al nono posto nella graduatoria internazionale.
Ma, indipendentemente dal volume dei capitali (884,7 milioni di dollari), vale la pena di evidenziare che l'aumento degli investimenti è stato del 225,5% in tre anni, secondo i dati elaborati dall'ultimo rilevamento del Consiglio Ecumenico delle Chiese, a cura di Eva Militz.
Il ministro degli esteri italiano, l'On. Giulio Andreotti, riferendo in sede di commissione, il 13 settembre giudicava ipocrita il continuo reiterarsi delle nobili dichiarazioni nelle diverse tribune internazionali: «è ora di passare ai fatti». Si tratta di una dichiarazione a sua volta ipocrita e gratuita, dato che il 18 aprile, il Parlamento Europeo ha approvato due risoluzioni molto concrete e non inapplicabili, visto che molti paesi le hanno adottate. Con le sanzioni economiche, chiedevano agli stati membri della CEE di prendere misure immediate per:
- mettere fine a tutti gli investimenti in Sudafrica e ai prestiti bancari per l'esportazione;
- ridurre progressivamente i rapporti commerciali;
- aderire all'embargo sugli armamenti;
- sospendere le relazioni con il Sudafrica nell'ambito sportivo e culturale;
- rinforzare il codice di comportamento;
- accordare un sostegno più forte alle Conferenze di coordinamento dello sviluppo dell'Africa Australe (SADCC);
- chiedere la liberazione immediata di Nelson Mandela e di tutti i prigionieri.

Inoltre davano mandato alla Commissione europea di trovare i modi di interdire le importazioni di Krugerrands, le esportazioni di petrolio verso il Sudafrica e le importazioni di carbone.
Dalla Francia alla Finlandia, dalla Svezia alla Danimarca le risposte sono state varie, ma concrete.
Dall'Italia si attende ancora, ma non si sà che cosa, visto che l'On. Andreotti approva anche la partecipazione delle vetture italiane alla gara di Formula 1.
Il ministro degli Esteri, come rappresentante del governo che ha retto per ultimo la presidenza comunitaria è d'altra parte andato con la delegazione della CEE in Sudafrica a rappresentare le preoccupazioni e lo sdegno dei paesi europei. Se Piet Botha ha espresso soddisfazione per l'incontro, le parole pronunciate debbono essere state assai poco vibrate; fatto tanto più grave in quanto la delegazione era partita dopo il rifiuto del governo sudafricano alla richiesta di ottenere (come avevano ottenuto i parlamentari americani) un incontro

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con Nelson Mandela. Proprio perché i principi non possono restare parole vuote, l'incontro con Nelson Mandela doveva essere determinante per la realizzazione della visita: se uno degli scopi della missione era quello di chiedere la liberazione dei prigionieri politici a partire dal leader dell'ANC in carcere da oltre ventitré anni, la mancanza di autorizzazione avrebbe dovuto comportare il rinvio del viaggio a termini strettamente diplomatici. I tre europei non hanno così incontrato quelli che dovevano vedere, o perché il governo non glielo ha permesso o perché non sono stati ritenuti credibili (l'UDR ha chiaramente ricusato di vederli); chi, come il vescovo Tutu, ha parlato con loro, li ha poi criticati; l'unico soddisfatto è stato Botha.
I Parlamentari dell'Europa occidentale contro l'apartheid (Awepaa) che si sono riuniti ad Amsterdam il 12-14 settembre, hanno detto giustamente, nel documento della presidenza, che questa delegazione è stata «una vergogna». L'On. Andreotti, che l'ha accompagnata, l'ha ritenuta una visita «non negativa».
D'altra parte ciò non meraviglia: quando lo scorso anno Piet Botha aveva fatto una sua tournée in Europa per rinsaldare rapporti con alcuni governi occidentali, il presidente del Consiglio italiano non aveva perso l'occasione nel riceverlo di confermare l'ambiguità e la connivenza sostenendo che non era semplice tagliare i ponti con un paese che ospita 80.000 connazionali.

Sugli stessi moduli si uniforma l'ambasciatore sudafricano a Roma, che si è stupito della protesta espressa nel suo ufficio da tutti i gruppi politici democratici e che ha inviato al Parlamento perfino un proprio intervento in cui elenca i canoni classici del razzismo, della «superiorità dei bianchi», della «democrazia ereditata dal Regno Unito non adeguata per il Sudafrica», della concessione di indipendenza ai neri «entro i confini geografici abitati dai loro avi», dei meticci, degli indiani e dei «miscugli ulteriori di altri indigeni», della politica del governo che «riassume in sé l'autoderminazione nel vero senso della parola». A quanto è dato supporre il ministro degli esteri italiano non gli deve avere mai detto che la democrazia significa il diritto di cittadinanza per tutti, il diritto di voto, la legge maggioritaria.
Né deve avergli detto che quella civiltà occidentale da cui il Sudafrica deriva il razzismo ha già prodotto altre tragedie storiche.
Cosa che dovrebbe essere detta a tutti i sudafricani «bianchi», perché, come dice Breyten Breytenbach, siamo arrivati al punto di non ritorno.



("Linus", Milano, ottobre 1985)

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Africa Austral: Análisis Militar

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Colectivo de estudios militares de IEPALA

SOMMARIO *Un'analisi attenta e documentata dell'apparato militare del Sud Africa, della sua potenza e modernità, in un raffronto con il potenziale militare dell'Angola e del Mozambico. L'articolo, basato su una relazione ad un seminario di studi militari dello IEPALA, evidenzia con chiarezza il sostegno alle forze armate sudafricane da parte di quasi tutti gli apparati militari dei paesi capitalisti occidentali. Viene inoltre dimostrata l'importanza della Namibia, oltre che per la sua rilevanza economico-politica, soprattutto per il suo ruolo di «gigantesca portaerei» che incrementa significativamente la portata di azione delle forze armate sudafricane.*

SUMMARY *An attentive and well-documented analysis of the South African military apparatus, its powerness and modernity, compared to the military potential of Angola and Mozambique. This essay, prepared by a member of a collective on military issues at IEPALA, highlights the massive support to the South African Armed Forces given by Western capitalist countries. The strategic role of Namibia, not just for its significant economical and political relevance, but especially for its fundamental function of «gigantic aircraft» for the South African military operations, is clearly demonstrated.*

ASPECTOS GENERALES

En cuanto al tamaño del ejército sudafricano, se cifra hoy día en medio millón de hombres aproximadamente, de los cuales unos 100.000 sería lo que ellos llaman "fuerza permanente". Casi la mitad de estas fuerzas son profesionales. Luego hay un escalón, a partir de esos — 100.000 hombres, que son los más especializados. Hay un segundo escalón, que llaman la "fuerza ciudadana" que es de reclutamiento, pero — con un sistema muy parecido a los más modernos, imperantes hoy en Israel, en Suiza, en Suecia o en Austria — sistema de lo que se ha llamado "ciudadano de uniforme", que consiste en tener permanentemente movilizada durante décadas, a parte de la población masculina, a base de permanecer así un periodo determinado de meses al año, o a veces de días al mes-. Con la suma de este escalón de la "fuerza ciudadana" y con el tercer escalón, que ellos le llaman "comandos" y que, por el mismo método de reclutamiento, asume las tareas de contra-insurgencia interior, puede calcularse que la República Sudafricana da instrucción militar y utiliza militarmente a toda -toda- su población masculina en edad de reclutamiento militar -allí desde los 21 (a veces, los 18 años) hasta los 35 años - en un ciclo de siete años. Cada siete años pasan por los cuarteles y por combate todos los jóvenes entre esas edades. Posteriormente, durante otro periodo de casi veinte años, son movilizados, periódicamente, cada cierto tiempo, para realizar maniobras con fuego real. Normalmente, ese eufemismo encubre ataques y operaciones de contra-insurgencia dentro de Sudáfrica y, a veces, operaciones en Namibia y el sur de Angola.

Como hace unos pocos meses en que, en un acto similar de apoyo al ANC sudafricano, ya realizamos un estudio de las FAS de la República Sudafricana, no vamos a profundizar aquí otra vez en estos aspectos generales, sino únicamente recordar algunos datos, porque la finalidad de esta reunión es muy otra.

En cuanto al aspecto humano, que ya se ha resumido, el ejército sudafricano ostenta una sustancial ventaja sobre sus vecinos, dado que ese medio millón teórico de angoleños encuadrados en la Defensa Popular, ni tienen armas, ni están concentrados, ni son fácilmente concentrables, ni hay dinero ni medios para encuadrarlos, armarlos y entrenarlos.

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CUADRO I

SUDAFRICA		ANGOLA		MOZAMBIQUE	
Ejército de Tierra	67.400 h.	Ej. Tierra	35.000 h.	Ej. Tierra	11.000 h.
Reservas (R. Activa)	130.000 h.	Marina	1.000 h.	Marina	650 h.
Marina	5.000 h.	Ej. Aire	1.500 h.	Ej. Aire	1.000 h.
Reservas	2.000 h.	Infantería Milicias	10.000 h.		
Ej. Aire	10.000 h.			TOTAL	12.650 h.
Reservas	25.000 h.	TOTAL	47.500 h.		
Kommandos	90.000 h.			C. Fronteras	6.000 h.
Policía	35.000 h.	Defensa Popular	500.000 h.		
Reserva Policía	20.000 h.			TOTAL	18.650 h.
TOTAL	384.400 h.				
SWAFT	90.000 h.				
TOTAL	474.400 h.				
Reservas Moviliz.	402.500 h.				
TOTAL	876.900 h.				

Fuente: Military Balance 1983-84

Con respecto al material, resulta también indubitable la ventaja de los racistas, y no sólo cuantitativamente, sino también cualitativamente:

CUADRO II

	SUDAFRICA	ANGOLA Y MOZAMBIQUE
Carros blindados	250	525
Blindados	2.800	285
T.O.A.'s	500	350
Cañones y morteros	1.385	1.275
Aviones ataque	104	92
Otros aviones	548	89
Helicópteros	100	52
Buques + 500 TM	12	2

Fuente: Military Balance, 1983-84

Efectivamente, por ejemplo, los carros "Centurion/Olifant", de origen británico, tienen radar, computador de navegación y de tiro, estabilización automática del cañon - que les permite disparar en marcha-, proyector de lasser, etc., mientras que los T.54/55 de angoleños y mozambicanos de origen soviético, no pueden ni siquiera soñar con estos adelantos, conformándose con los visores nocturnos de tiro, únicamente. En cuanto a la artillería, los obuses G.5, de los sudafricanos, recién contruídos y con capacidad nuclear, no tienen parangón en el otro bando. Los misiles "Cactus", "Tigercat", "Entac" y SS.11, 228 lanzadores en total para Sudáfrica, superan ampliamente a los anticuados

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"Sagger" soviéticos, y a los menos anticuados SA.6 y SA.7, con 150 lanzadores en total para Angola—Mozambique. Por último, los aviones: los 45 "Mirage F.1" sudafricanos, desbordan ampliamente a los 39 Mig.21 de sus vecinos, y los 54 "Mirage III" dominan sobradamente a los 60 Mig.17 rivales porque Angola y Mozambique sólo poseen estos dos tipos de aviones de combate para todos los cometidos (defensa aérea, bombardeos, ataque al suelo, COIN, etc.), mientras que la República Sudafricana únicamente los emplea en defensa aérea y ataque al suelo, porque posee, además, 14 bombarderos medios tipo "Camberra" y "Buccaneer", ambos con capacidad nuclear, y otros 167 de ataque al suelo/COIN, además de otros 140 de COIN exclusivamente.

Esta potencialidad militar se debe a la ayuda abierta o soterrada del "centro capitalista" a la República Sudafricana, por medio de la venta y cesión de material hasta que se declaró el boicot, y de la venta de patentes de ese material, después de declarado el boicot, lo cual permite a Pretoria fabricar sistemas de armas nuevos y componentes y repuestos para los recibidos antes. Igualmente, antes y después del boicot se han hecho llegar a la República Sudafricana toda clase de sistemas electrónicos -que en sí no son considerados como armamento-, adaptables a necesidades militares, y que son la parte más importante de la ayuda, con vistas a la guerra moderna.

El centro de escucha de Silvermine, montado por la Plessey británica, la red de alerta "Advokaat", montada por la Telefunken germano-holandesa, el centro de cálculo del Estado Mayor, con computadoras IBM, Thomson, etc., colocan al Gobierno racista de Pretoria y a su ejército a un nivel sin comparación en toda Africa, respecto a tecnología militar, que es capaz de enlazar Sudáfrica con el sistema de satélites militares USA y las redes electrónicas exteriores de Francia (Diego Suarez, Djibuti, Senegal, República Centroafricana, Chad...) e Inglaterra (Ascensión, Oman, Malvinas...).

Sin embargo, este instrumento militar encara agresivamente no sólo a los países de la "Línea del Frente" (además de amenazar potencialemnte a media Africa), sino también, y muy fundamentalmente, al ANC en la propia Sudáfrica, y al SWAPO en Namibia, verdaderos problemas bélicos para el régimen, además de ser importantes cuestiones políticas, socioeconómicas e ideológicas, a nivel interno y externo.

El conflicto de Namibia ha sido complicado por Pretoria, entre otras razones, para que el Capitalismo internacional pueda acosar a los pueblos de Angola y Mozambique, principalmente, que consiguieron su liberación del Colonialismo tras duros sacrificios y lucha, y constituyen un "reto inadmisible" y un "mal ejemplo" para toda Africa, además de una "amenaza estratégiaca" para la dominación y explotación del Cono Sur del continente. Por otro lado, dicha complicación tiene también por objeto desviar la atención externa e interna del problema del "apartheid" y del ANC, también de importante repercusión militar, ya que toda la "metodología de la contrainsurgencia" puesta en práctica no consigue resultados apreciables frente a la organización popular-militar sudafricana.
El conflicto en Namibia, la guerra contra el SWAPO, adquiere semejantes características, y ambas situaciones unidas "precisan de una solución" externa, a los ojos militaristas de Pretoria. No sólo por la cuestión del teórico aprovisionamiento, entrenamiento y refugio de las guerrillas en Angola y demás Estados limítrofes, sino también, y muy fundamentalmente, porque la internacionalización de la guerra permitiría al régimen racista disponer de mayores facilidades y ayuda externa como para militarizar del todo el sistema y agudizar más los procesos de genocidio.

Sin embargo, las posibilidades de internacionalización tienen un límite - la "rentabilidad" de la República Sudafricana para el Capitalismo-, y por eso Pretoria intenta lograr una complicación limitada y controlada, flexible a su antojo, que permita al país "disfrutar" de esta situación sin embarcarse en una guerra internacional. Ligando Namibia, el SWAPO y el ANC a Angola, Mozambique y demás país limítrofes, y todo a la URSS y al "comunismo internacional", Sudáfrica consigue sus propósitos de:
- Ayuda efectiva del Capitalismo, especialmente de USA
- Militarización creciente de toda Sudáfrica, de cara al ANC
- Militarización creciente de Namibia, de cara al SWAPO.

EL CONFLICTO

Por su importancia de todo orden - que luego veremos- las FAS sudafricanas tienen en Namibia su "teatro" de guerra principal:
- Convencionalmente, frente a Angola
- Desestabilizador encubierto, de enlace y ayuda a UNITA
- COIN, especialmente de cara al SWAPO
- Estratégico, de amenaza a Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe y de contactos con Zaire.

Consecutivamente, este ejército ha desplegado allí los "escalones" bélicos necesrios para cumplir estas misiones múltiples:

Fuerzas "convencionales" destinadas a las penetraciones rápidas y acoso constante del Sur de Angola. En agosto de 1981, la ofensiva principal reunió 11.000 hombres; 40 carros "Centurion/Olifant"; 70 blindados AML. 70; 200 TOA's; artillería, misiles; 90 aviones y helicópteros; es decir, el 13,34% de efectivos humanos de "maniobra"; el 16% de los carros; 2,5% de los blindados; 40% de los TOA's y 12% de aviones y helicópteros.
Fue un raid corto y sin ambiciones, puesto que, antes y después, en otras ofensivas, se llegó a lanzar hasta el 30% de todas las fuerzas contra esa zona. En todo caso, aparte del contingente principal, en todas las ofensivas se han montado operaciones paralelas, generalmente de "kommandos", e incluso de la "Fuerza Ciudadana" (Reservas), y se

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ha mantenido un "escalón de reserva" de, al menos, los mismos efectivos del cuerpo principal. Todo ello dependió de los objetivos buscados en cada operación, que algunas veces se limitaba a "sondear" las defensas angoleñas; otras, a cubrir envíos y operaciones de UNITA; otras, a desplazar a algunas unidades angoleñas, que "amenazaban" el dispositivo militar sudafricano en el Sur de la propia Angola, etc., pero en ningún caso, a provocar una batalla convencional en toda regla.

Pensemos en que más del 75% del aparato militar "pesado" (carros, artillería, blindados, aviación...) sudafricano se encuentra desplegado en las fronteras del país, y que todas las Unidades van rotando por los diversos sectores, incluída Namibia, "para adquirir experiencia de combate". Así, si distribuímos el frente en 10 secciones ideales, por su importancia, tendríamos 4 para Namibia, 2 para Botswana, y 4 para Zimbabwe-Mozambique; repartiendo el citado 75% entre estas secciones, ello representaría para Namibia unos 25.000 hombres, 75 carros, 840 blindados, 150 TOA's, 415 cañones y morteros, 31 aviones de ataque, otros 164 aviones y 30 helicópteros. Estos, son sólo datos indicativos, claro.

Fuerzas COIN. En primer lugar, las "fuerzas convencionales" que, en sus desplazamientos, colaboran en las labores de "contrainsurgencia". Además, y específicamente, la "Fuerza de Defensa del Africa Sudoccidental" (SWATF), compuesta por:

— 7 batallones nativos, con 4.200 h. (que tuvieron 8.000 desertores en sólo tres meses, de diciembre/80 a marzo/81)
— 3.000 h. de la "Fuerza Ciudadana"
— 15.600 h. de los "kommandos"
— 5.000 h. de la Reserva Móvil
— 3.000 h. de la Fuerza Policial de Africa del SO.
— 30.000 h. de las reservas de la Fuerza Ciudadana

Con todos sus medios, incluyendo aviación ligera, blindados ligeros, artillería móvil, etc..

Todo ello sumaba, en diciembre de 1981, 90.000 h. de fuerzas de ocupación, distribuídos en numerosas bases, entre las que destacaban las de Tenegab (Ejército), cerca de Marienthal, Ondangua (Fuerza Aérea) y Valvis Bay (Marina).

No es extraño, pues, que en 1984 el Presupuesto de la República Sudafricana asignase 800 millones de rands a la "fuerza de ocupación", el 24,47% del Presupuesto Militar total, y de entre ellos, 124 millones la SWATF. No se cuentan aquí, claro, ni los gastos proporcionales que originaba Namibia a todos los "escalones" globales del aparato militar, ni los gastos de Policía, consignados en su correspondiente Ministerio, etc..

En Namibia han combatido y combate lo más "grande" de las FAS sudafricanas, desde los pilotos de los "Mirage F.1", a los carros "Olifant", desde los aviones de "inteligencia" "Piaggio P.166 "", a los helicópteros "Puma", desde los oficiales de la red "Advokaat" a los mercenarios del batallón "Buffalo 32", y a las unidades COIN, especialistas en masacres, llamadas "Koevoet".

Las tácticas COIN clásicas (tropas helitransportadas, poblados fortificados, rastreadores, delatores, propagandas, secuestros, represalias civiles, etc.), se combinan con los sistemas más modernos (detectores de infrarrojos, computadoras de mando y comunicaciones, de coordinación operativa, simuladores, señalizadores lasser, detectores de olores y sonidos, radares portátiles, comunicaciones monitorizadas, etc.) para acabar con el SWAPO y sojuzgar a la población.... y no se consigue, porque la tecnología militar, el aparato bélico poderoso y sofisticado, nada puede lograr definitivamente si tiene al Pueblo en contra y lo que ellos significa a los efectos de la Guerra Popular Revolucionaria (asistencia al SWAPO, falsa información, camuflaje etc.).

LA IMPORTANCIA MILITAR DE NAMIBIA

Dentro de la importancia militar que el Capitalismo otorga a la República Sudafricana, como "peón estratégico", Namibia ocupa un lugar fundamental en los designios de Pretoria y de sus valedores capitalistas.

— A nivel económico:

• Mercados en Africa, para cuya conquista, los Pueblos Libres son un obstáculo, como lo sería Namibia, en su caso.

• Buenas relaciones con la dictaduras de Seguridad Nacional de América Latina, especialmente Chile y Uruguay en la actualidad, y, antes además, Argentina, a las que se aproximan mutuamente por sus fachadas atlánticas, estando constituída la de Sudáfrica, en su mayor parte, por la costa de Namibia, en la que se enclava la poderosa base de Valvis Bay. Con estas dictaduras, los EEUU en el pasado, trataron de montar una "Organización del Atlántico Sur" (OTAS), incluyendo a Sudáfrica, que tenía una vertiente económica y comercial, que aún subsiste, beneficiando a las empresas sudafricanas, transnacionles y de Israel.

• Eje de "zonas de libre comercio", como las de Taiwan, Israel y Corea del Sur, con las que Pretoria mantiene excelentes relaciones y como la que se intentaría montar, en su caso, en la propia Namibia.

• Salvaguardia de los intereses USA y europeos en Africa, especialmente en Zaire y Nigeria, que la privilegiada situación de Namibia favorece, gracias a sus puertos y aeropuertos militares, utilizados por aviones comerciales.

• Plataforma ante la Antártida, en la que la República Sudafricana no ha reivindicado aún zona alguna, pero posee las Islas del Príncipe Eduardo, en privilegiada posición como base de operaciones artárticas, junto con Gran Bretaña (Malvinas, Sandwich,

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Orcadas del Sur, Shetlands del Sur, Tristán da Cunha...), Francia (Crozet, Kerguelen, Nueva Amsterdam...), Noruega (Bouvet), Australia (Heard, McDonald, McQuaria), Nueva Zelanda (Bounty, Auckland, Chatham, Campbell), Chile (Lennox, Picton y Nueva, en Tierra de Fuego) y Argentina (Tierra de Fuego). Todo ello, de cara a las inmensas riquezas del "krill", los minerales del Continente Helado y los riquísimos "nódulos polimetálicos".

• Minerales, bancos de pesca, agricultura y mano de obra barata de Namibia.

— A nivel estratégico:

Si extendemos un mapa de la mitad sur de Africa y, con un compás, marcamos el radio de acción de los aviones de combate y transporte sudafricanos, vemos que su "capacidad de acción" resulta notablemente acrecentada gracias al "portaaviones namibiano":

Avion	Capacidad	Alcance	Ciudad comarca	Pais	Distancia
Camberra (8)	—	1.779 Kms.	—	Angola	150/1.700 (d. Namibia)
Buccaneer (6)	—	3.700 »	—	Angola	900/3.400 (d. RSA)
Mirage F.1 (45)	—	1.385 »	—	Zambia	350/2.000 (d. Namibia)
Mirage III (54)	—	1.200 »	—	Zambia	450/1.750 (d. RSA)
C. 130 (7)	92 h.	3.625/ 8.264 »	—	Botswana	150/1.059 (d. Namibia)
Transall (9)	93 h.	1.850 »	—	Botswana	100/900 (d. RSA)
DC. 4 y C. 47 (43)	45 h.	2.575/ 4.020 »	—	Zambia	10/1.175 (d. Caprivi)
H.S. 125 (4)	14 h.	4.482 »	Shaba/ Katanga	Zaire	450/1.600 (d. Caprivi)
L. 100 Civil (15)	128 h.	3.625/ 8.264 »	Shaba/ Katanga	Zaire	1.000/2.000 (d. RSA)
A. 300 Civil (7)	269 h.	7.040 »	—	Camerun	2.400/3.100 (d. Namibia)
Boeing 707 (2)	147 h.	9.262 »	—	Camerun	3.400/3.600 (d. RSA)
Boeing 727 (4)	189 h.	4.002 »	Norte	Zaire	2.100 (d. Namibia)
Boeing 737 (19)	148 h.	4.262 »	Norte	Zaire	3.200/3.499 (d. RSA)
Boeing 747 (15)	442 h.	9.624 »	—	—	—
H.S. 748-272 (3)	—	—	—	—	—

Como se ve, las bases aéreas de Namibia acortan notablemente las distancias a toda Africa Sudoccidental, para todos los tipos de aviones.
Esto es importante, si pensamos que la capacidad de transporte aéreo (incluídos los aviones civiles de la compañía aérea SAA, totalmente movilizables) alcanza a más de 17.000 h. en un solo vuelo, con armamento ligero, o a 15.000 con un buen puñado de blindados i artillería.

Además, países como Botswana y Zimbabwe resultan así totalmente accesibles y rodeados para cualquier tipo de operación aeroterrestre. Incluso, las teóricas bases de los aviones Tu.95 de reconocimiento marítimo soviético en Angola, quedan perfectamente controlables y accesibles a las operaciones, si ello se "hiciese necesario".

Por último, cabe señalar que, tanto la base de Valvis Bay, como las de Ondangua y Tenegab, enlazan con el sistema "Advokaat" y con el centro de escucha de Silvermine y la base de Simonstown (a disposición de la FDR norteamericana), y a través de estos sistemas, con la red de satélites estadunidenses, tipos "Vela", "Big Bird", KH.11, "Navstar", y "Noss".

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«Aiuti militari italiani e rispetto dei diritti umani nel Terzo Mondo», curata da Sergio Trevisan e Luciano Bertozzi, «Gli esperimenti nucleari nell'Oceano Pacifico», curata da Tadashi Funada.

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LA CONNECTION TRICOLORE

Abdul S. Minty

Dopo che il Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU adottò nel 1963 l'embargo militare contro il Sudafrica, vi fu una notevole pressione contro la Gran Bretagna, tradizionale fornitrice di armi a Pretoria, perché rispettasse la decisione del massimo organismo internazionale. Quando il partito laburista arrivò al potere nel 1964, la Gran Bretagna iniziò ad applicare l'embargo. Questo però costrinse il Sudafrica a cercare altri fornitori.
È risaputo che la Francia ha praticamente rimpiazzato la Gran Bretagna come principale fornitore d'armi a Pretoria. Quello che non si sa invece è che l'Italia segue a ruota la Francia.

A metà degli anni sessanta, il regime dell'apartheid non solo ricevette una quantità di aerei Aermacchi del tipo MB 326 ma la sua nuova fabbrica, la Atlas, diede inizio alla fabbricazione di quell'aereo noto in Sudafrica come Impala 1. Il primo Impala, montato dalla corporazione Atlas, fu brevettato nel novembre 1966. Da allora oltre 200 Impala 1 sono stati costruiti in Sudafrica che ha però dovuto dipendere dall'estero per vari pezzi. I motori Rolls Royce per questi aerei furono dapprima importati e poi prodotti direttamente in Sudafrica con licenza concessa dalla compagnia italiana Piaggio che aveva originariamente ricevuto la licenza dalla Rolls Royce inglese.
È stata questa la maniera per circuire l'embargo imposto dalla Gran Bretagna. Gli Impala 1 infatti dovevano rimpiazzare altri aerei forniti dagli inglesi: chiaramente i motori Rolls Royce per gli MB 326 sarebbro caduti sotto l'embargo. Ma l'embargo non includeva il sottoappalto fatto tramite altre nazioni come appunto l'Italia. Il Sudafrica poté così aggirare l'embargo utilizzando queste varie scappatoie nonché la disponibilità delle compagnie e del governo italiano per ottenere materiale vitale per la sua forza aerea. Più importante ancora, la produzione Impala in Sudafrica iniziò a dare al regime dell'apartheid l'esperienza e le tecniche per sviluppare la sua produzione bellica oggi in pieno boom.
Nel 1973 si venne a sapere che il governo di Pretoria avrebbe acquistato dall'Aermacchi un buon numero di aerei più sofisticati, gli MB 326 K e li avrebbe costruiti su licenza in Sudafrica.
Nel libro bianco del ministero della difesa del 1973, l'allora ministro della difesa Botha (ora capo di stato) rivelò che erano andati in porto i negoziati per l'aquisto di una nuova serie di aerei da caccia e che la produzione sudafricana di un tipo di Impala più sofisticato sarebbe diventata realtà. Egli annunciò anche che erano in atto i preparativi per la creazione e produzione locale di un aereo militare di tipo leggero.
Eventi susseguenti confermeranno che l'aereo leggero citato dal libro bianco non era altro che l'Aermacchi AM-3C, che già dal giugno 1973 era stato ordinato dalle forze aeree sudafricane. Il ministero della difesa sudafricana ed alti alti ufficiali non hanno mai negato di aver comperato le licenze per gli Impala così come per gli AM-3C dall'Italia.
Nel 1965 quando il governo italiano fu accusato alle Nazioni Unite di infrangere l'embargo contro il Sudafrica, la risposta fu di questo tenore: «si tratta di una ditta italiana che ha fornito a Pretoria alcuni aerei per addestramento civile che non cadono però sotto le risoluzioni del Consiglio di Sicurezza e non rafforzano il potenziale militare sudafricano».
È incredibile che il governo italiano sostenesse che gli aerei dati non avrebbero rafforzato il potenziale delle forze aeree sudafricane. Il governo italiano ha continuato a negare di aver dato aerei italiani e di aver ceduto le licenze di costruzione in Sudafrica per scopi militari. Ma l'inventario delle forze aeree sudafricane fa trasparire vaste quantità di aerei e altre armi che sono di origine italiana. L'aereo AM-3C era stato comperato e un contratto siglato per la sua produzione locale perché gli aerei CESSNA che il Sudafrica voleva aquistare erano infatti bloccati dall'embargo statunitense. Ironia volle che l'AM-3C fosse equipaggiato con i motori Lycoming GS0-480-B1B6 di produzione americana. Di nuovo l'embargo portato avanti dagli USA è stato aggirato con accordi particolari via Italia. In questa materia, tecnologia inglese e americana di vitale importanza per il Sudafrica, come i motori, è

("Nigrizia", Verona, agosto 1985. L'autore è direttore della Campagna Mondiale contro la collaborazione militare e nucleare con il Sudafrica, di Oslo)

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stata data al Sudafrica con la complicità italiana.

Stranamente il governo italiano ha in questi ultimi anni ammesso di aver fornito molto tempo fa armi al Sudafrica ma insiste che dal 1972 tutte queste vendite sono state bloccate. Uno non può non chiedersi perché mai siano state bloccate nel 1972 quando il governo italiano aveva insistito che dal 1966 nessun pezzo andava alle forze armate sudafricane. Ma anche di questa decisione di voler aderire all'embargo dal 1972 si venne a conoscerne solo dopo la conferenza di Lagos contro l'apartheid (1977) dove ho enumerato i vari pezzi italiani che sono stati utilizzati dal Sudafrica. Un anno prima, in un incontro a Roma alla Farnesina, mi era stato detto che tutte le prove che avevo portato sul fatto che gli Impala ecc. erano prodotti in Sudafrica erano «solo storielle» che il governo aveva sentito già ma che erano fandonie.
Fu solo dopo che ho insistito dando altre prove in particolare davanti al comitato dell'ONU sull'embargo della vendita di armi al Sudafrica che, iniziando dal 1978, il governo italiano iniziò ad ammettere traffici avvenuti anni prima. Ma anche in quell'occasione il governo italiano si rifiutò di sospendere le licenze per la costruzione degli aerei e dei motori Rolls Royce affermando che erano state cedute definitivamente.
Ma c'è dell'altro.
La rivista americana *Defence & Foreign Affairs Digest* (6/1979) affermava che tre unità dell'Albatross (sistema anti-aereo su nave) erano state comperate sul mercato italiano dal Sudafrica. Un'altra rivista *Armies & Weapons* (n. 50, gennaio 1979) affemava che il Sudafrica aveva acquistato corvette israeliane con missile dati pure da Israele. La rivista chiedeva: «Ma i cannoni e l'apparato anti-incendio sono italiani. Come siano arrivati in Sudafrica rimane un mistero».
Da quanto ci consta non c'è stata alcuna inchiesta in questi casi da parte del governo italiano.
Altro caso interessante.
Nell'aprile 1984 una corte danese ha condannato Peter Antonio Getterman trovato colpevole di 22 reati tra cui quello di esportazione illegale di armi in Sudafrica in violazione dell'embargo dell'ONU. Tre accuse riguardano direttamente l'Italia.
Primo, un carico di 626 tonnelate di granate, miccie e detonatori trasportato dal porto di Talamone al Porto di Durban (Sudafrica) dal 26 gennaio al 15 marzo 1979.
Secondo, un carico di 28 tonnellate di mine e detonatori dal porto di Talamone al porto di Durban (Sudafrica) dal 7 febbraio al maggio 1980 su un vascello di nome PIA FREM.
Terzo, carico di 6 tonnellate di mine, detonatori ecc. da Talamone a Walvis Bay in Namibia dal 19 febbraio al 16 luglio 1980 su un vascello di nome ARIES TRIGON.
Tre casi con gli atti ufficiali della corte sono stati portati dalla nostra organizzazione a conoscenza del governo italiano insieme con una nostra lettera in data 11 aprile 1984 in cui chiedevano un'inchiesta sull'affare in Italia. A tutt'oggi non abbiamo avuto alcuna risposta. Né tantomeno c'è stato l'arresto oppure il processo nei confronti di quelli che in Italia sono coinvolti in queste violazioni dell'embargo delle armi.
Tutto questo sta a dimostrare quanto sia importante per il governo italiano offrire un chiaro resoconto delle esportazioni militari e delle licenze concesse al regime dell'apartheid.
Sono gli aerei Aermacchi, noti in Sudafrica come Impala, ad essere utilizzati per attaccare gli stati del Fronte ed altri stati dell'Africa australe. Tutti gli accordi che hanno a che fare con previ patti militari dovrebbero essere terminati. E coloro che continuano ad agire contro l'embargo militare al Sudafrica dovrebbero essere arrestati e processati.
È incredibile come in Gran Bretagna, USA, Danimarca ed altrove vi siano stati processi per le violazioni dell'embargo, mentre non esiste niente del genere in Italia. Vuol forse dire che non ci sono violazioni del genere nel bel paese?

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LOOPHOLES IN THE OIL EMBARGO: WEST EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT

A series of United Nations General Assembly resolutions have called on all States to cut off oil supplies to South Africa, and urged the Security Council to impose a mandatory embargo. Only **six** nations were opposed to the latest resolution on an oil embargo of December 1983, **five** of them were West European countries: **the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium** and **Luxemburg**.
For the first time **Norway** abstained. As an oil exporting and shipping nation Norway had always voted in favour of oil embargo resolutions earlier and this new step caused considerable controversy.
All major oil exporting countries have a policy that their oil should not reach South Africa. All OPEC member states ban supplies to South Africa and the OPEC passed a strong resolution in 1981 supporting the tightening of measures. Other major oil exporting countries introduced restrictions which effectively ban the sale of crude oil to South Africa. Thus there is virtually no more «non-embargoed» crude oil available on the world market. Nevertheless, South Africa still manages to obtain oil from the outside world, albeit at considerable cost. A study of the loopholes reveals the following different types of **West European** involvement in circumventions of the international oil embargo:

1. Oil refineries in South Africa

As a key sector in the South African economy the refining industry is the most secretive. Procurement of oil is co-ordinated by the state-controlled Strategic Fuel Fund Association Ltd (SFF) on behalf of the South African subsidiaries of five major oil companies. Three of them are oil majors based in Western Europe: **British Petroleum (BP)** in the United Kingdom, **Shell** in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and **Total** in France.
These companies are not only active in the production, distribution and marketing of petroleum products in South Africa, but are also involved in the export of coal from South Africa to Western Europe.

2. Oil companies supplying crude oil

Oil companies and the so-called independent oil traders appear to be rather successful in secrecy measures. As owners of the cargo they usually conclude confidential charter parties, hiding behind the shipping companies.
Research by the Shipping Research Bureau on the period 1979-1982 indicates that the oil companies most deeply involved are all based in Western Europe: **Transworld Oil/John Deuss** in the Netherlands and Bermuda, **Shell** in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, **Vitol Trading** in the Netherlands and Switzerland, **Marc Rich & Co** in Switzerland and the United States of America and **Marimpex** in the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. Shipping companies transporting crude oil

Although it is impossible to hide a very large tanker, shipping companies try to conceal their calls to South Africa by not reporting destinations to the specialized shipping industry publications. Sometimes false destinations are given and even modifications and fabrications are made in documents. In 1982, about **90 percent** of the calls at South Africa have been kept strictly secret in this way. Almost all shipping companies which apparently delivered crude oil to South Africa are based in Western Europe: about **90 percent** of the total number. Most priminent are shipping companies from Norway: **Sig. Bergesen D.Y., Havtor A/S** (now dissolved), **Havtor Management A/S, Staubo/Verven** (sold its only tander Staland), **Thor Dahl, Hansen-Tangen** (its two tankers presently laid up), **Godager** (no own fleet any more), **Lorentzens Rederi Co.**.
Other shipping companies involved are **A.P. Moller** in Denmark, **Cast Eurocanadian Shipholdings** in Switzerland/Canada/Bermuda (now dissolved as far as tanker interests are involved), **Denholm Shipmanagement Ltd.** in the United Kingdom, **and SHV—RSV/van Nievelt, Goudriaan & Co** in the Netherlands (SHV/RSV withdrew from shipping, van Nievelt/Goudriaan does not operate tankers any more).

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4. North Sea oil

Sometimes crude oil which originates from fields in the North Sea is secretly shipped to South Africa, either directly or by making use of trans-shipment ports like Rotterdam. In 1980 and 1981 Norwegian oil was shipped directly from Tees (U.K.), where the Norwegian oil comes ashore, to South Africa by the tankers **Cast Puffin** and **Spey Bridge.** In both cases forged customs stamps were used on so called *certificates of discharge* stating that the crude oil had been delivered to Le Verdon in France.
In 1980 British North Sea oil was delivered to South Africa by the tanker **Robert Maersk** and Norwegian oil from the Ekofisk field was shipped to South Africa in 1981 by the tanker **Cast Fulmar.** In both these cases the port of Rotterdam was used for trans-shipment.
Both Norway and the United Kingdom have a policy that their oil should not go to South Africa. Embarassed by the disclosure of these shipments, the Norwegian Government decided to start an official investigation. In December 1984 the Norwegian Ministry of Oil an Energy indicated that there may have been twelve deliveries of Norwegian crude oil to South Africa in the years 1980-1981. In three of these twelve cases probably forged certificates of discharge were used. Two of the oil companies involved are **Petrofina** of Belgium and **Phillips Petroleum** of the U.S.A. (*Dagbladet*, Norway, 14 December 1984; *Arbei terbladet*, Norway, 14 December 1984).

5. Trans-shipment

In a trans-shipment port, crude oil can be brought in by a tanker from oil-exporting countries, held in storage, and then sent to South Africa. Research findings show that the West European ports of Rotterdam and Bilbao have been used this way to conceal crude oil deliveries to South Africa.

6. South African companies in North Sea oil exploration and production

In recent years, South African mining companies purchased stakes in North Sea oil fields through their subsidiaries registered in Western Europe. Three British registered companies: **Charter Consolidated (Anglo American Group), Baytrust** and **Union (Gencor Group)** acquired North Sea interests. British, Norwegian, Swedish and Dutch companies acted as partners in those stakes.

7. Transfer of technology to SASOL

More than seventy West European companies were involved in the construction of the large oil-from-coal plants of SASOL. Most prominent in this transfer of sensitive technologies were companies from the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Switzerland such as **Linde, Lurgi, Uhde, Air Liquide** and **Sulzer.**

8. Technical support to oil exploration in South Africa

The South African state-owned oil exploration company **SOEKOR** has been assisted over the years by a number of West European companies specialized in this field. British, Norwegian, Dutch, French, West German, Swiss, Italian and Belgian companies have been or still are active in supporting **SOEKOR** to find oil. The companies **John Brown engineers and Constructions** of the United Kingdom and **Foster Wheeler** of the United States of America, are presently involved in feasibilty studies regarding the gas finds in Mosselbay and the alleged oil finds in the Kudu field.

9. Financial support to South African oil industries

Mainly West German and Swiss banks have supplied large funds for the construction of **SASOL** plants. Together with French banking houses they also raised funds for loans to the **Strategic Oil Fund (SOF).**

(Excerpts from a paper prepared for the PCR Workshop on Strategies towards Economic Isolation of South Africa of the WCC by the Shipping Research Bureau, Amsterdam, May 1985)

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PRESTITI BANCARI AL SUDAFRICA, 1982-1984

Heinz Hunke

Con questo titolo, il Consiglio Ecumenico Mondiale delle Chiese, più precisamente il suo «Programma per Combattere il Razzismo», (PCR), ha pubblicato, nell'aprile passato, una ricerca, da esso finanziata, condotta da Eva Militz.

Lo studio evidenzia che 98 prestiti per un ammontare complessivo di US$ 4,244 milioni sono stati concessi ad enti sudafricani nel periodo metà 1982 - fine 1984, la cifra più alta mai registrata in un tale arco di tempo. La ricerca documenta dettagliatamente la partecipazione di 202 banche di 18 paesi a questi prestiti.

La pubblicazione del PCR esce in un momento in cui diventa sempre più ovvio che sulla questione dei prestiti e degli afflussi di nuovi capitali, il regime sudafricano è più sensibile e vulnerabile che non a qualsiasi altra forma di boicottaggio, sia esso militare, commerciale, energetico. Queste altre forme di embargo, infatti, possono essere circuite purché il regime abbia a disposizione i capitali necessari per acquistare sul mercato «libero» internazionale ad est o ovest.

In questo momento, l'economia sudafricana sta attraversando la sua crisi più profonda e seria da molti decenni: il prezzo dell'oro ha toccato livelli bassissimi; malgrado la pretesa di una politica di pacificazione nella regione, il budget per la militarizzazione cresce in modo malsano; la politica dei bantustan e la riforma costituzionale causano uno spreco enorme in spese «parallele»; il valore del Rand è sceso in cinque anni da US$ 1,- a US$ 0,38 dopo gli ultimi disordini e la dichiarazione dello stato di emergenza. Il Sudafrica si vede costretto a rimandare oltre la fine del 1985 il pagamento degli interessi per i debiti esteri che, secondo un funzionario del ministero delle finanze, Chris Stals, ammontano a US$ 22 miliardi, una cifra con la quale il Sudafrica si qualifica fra il più grandi debitori del mondo.

Certo, la campagna internazionale contro gli investimenti ed i prestiti ha incontrato importanti pur se parziali successi negli ultimi tempi. La campagna «ELTSA» (End Loans to South Africa, interrompere i prestiti al Sudafrica) in Gran Bretagna ha avuto un'eco fra le organizzazioni delle chiese, molte delle quali, inclusi molti ordini religiosi cattolici, hanno ritirato i loro fondi da banche che, come la Barclay's, hanno degli impegni molto consistenti in Sudafrica. Lo stesso è vero per la «campagna di disinvestimento» negli USA, che è riuscita a convincere non soltanto organizzazioni di chiese, ma sindacati, molti comuni e grandi città, e perfino cinque Stati, a ritirare i loro investimenti da qualsiasi impresa che commerci o investa in Sudafrica. La Citibank, la Chase Manhattan e altre anche hanno tagliato i loro legami in Sudafrica. La Camera ed il Senato hanno approvato una legislazione contro gli investimenti in Sudafrica, e perfino l'amministrazione Reagan ha ritenuto necessario far finta di imporre sanzioni, una delle quali era compresa fra le richieste della «campagna di disinvestimento»: la proibizione della vendita dei «Kruger Rand» (monte d'oro sudafricane) negli USA.

Nel frattempo però, i prestiti bancari ad enti statali o parastatali sudafricani da parte di banche europee e nordamericane continuano.

Da gennaio a giugno 1985, 16 prestiti per una somma totale di US$ 700 milioni sono stati concessi a tali enti. Ministri e sottosegretari del governo sudafricano, uomini dell'alta finanza e del commercio del Sudafrica, visitano in questi mesi le capitali occidentali in cerca di altri prestiti.

Dallo studio del PCR risulta che i paesi con le banche maggiormente impegnate in Sudafrica durante il periodo sopraindicato sono i seguenti:

Paese	Numero di banche	Numero di prestiti	Ammontare in milioni di US$
1. Gran Bretagna	26	34	1.957,6
2. Svizzera	20	37	1.520,4
3. Sudafrica	12	24	1.382.3
4. Germania Federale	48	27	1.235,0
5. Francia	23	22	1.094,8
6. USA	20	20	1.079,9
7. Austria	8	19	959,7
8. Belgio	7	19	927,7
9. Italia	11	18	884,7

Più significativa della statistica è l'analisi della tendenza per i vari paesi.

Mentre le banche americane e britanniche vengono sotto il tiro della campagna anti-investimenti, ne risentono la forza e si ritirano in varie forme parziali almeno dal mercato dei prestiti pubblici (public bonds), l'iniziativa nel traffico bancario passa alle banche tedesche, francesi ed italiane.

Nel 1984, banche della Germania Federale erano i dirigenti consorziali di 14 prestiti pubblici, per il 1985 si annuncia un impegno simile.

Sotto il governo socialista di Mitterrand, le più grandi banche della Francia sono state nazionalizzate. Ciononostante, le banche francesi hanno incrementato i loro prestiti, durante il periodo preso in esame dallo studio, del 90%, e tre di queste banche sono fra le prime dieci fra quelle che in tutto il mondo effettuano prestiti al Sudafrica.

Ugualmente allarmante è la tendenza crescente del coinvolgimento delle banche italiane. Mentre fra il 1979 e

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la metà del 1982, le banche italiane concessero prestiti per un ammontare di US$ 271,8 milioni, nel periodo in esame la cifra complessiva è di US$ 884,7 milioni, il che significa un aumento del 225,5%. L'Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino *è fra i primi venti istituti nel mondo che concedono prestiti ad enti sudafricani, durante il periodo indicato, per una cifra totale di US$ 792,7 milioni.*

Altre banche e finanziarie italiane coinvolte: Banca Commerciale Italiana, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banco di Sicilia, Cariplo, Credito Italiano, Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano (Banco del Gottardo), la Euromobiliare, Assicurazioni Generali.

Un aspetto particolarmente condannabile in questo contesto non è solo il fatto che i prestiti rafforzano il regime centrale dell'apartheid, ma che sui mercati internazionali dei capitali, i bantustan acquistano uno status indipendente che certamente non hanno nell'apparato «multirazziale» del Sudafrica. Transkei e Bophuthatswana hanno già ottenuto prestiti inernazionali. La Standard Bank britannica, tramite la sua filiale sudafricana, ha perfino istituito una banca a parte per un bantustan: La «Standard Bank of Bophuthatswana».

Fra gli stati elencati le cui banche sono nel giro d'affari dell'apartheid, figura al posto numero 16 anche la Città del Vaticano, ancora prima dell'Olanda, della Spagna e del Portogallo. La ricerca della Militz rivela che l'Istituto per le Opere di Religione (IOR), famoso per il suo coinvolgimento nella storia del crollo del Banco Ambrosiano e della triste fine del banchiere Calvi, attraverso il Banco di Roma per la Svizzera, da esso controllato, ha concesso prestiti per complessivi US$ 171,9 milioni ai seguenti enti pubblici o statali sudafricani: Comune di Johannesburg, Servizi Sudafricani di Trasporto, Dipartimento delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni. Tutti questi enti sono pilastri del sistema razzista. Il Comune di Johannesburg ha duramente represso tutte le rivendicazioni dei suoi lavoratori neri e risposto a dei tentativi di sindacalizzazione con licenziamenti in massa. I Servizi di Trasporto sono totalmente razzisti, con servizi pessimi ed oneri intollerabili per i neri, e gli impiegati neri sono cronicamente malpagati. Il sistema delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni non soltanto è diviso secondo le razze, ma costituisce per il regime uno strumento di propaganda e di controllo. Le telecomunicazioni sono ben integrate nell'apparato di sicurezza dello Stato e la sua militarizzazione è totale.

Il Vaticano ha smentito di aver mai dato dei prestiti al governo di Pretoria. Per carità! Ma non è questo che evidenziano i dati pubblicati dal PCR. Ciò che in esso viene denunciato non è ancora stato smentito: i prestiti agli enti pubblici e statali sopra citati.

Questo studio del PCR dovrebbe essere alla base delle campagne antiapartheid, anche in Italia, perché il Sudafrica razzista non si è mai dimostrato così nervoso e preoccupato come quando si tenta di impedire il flusso dei capitali sotto forma di prestiti.

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SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES: RESOLUTION N. 5 ON DISINVESTMENT

The National Conference of the South African Council of Churches, being deeply concerned at the violent conflict in which the people of South Africa are now embroiled,

1. reiterates the statement which the Council has made in the past that foreign investment and loans have been used to support prevailing patterns of power and priviledge in South Africa;
2. recognises that many church leaders and christian people in South Africa are in favour of (selective) disinvestment and economic sanctions because they believe that the situation is now so serious that economic action must be taken to strengthen political and diplomatic pressures on South Africa to force the South African government to take seriously the need for fundamental change in South Africa;
3. is agreed that fundamental change would include the dismantling of apartheid and the democratic involvement of all South Africans in the planning of new political, economic and social structures which would seek to guarantee for all people justice, development, freedom and peace;
4. welcomes the concern and support of our fellow christians in other countries who are working to assist us in finding non-violent ways in which fundamental change can be brought about in South Africa;
5. believes that the pressure in Western countries for disinvestment and divestment has been most effective in moving white South Africans into a more serious consideration of the cause of the political conflict in this country;
6. concludes from the evidence placed before it that foreign investment does not necessarily create new jobs and that the contrary is often the case because new investment is frequently in the form of sophisticated technological equipment;
7. draws attention to the fact that the churches have for many years tried to address the problem of structural unemployment in black communities and have not been aware of any serious concern being shown by the business sector, foreign or South African, or by government until recent months when economic sanctions have become a legislative probability in the United States;
8. confesses that in the churches there has been no proper debate and consideration of the disinvestment question because we have allowed ourselves to be restrained by the severity of laws designed to prevent open discussion of economic sanctions. This has meant that the only arguments being heard in South Africa are those in opposition to disinvestment;

This conference therefore resolves:

a. to express our belief that disinvestment and similar economic pressures are now called for as a peaceful and effective means of putting pressure on the South African government to bring about those fundamental changes this country needs;
b. to ask our partner churches in other countries to continue with their efforts to identify and promote effective economic pressures to influence the situation in South Africa, towards achieving justice and peace in this country and minimizing the violence of the conflict;
c. to promote fuller consideration of the issues by placing the case for the imposition of economic sanctions and disinvestment before the executive committee of the SACC and the regional councils, and the councils of our member churches and organizations with the request that they encourage congregations to study and debate them;
d. to ask the executive to appoint in consultation with the director of justice and reconciliation a task force to examine the whole question of economic justice as well as issues of disinvestment and economic sanctions, to review and coordinate the responses from the churches, and to assist the church leaders by making available to them information and analyses;
e. to call member churches and individual christians to withdraw from participation in the economic system that oppresses the poor, by re-investing money and energy in alternative economic systems in existence in our region.

ACCEPTED BY NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SACC ON JUNE 28, 1985.

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Forced Removals in South Africa

SOMMARIO

Quanto segue è uno degli esempi concreti di come si svolgano in Sudafrica i trasferimenti di massa di popolazioni nere dalle loro terre ad altre destinazioni decise dal governo. È solo uno dei numerosi casi in cui, nonostante le promesse del governo di rispettare almeno la volontà del capo di una tribù, si procede con l'inganno e con la forza a disporre della vita, delle risorse e della storia della gente nera con l'agghiacciante indifferenza di chi considera alla stregua di una merce qualsiasi il valore della dignità degli esseri umani.

RESUMEN

A continuación se presenta un ejemplo concreto de cómo en Sud-Africa el gobierno traslada a la población negra de sus territorios. Es sólo uno de los numerosos casos en que, a pesar de las promesas gubernamentales de respetar al menos la voluntad del jefe de una tribu, se procede con la fuerza y el engaño a disponer de la vida, recursos e historia de la gente negra con la fría indiferencia de quien considera el valor de la dignidad humana una mercancía cualquiera.

Dr Viljoen's statement in February 1985, that forced removals would be suspended while the government reviewed its policy on this matter, was greeted with mixed feelings. Communities in the Transvaal reacted sceptically that they would ''wait and see''.

Dr Viljoen mentioned to the Rand Daily Mail that his department was ''unwilling'' to proceed with a removal without the agreement of the people concerned. However, his statement on the 1st February said that the government would continue to resettle black communities if ''their leaders agreed''.

The communities themselves felt no such relief. In a joint statement replying to Dr Viljoen they asked: ''What leaders are the government talking about when it says it will move the people whose leaders agree? Are these the chiefs and ''leaders'' they have put over us or our real leaders?''

There is therefore some vagueness as to whether the botton line of halting removal will be due to the resistance of the leaders or the people in the community, or to put it the other way, whether the government will move a community if the leader agrees or whether an agreement of the majority of the people is also needed. It seems as if the strategies used by the government since February 1st have varied according to the ''inroads'' the government has made to persuade the people in various communities to move.

In Kwa Ngema for exmple, the strategy has been concentrated on the leadership, because the authorities have been able to gain the support of a member of the Kwa Ngema family. Steps were then taken to impose this man, Cuthbert Ngema as a Chief over the community that traditionally has never had a Chief, but rather an elected representative. The Ngema Committee, famous for resistance to the removal, applied for an interdict to stop government officials from dealing with Cuthbert Ngema as ''acting chief'' of the so-called Ngema tribe. The action was brought on an urgent basis after the Chief Commissioner, Northern Areas had appointed Cuthbert as acting chief on 1 December 1984.

Cuthbert has agreed to the removal and in terms of his appointment he was quite correct in saying: ''I as acting Chief am the person with whom the government liaises concerning all matters affecting the Ngema tribe''.
Here the thereat of removal still remains, but the government has not consulted the community as a whole on this — it would not be in their interests to do so, as the majority reject the removal as fervently as they reject Cuthbert. However, if Cuthbert agrees to this removal, it will be an ''officially negotiated'' removal.

The most recent example of such ''negotiations'' was Mogopa. The state insisted that it had negotiated the removal with an officially recognised headman. No matter that the headman had been democratically deposed by his tribe, that the majority of the tribe refused to follow him when he moved, and that the government then had to smash the schools and church in a further effort to get the people to go. Even then they refused.

In Mathopestad the government strategy

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has included several unsuccessful attempts to co-opt the existing acting Chief, and in the past vague attempts have been made to set up an illegitimate child of the wife of a past chief as the righful Chief.

After these unsuccessful attempts at obtaining the agreement of the chief, it seems the local commissioner concentrated on secret meetings with informers in the village — who in turn were able to get a small amount of followers in the village to agree to go and see Onderstepoort (the proposed resettlement camp).

On 11 March 1985 a truck belonging to a neighbouring white farmer, arrived on Mathopestad land, and parked near the bus rank. The driver did not approach the chief to announce his business. 29 people, got onto the truck. It then drove off Mathopestad land to where two government buses were parked (it was as if a larger number of people were expected).
The people were taken to Onderstepoort, the resettlement camp earmarked for Mathopestad. It seems that most of the 29 people who went on the 11th March to see Onderstepoort on buses arranged by the government were tenants — and not the landowners or members of the Mathopestad tribe. The tenants are often labourers who were evicted from farms and sought refuge in Mathopestad. Now these people were being promised a place of their own and were serving the government's strategy of getting a number of people to move, who would then be classified as residents of Mathopestad. Obviously from the government's point of view no distinction being made between tenants and landowners in the tribe.

The leaders of Mathopestad and the majority of the landowners are clearly against the move. They have not been consulted by the government since May 1983, where their strong opposition was voiced to Dr Koornhof in a meeing held in Pretoria.

The government insisted on a planning committee being set up to liaise about the removal. It was set up by the tribe and voiced its opposition to the removal. Since then it has never been consulted.

Therefore the only contact the government has had with the community in the past two years has been through devious means. It is clear that the event on the 11th March was arranged secretly because the headman and Chief know nothing about it beforehand. The Chief had in fact complained to Dr Koornhof in May '83 about strangers having secret meetings in Mathopestad at night and Koornhof had agreed that the government officials concerned, especially the local commissioner could only come to Mathopestad with the knowledge and permission of the Chief. Sending a white farmer onto the land was a pathetic attempt at circumventing this agreement.



On Tuesday 9th April 1985 Peter Soal a member of the PFP opposition party, asked a question in Parliament about whether it is intention to resettle the residents of Mathopestad in Onderstepoort. The reply by Dr Gerrit Viljoen was Yes, because it is in the interests of all parties concerned. He added the date would be determined in consultation with the residents of Mathopestad.

Acting Chief John Mathope's response to this statement was: "We read in the newspapers that Dr Gerrit Viljoen says the removal of Mathopestad will go ahead. Why didn't he come to us before he wrote our name in the papers? Dr Viljoen has said that there will be no more removals unless the leaders agree. With whom did he talk? With whom did he settle this removal? We as owners of Mathopestad are innocent of this.

"We the Mathopestad people will not move from our land. If we move we will lose our farming and be poor. There will be no progress. We will die there. We own our land. We were born here and our parents were born here. We will not move".

On the 10th April the Black Sash sent Dr Viljoen a telegram. It read: "You stated 1 February all forced removals would be suspended. Now you tell Parliament Mathpestad will be moved. You misled South Africa and the World.
Again you promise, you withdraw, you inflame peaceful people, Black Sash".

Dr Viljoen replied on the 10th in a telegram stating that: "Removals are suspended except where it takes place with the agreement, that is in consultation with residents". Here Dr Viljoen equates agreement with consultation.
The residents of the tribe of Mathopestad have never been officially consulted neither have they agreed (except for the small group that the government has met with clandestinely and which consists of mostly tenants). Has Dr Viljoen made a foregone conclusion of removal therefore?

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Development, Mr Ben Wilkens had informed the radio station that a large number of Mathopestad residents have declared themselves willing to go to Onderstepoort and that on request many residents have ben taken by the department to see Onderstepoort.

On Monday 15th April the Mathopestad acting Chief, John Mathope invited the Commissioner of Koster and Rustenburg to a tribal meeting in Mathopestad on the 20th April. On Thursday these Commissioners came to inform John that they had received a phone call from Mathopestad on Saturday at 8am to go and see Onderstepoort. They invited John and headmen too. In fact the buses came at 6.30 am to fetch the people and about 150 people, about 12 of them teenagers, boarded the bus.

Reporters from the BBC and CBS News followed these buses to Onderstepoort. There they interviewed people. It became clear that the majority of these people had agreed to leave Mathopestad because they were tenants, and therefore did not own land. The landowners there had given them a stand to live on when they were homeless. Now they were under the impression that if they moved they would get land. The reporters asked the Chief commissioner of Rustenburg, Mr Pretorius which land the tenants would be given. The answar was that he could not guarantee these tenants any land — it would depend on the Mathopestad tribe once they were moved. Then afterwards if the tribe did not decide to give these tenants land they would be in the same position as before. The tenants clearly did not know this.

Back in Mathopestad the tribe held their meeting. There were also tenants present who had no wish to leave. The Chief, six headmen of the six sections of the tribe and the planning committee declared their rejection of the removal. The people then signed a petition and this showed that a clear majority wanted to stay in Mathopestad. 291 man and women (no teenager) signed the petition. Many urban members of the tribe were absent because of a funeral in town, but they too are opposed to the removal and will sign the petition this week. The tribal leaders have said that the tenants are free to go or stay, but in no way does this change the stand of the tribe.

Referring to the latest government strategy of misleading tenants to persuade them to move, member of the tribe stated, "Who has heard before of a man owning a house and letting someone rent a part of it, and then, when the lodger, decides to leave, the owner loses his house? This is madness!" Madness it might be, but it seems that the government will use any device to uproot this stable, peace-loving community.

The Mathopestad people will complete the school this month that they have been building since January. Their crops are ready for harvesting.
It has been a good year agriculturally. This should be a time of feasting and happiness. Yet a shadow of uncertainty hangs over the tribe — the shadow of forced removal.

(Broken Promises, Working Group Kairos, Utrecht, June 1985)

STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER PLENARY SESSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA CATHOLIC BISHOPS CONFERENCE HELD IN HAMMANSKRAAL

People who have lived through the horror of township unrest in the last twelve months describe it as a «traumatic experience characterised by the thud of rubber bullets, the suffocating stench of teargas, the shooting, the screaming of hysterical children, the ruthless whipping of young and old mourners at funerals, the burning of tyres at night and army invasions».
The immediate cause of this unrest may have been an increase in rents or bus fares, an industrial strike or a boycott of schools in protest against the poor quality of education, but the underlying cause is really the burning resentment in people's hearts against the indignities, privations and denials of rights and opportunities stemming from the policy of apartheid.
Hearing of the tragic events in our country, Pope John Paul II last week spoke of this apartheid policy in these words: «to those who suffer the violence of such and inhuman situation I express sentiments of profound participation and support.» And we say now, as long as the system of apartheid prevails, the resentment and the unrest will never die down.
In our report on police conduct during township protests, in December 1984, and our statement of March 22 on the Langa tragedy, we deplored the unnecessary force and violence used by the police. We deplore the violence that has continued: the violence of the system, the violence of the police — acknowledging proper fulfilment of duty where this has occurred — and the violence of those who, angered and frustrated beyond measure, have pursued in reprisal and political antagonism the path of destruction, injury, intimidation and even killing.
This is the way of anarchy and chaos. The system bears the gravest responsibility for it. And unless the system is changed, the violence is not likely to abate.
A state of emergency has been proclaimed but many question its necessity in view of the statutory provisions for control and suppression that the government already had at its command. Others say there has been a state of emergency in South Africa for the last 25 years.
In the circumstances, we add our voices to the call made upon the government to lift the state of emergency and to open urgent discussions with the real leaders or the people. But these discussions will be fruitless unless they involve recognised leaders, including those at present in prison, detention, awaiting trial and in exile.
Since the beginning of the year we have been promoting a campaign of prayer for peace. The growing unrest and the state of emergency are an invitation to intesify our efforts remembering that there can be no peace without reconciliation and no reconciliation without justice.

(Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, August 13, 1985)

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LE LEGGI DELL'APARTHEID

1913 **Native Land Act no. 127**
Impone il divieto alle popolazioni nere di acquistare terre al di fuori delle riserve, così come i bianchi non possono possedere terre nelle «homelands». Inizialmente questa legge assegnava il 7,3% del territorio sudafricano alle riserve. Con il Land Resettlement Act del 1936 l'area veniva estesa al 13,7%, mentre il resto del territorio era concesso alla popolazione bianca. Ancor oggi questa proporzione è valida.

1923 **Native (Urban Areas) Act no. 21**
La segregazione razziale viene introdotta ufficialmente

1927 **Native Administration Act**
Autorizza il governatore generale del Sudafrica a emanare decreti nelle riserve e a nominare i capi-tribù; lo autorizza, inoltre, a prendere decisioni sul trasferimento delle tribù, di parti di tribù, di singoli individui, senza preannuncio.

1945 **Native (Urban Areas Consolidation) Act no. 25**
Viene introdotta una pena per i neri che risiedono senza permesso nelle aree urbane. I neri, nati in città, non hanno diritto a un permesso di residenza a tempo indeterminato; lo stesso vale per i familiari.

1950 **Group Areas Act (or Consolidated Act no. 36/1966)**
Si creano distretti residenziali per i vari gruppi etnici. Vengono dunque effettuate evacuazioni di massa.

1951 **Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act**
Proibisce le abitazioni non autorizzate. In caso d'infrazione la pena prevede lo sfratto o l'abbattimento dell'abitazione stessa.

1952 **Native Laws Amendment Act, no. 54**
Questa legge estende il controllo sulla popolazione urbana alle donne nere e aggrava ulteriormente la situazione nelle aree urbane: senza permesso nessun nero può restare nelle città più di 72 ore

1952 **Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act no. 67**
Inasprisce il controllo sugli abitanti neri introducendo l'obbligo ai maggiori di sedici anni di circolare muniti del lasciapassare su cui risultano il permesso di residenza e di lavoro

1959 **Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act no. 46**
Si fanno i primi passi per la formazione degli auto-governi nelle riserve. Da questo momento i neri possono votare solo nei bantustan.

1970 **Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act**
Stabilisce che tutti i neri sudafricani diventino «cittadini» di quelle riserve a cui per nascita, cultura o linguaggio appartengono.

1971 **Bantu Homeland Constitution Act no. 21**
Prepara l'autonomia delle homelands.

1972 **Admission to the Republic Regulation Act**
Dichiara che ogni straniero privo di un valido permesso di entrata, possa essere espulso. Tutti i cittadini di nazioni indipendenti dovranno sottostare a tale legge se non saranno muniti di regolare permesso.

1976 **Transkei Constitution Act**
La riserva, o bantustan del Transkei diventa indipendente, il che significa che i cittadini di questa o altre riserve non sono più cittadini sudafricani

1977 **Prevention of illegal Squatting Act no. 72**
Consente, senza preannuncio alcuno, l'abbattimento di interi stanziamenti di popolazione, a meno che non venga dimostrato il possesso della relativa terra.

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1978 **Bantu Laws Amendment Act no. 12**
Inasprisce le misure per espellere la popolazione nera. L'articolo 29 definisce «pigro Bantu» ogni nero che sia disoccupato da più di quattro mesi e autorizza che sia deportato o internato in un campo di lavoro. Gli appartenenti a questa categoria perdono immediatamente il permesso di residenza.

1982 **Bill: The Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons**
Si tratta della cosiddetta legge Koornhof (dal nome del Ministro per la Cooperazione e lo Sviluppo); si restringono ulteriormente le norme per il permesso di residenza o soggiorno dei neri nelle aree urbane.

1984 **The Aliens and Immigration Laws Amendment Bill**
Si tratta dell'amendamento della legge del 1982

Riserva, Bantustan, Homeland, Nazione-Stato, sono tutti concetti usati dal governo sudafricano in vari periodi storici per designare i territori riservati ai neri. Il concetto originario fu «riserva». Fino al 1959 il nome corrente fu quello di bantustan, seguito da quello di homeland (patria).
L'ipocrisia crescente degli ultimi anni è arrivata alla definizione del concetto di nazioni-stato, come se queste zone fossero stati indipendenti dal Sudafrica nel quale invece, risiederebbero solamente i bianchi.

Critique of ''Church theology''

RESUMEN *A continuación se presenta una parte del reciente documento «Challenge to the Church», firmado por 111 teólogos (religiosos y laicos), pertenecientes a todas las órdenes religiosas presentes en Sudáfrica. Se trata, como explica el prólogo, de un comentario crítico a la actual posición teológica de la Iglesia sudafricana que se considera inadecuada para construir un movimiento renovador al interior de la sociedad sudafricana, enferma por la plaga del apartheid. En particular, el capítulo que publicamos, se detiene a analizar la interpretación actual de conceptos fundamentales como reconciliación, justicia, no-violencia.*

SOMMARIO *Il seguente è un brano tratto dal recentissimo documento «Challenge to the Church» firmato da centoundici teologi (religiosi e laici) appartenenti a tutte le denominazioni religiose presenti in Sudafrica. Si tratta, come spiega la prefazione, di un commento critico alle attuali posizioni teologiche della Chiesa sudafricana che vengono ritenute inadeguate a sviluppare un movimento di rinnovamento all'interno della società sudafricana vessata dalla piaga dell'apartheid. In particolare, il capitolo che pubblichiamo si sofferma ad analizzare l'interpretazione attuale di concetti fondamentali come la riconciliazione, la giustizia, la non-violenza.*

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The KAIROS document is a Christian, biblical and theological comment on the political crisis in South Africa today. It is an attempt by concerned Christians in South Africa to reflect on the situation of death in our country. It is a critique of the current theological models that determine the type of activities the Church engages in to try to resolve the problems of the country. it is an attempt to develop, out of this perplexing situation, an alternative biblical and theological model that will in turn lead to forms of activity that will make a real difference to the future of our country.
By the 13th September 1985 when the document was submitted for publication there were still comments and recommendations flowing in. The first publication therefore must be taken as a beginning, a basis for futher discussion by all Christians in the country. Further editions will be published later.

We have analysed the statements that are made from time-to-time by the so called «English-speaking» Churches. We have looked at what Church leaders tend to say in their speeches and press statements about the apartheid regime and the present crisis.
What we found running through all these pronouncements is a series of inter-related theological assumptions. These we have chosen to call «Church Theology». We are well aware of the fact that this theology does *not* express the faith of the majority of Christians in South Africa today who form the greater part of most of our Churches. Nevertheless the opinions expressed by Church leaders are regarded in the media and generally in our society as the official opinions of the Churches. We have therefore chosen to call these opinions «Church Theology».
The crisis in which we find ourselves today compels us to question this theology, to question its assumptions, its implications and its practicality.
In a limited, guarded and cautious way this theology is critical of apartheid. Its criticism, however, is superficial and counter-productive because instead of ingaging in an in-depth analysis of the signs of our times, it relies upon a few stock ideas derived from Christian tradition and then uncritically and repeatedly applies them to our situation.
The stock ideas used by almost all these Church leaders that we would like to examine here are: reconciliation (or peace), justice and non-violence.

RECONCILIATION

«Church Theology» takes «reconciliation» as the key to problem resolution. It talks about the need for reconciliation between white and balck, or between all South Africans. «Church Theology» often describes the Christian stance in the following way: «We must be fair. We must listen to both sides of the story. If the two sides can only meet to talk and negotiate they will sort out their differences and misunderstandings, and the conflict will be resolved». On the face of it this may sound very Christian. But is it?
The fallacy here is that «Reconciliation» has been made into an absolute principle that must be applied in all cases of conflict or dissension. But not all cases of conflict are the same. We can imagine a private quarrel between two people or two groups whose differences are based upon misunderstandings. In such cases it would be appropriate to talk and negotiate to sort out the misunderstandings and to reconcile the two sides. But there are other conflicts in which one side is right and the other wrong. There are conflicts where one side is a fully armed and violent oppressor while the other side is defenceless and oppressed. There are conflicts that can only be described as the struggle between justice and injustice, good and evil, God and the devil. To speak of reconciling these two is not only a mistaken application of the Christian idea of reconciliation, it is a total betrayal of all that Christian faith has ever meant. Nowhere in the Bible or in Christian tradition has it ever been suggested that we ought to try to reconcile good and evil, God and the devil. We are supposed to do away with evil, injustice, oppression and sin, not come to terms with it. We are supposed to oppose, confront and reject the devil and not try to sup with the devil.
In our situation in South Africa today it would be totally unChristian to plead for reconciliation and peace before the present injustices have been removed. Any such plea plays into the hands of the oppressor by trying to persuade those of us who are oppressed to accept our oppression and to become reconciled to the intolerable crimes that are committed against us. That is not Christian reconciliation, it is sin. It is asking us to become accomplices in our own oppression, to become servants of the devil. No reconciliation is possible in South Africa *without justice.*
What this means in practice is that no reconciliation, no forgiveness and no negotiations are possibles *without repentance.* The Biblical teaching on reconciliation and forgiveness makes it quite clear that nobody can be forgiven and reconciled with God unless he or she repents of their sins. Nor are *we* expected to forgive the unrepentant sinner. When he or she repents we must be willing to forgive seventy times seven times but before that, we are expected to preach repentance to those who sin against us or against anyone. Reconciliation, forgiveness and negotiations willl become our Christian duty in South Africa only when the apartheid regime shows signs of genuine repentance. The recent speech of PW Botha in Durban, the continued military repression of the people in the townships and the jailing of all its opponents is clear proof of the total lack of repentance on the part of the present regime.
There is nothing that we want more than true reconciliation and genuine peace — the peace that God wants and not the peace the world wants (Jn 14: 27). The peace that God wants is based upon truth, repentance, justice and love. The peace that the world offers us is a unity that compromises the truth, covers over injustice an oppression and is totally motivated by selfishness. At this stage, like Jesus, we must expose this false peace, confront our oppressors and sow

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dissension. As Christians we must say with Jesus: «Do you suppose that I am here to bring peace on earth. No, I tell you, but rather dissension» (LK 12: 51). There can be no real peace without justice and repentance.
It would be quite wrong to try to preserve «peace» and «unity» at all costs, even at the cost of truth and justice and, worse still, at the cost of thousands of young lives. As disciples of Jesus we should rather promote truth and justice and life at all costs, even at the cost of creating conflict, disunity and dissension along the way. To be truly biblical our Church leaders must adopt a theology that millions of Christians have already adopted — a biblical theology of direct confrontation with the forces of evil rahter than a theology of reconciliation with sin and the devil.

JUSTICE

It would be quite wrong to give the impression that «Church Theology» in South Africa is not particularly concernd about the need for justice. There have been some very strong and very sincere demands for justice. But the question we need to ask here, the very serious theological question is: What Kind of justice? An examination of Church statements and pronouncements gives the distinct impression that the justice that is envisaged is *the justice of reform*, that is to say, a justice that is determined by the oppressor, by the white minority and that is offered to the people as a kind of concession. It does not appear to be the more radical justice that comes from below and is determined by the people of South Africa.
One of our main reasons for drawing this conclusion is the simple fact that almost all Church statements and appeals are made to the State or to the white community. The assumption seems to be that changes must come from whites or at least from people who are at the top of the pile. The general idea appears to be that one must simply appeal to the conscience and the goodwill of those who are responsible for injustice in our land and that once thay have repented of their sins and after some

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consultation with others they will introduce the necessary reforms to the system. Why else would Church leaders be having talks with PW Botha, if this is not the vision of a just and peaceful solution to our problems?

At the heart of this approach is the reliance upon «individual conversions» in response to «moralising demands» to change the structures of a society. It has not worked an it never will work. The present crisis with all this cruelty, brutality and callousness is ample proof of the ineffectiveness of years and years of Christian «moralising» about the need for love. The problem that we are dealing with here in South Africa is not merely a problem of personal guilt, it is a problem of structural injustice. People are suffering, people are being maimed and killed and tortured every day. We cannot just sit back and wait for the oppressor to see the light so that the oppressed can put out their hands and beg for the crumbs of some small reforms. That in itself would be degrading and oppressive.

There have been reforms and, no doubt, there will be further reforms in the near future. And it may well be that the Church's appeal to the consciences of whites has contributed marginally to the introduction of some of these reforms. But can such reforms ever be regarded as real change, as the introduction of a true and lasting justice. Reforms that come from the top are never satisfactory. They seldom do more than make the oppression more effective and more acceptable. If the oppressor does ever introduce reforms that might lead to real change this will come about because of strong pressure from those who are oppressed. True justice, God's justice, demands a radical change of structures. This can only come from below, from the oppressed themselves. God will bring about change through the oppressed as he did through the oppressed Hebrew slaves in Egypt. God does not bring his justice through reforms introduced by the Pharaoh's of this world.

Why then does «Church Theology» appeal to the top rather than to the people who are suffering? Why does this theology not demand that the oppressed stand up for their rights and wage a struggle against their oppressors? Why does it not tell them that it is *their* duty to work for justice and to change the unjust structures? Perhaps the answer to these questions is that appeals from the «top» in the Church tend very easily to be appeals to the «top» in society. An appeal to the conscience of those who perpetuate the system of injustice must be made. But real change and true justice can only come from below, from the people — most of whom are Christians.

NON-VIOLENCE

The stance of «Church Theology» on non-violence, expressed as a blanket condemnation of all that is *called* violence, has not only been unable to curb the violence of our situation, it has actually, although unwittingly, been a major contributing factor in the recent escalation of State violence. here again non-violence has been made into an aboslute principle that applies to anything anyone *calls* violence without regard for who is using it, which side they are on or what purpose they may have in mind. In our situation, this is simply counter-productive.

The problem for the Church here is the way the word violence is being used in the propaganda of the State. The State and the media have chosen to call violence what some people do in the townships as they struggle for their liberation i.e. throwing stones, burning cars and buildings and sometimes killing collaborators. But this *excludes* the structural, institutional and unrepentant violence of the State and especially the oppressive and neked violence of the police and the army. These things are not counted as violence. And even when they are acknowledged to be «excessive», they are called «misconduct» or even «atrocities» but never violence. Thus the phrase «violence in the townships» comes to mean what the young people are doing and not what the police are doing or what apartheid in general is doing to people. If one calls for nonviolence in such circumstances one appears to be criticising the resistance of the people while justifying or at least overlooking the violence of the police and the State. That is how it is understood not only by the State and its supporters but also by the people who are struggling for their freedom. Violence, especially in our cimcumstances, is a loaded word.

It is true that Church statements and pronouncements do also condemn the violence of the police. They do say that they condemn *all violence*. But is it legitimate, especially in our circumstances, to use the same word violence in a blanket condemnation to cover the ruthless and repressive activities of the State and the desperate attempts of the people to defend themselves? Do such abstractions and generalisations not confuse the issue? How can acts of oppression, injustice and domination be equated with acts of resistance and self-defence? Would it be legitimate to describe both the physical force used by a rapist and the physical force used by a woman trying to resist the rapist as violence? Moreover there is nothing in the Bible or in our Christian tradition that would permit us to make such generalisations. Throughout the Bible the word violence is used to describe everything that is done by a wicked oppressor (e.g. Ps 72: 12-14; Is 59: 1-8; Jer 22: 13-17; Amos 3:-10; 6: 3; Mic 2: 2; 3: 1-3; 6: 12). It is never used to describe the activities of Israel's armies in attempting to liberate themselves or to resist aggression. When Jesus says that we should turn the other cheek he is telling us that we must not take revenge; he is not saying that we should never defend ourselves or others. There is a long and consistent Christian tradition about the use of physical force to defend oneself against aggressors and tyrants. In other words there are circumstances when physical force may be used. They are very restrictive circumstances, only as the very last resort and only as the lesser of two evils, or, as Bonhoeffer put it, «the

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lesser of two guilts». But it is simply not true to say that every possible use of physical force is violence and that no matter what the circumstances may be it is never permissible.
This is not to say that any use of force at any time by people who are oppressed is permissible simply because they are struggling for their liberation. There have been cases of killing and maiming that no Christian would want to approve of. But then our disapproval is based upon a concern for genuine liberation and a convinction that such acts are unnecessary, counter-productive and unjustifiable and not because they fall under a blanket condemnation of any use of physical force in any circumstances.
And finally what makes the professed non-violence of «Church Theology» extremely suspect in the eyes of very many people, including ourselves, is the tacit support that many Church leaders give to the growing *militarisation* of the South African State. How can one condemn all violence and then appoint chaplains to a very violent and oppressive army? How can one condemn all violence and then allow young white males to accept their conscription into the armed forces? Is it because the activities of the armed forces and the police are counted as defensive? That raises very serious questions about whose side such Church leaders might be on. Why are the activities of young blacks in the townships not regarded as defensive?
In practice what one calls «violence» and what one calls «self-defence» seems to depend upon which side one is on. To call all physical force «violence» is to try to be neutral and to refuse to make a judgment about who is right and who is wrong. The attempt to remain neutral in this kind of conflict is futile. Neutrality enables the status quo of oppression (and therefore violence) to continue. It is a way of giving tacit support to the oppressor.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM

It is not enough to criticise «Church Theology» we must also try to account for it. What is behind the mistakes and misunderstandigs and inadequacies of this theology?
In the first place we can point to a lack of *social analysis*. We have seen how «Church Theology» tends to make use of absolute principles like reconciliation, negotiation, non-violence and peaceful solutions and applies them indiscriminatedly and uncritically to all situations. Very little attempt is made to analyse what is actually happening in our society and why it is happening. It is not possible to make valid moral judgments about a society without first understanding that society. The analysis of apartheid that underpins «Church Theology» is simply inadequate. The present crisis has now made it very clear that the efforts of Church leaders to promote effective and practical ways of changing our society have failed. This failure is due in no small measure to the fact that «Church Theology» has not developed a social analysis that would enable it to understand the mechanics of injustice and oppression.
Closely linked to this, is the lack in «Church Theology» of an adequate understanding of *politics and political strategy*. Changing the structures of a society is fundamentally a matter of politics. It requires a political strategy based upon a clear social or political analysis. The Church has to address itself to these strategies and to the analysis upon which they are based. It is into this political situation that the Church has to bring the gospel. Not as an alternative solution to our problems as if the gospel provided us with a non-political solution to political problems. There is no specifically Christian solution. There will be a Christian way of approaching the political solutions, a Christian spirit and motivation and attitude. But there is no way of bypassing politics and political strategies.
But we have still not pinpointed the fundamental problem. Why has «Church Theology» not developed a social analysis? Why does it have an inadequate understanding of the need for political strategies? And why does it make a virtue of neutrality and sitting on the sidelines?
The answer must be sought in the *type of faith and spirituality* that has dominated Church life for centuries. As we all know, spirituality has tended to be an other-worldly affair that has very little, if anything at all, to do with the affairs of this world. Social and political matters were seen as worldly affairs that have nothing to do with the spiritual concerns of the Church. Moreover, spirituality has also been understood to be purely private and individualistic. Public affairs and social problems were thought to be beyond the sphere of spirituality. And finally the spirituality we inherit tends to rely upon God to intervene in his own good time to put right what is wrong in the world. That leaves very little for human beings to do except to pray for God's intervention.
It is precisely this kind of spirituality that, when faced with the present crisis in South Africa, leaves so many Christians and Church leaders in a state of near paralysis.
It hardly needs saying that this kind of faith and this type of spirituality has no biblical foundation. The Bible does not separate the human person from the world in which he or she lives; it does not separate the individual from the social or one's private life from one's public life. God redeems the whole person as part of his whole creation (Rom 8: 18-24). A truly biblical sprirituality would penetrate into every aspect of human existence and would exclude nothing from God's redemptive will. Biblical faith is prophetically relevant to every thing that happens in the world

(Challenge to the Church, Kairos Theologians, Braamfontein, South Africa, September 1985)

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CENTRO IES NOTIZIE

Newsletter di informazione e educazione allo sviluppo - n. 0 - Luglio 1985

Perché questa newsletter? Perché, in un momento in cui si fa un gran parlare di informazione e educazione allo sviluppo, noi — da tanti anni impegnati in questo campo — pensiamo che la sua definizione sia ancora carente, o meglio parziale.

Ecco allora la necessità di intervenire con una voce nuova, probabilmente diversa da altre che già si fanno sentire, nel dibattito apertosi sul come fare educazione sui problemi dello sviluppo, dell'emergenza, della cooperazione, del volontariato.

Un dibattito, si badi bene, tutt'altro che teorico, bensì ricco di implicazioni concrete. *Esso, infatti, tocca una delle questioni più sentite nella nostra società, soprattutto tra i giovani, e nello stesso tempo ha importanti conseguenze per quanto riguarda le metodologie di intervento nei paesi in via di sviluppo.*

Il concetto di interdipendenza fra Nord e Sud *come percezione delle responsabilità individuali e collettive delle sorti del nostro pianeta non è ancora un dato culturale. La formazione di tale consapevolezza può forse costituire la definizione onnicompresiva di* educazione allo sviluppo.

In questo senso l'educazione allo sviluppo è un concetto totalmente complementare all'educazione alla pace, alla mondialità e alla comprensione tra i popoli, in quanto pace e sviluppo nella realtà sono inscindibili *così come sono inscindibili le relazioni Est-Ovest e Nord-Sud, o la fame e la corsa agli armamenti.*

Dunque, sbarazzato il campo da un terzomondismo obsoleto, l'obiettivo dell'educazione allo sviluppo sta nel far diventare «cultura» il fatto che il problema del Terzo Mondo è il problema del Primo, la consapevolezza che per eliminare la piaga della fame occorre dare un assetto differente al sistema produttivo del Nord industrializzato.

Bisogna partire dalla considerazione che la definizione di educazione allo *sviluppo ha avuto origine in ambito «sviluppato», come riflessione e sensibilizzazione dell'opinione pubblica sulle realtà dei paesi in via di sviluppo. L'educazione per lo sviluppo, invece, pur nella pluralità delle scelte politiche ed economiche, costituisce uno dei più pressanti problemi dei nuovi paesi indipendenti.*

Da un lato, quindi conoscere *lo sviluppo; dall'altro,* costituirlo, *anche attraverso l'educazione e la cultura. Noi riteniamo che questi due aspetti di un unico problema vadano riaccordati e tenuti uniti.*

Educare, allo sviluppo, come d'altra parte qualsiasi processo educativo, implica in primo luogo uno sforzo di decentramento. *Come il bambino, per conoscere e quindi controllare il proprio ambiente, deve migliorare i suoi strumenti logici attraverso un processo di decentramento che lo aiuti a percepire se stesso sempre meno come il centro della realtà e sempre più come un elemento di essa, così per percepire realmente il concetto di interdipendenza — ossia educare allo sviluppo — è necessario im primo luogo* decentrasi *dalla propria realtà sociele. È ben noto di quanto e quale* pregiudizio eurocentrico *siano viziate le nostre abitudini culturali.*

A chi si rivolge questa newsletter? *a chiunque è interessato ai problemi dell'educazione allo sviluppo e alla cooperazione, con un'attenzione particolare al mondo* della scuola *nella sua duplice componente studenti/insegnanti. Siamo convinti, infatti, che attraveso la scuola è possibile raggiungere gran parte dell'opinione pubblica sensibile ai grandi «nodi» dello sviluppo e della pace.*

CENTRO IES NOTIZIE
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Well-Fed Japanese Drinking the Blood of Black Africans

Kitazawa Yoko

SOMMARIO *Il Giappone importa, fra l'altro, anche dal Sud Africa: in sei mesi, dal marzo al settembre 1984, per 335 milioni di yen (circa 1.5 milioni di dollari USA). Come si spiega?*
Da una parte, il fabbisogno di sangue e di plasma in Giappone è in continuo aumento, non soltanto per uso ospedaliero, ma anche per uso commerciale (il plasma serve per una quantità di prodotti farmaceutici). Le trasfusioni fornite in Giappone sono ben lontane dal coprire la domanda crescente.
D'altra parte in Sud Africa, a causa delle leggi razziali, il sangue dei neri non può servire ai bianchi e si è trovata la maniera di utilizzarlo altrimenti. I minatori neri sono costretti ad una trasfusione di mezzo litro di sangue ogni 56 giorni, con la scusa che potrebbe servire per incidenti, ecc. Una sovrabbondanza che il commercio estero del Sud Africa è pronto ad utilizzare. Il Giappone ne è, infatti, fra i partners principali, secondo soltanto agli USA.

RESUMEN *El Japón, entre otras cosas, importa sangre de Sudáfrica. En seis meses, de marzo a septiembre de 1984, la ha importado por un valor de 335 millones de yen (alrededor de 1.5 millones de dólares USA). Cómo se explica?*
Por una parte, la necesidad de sangre y plasma en Japón va en continuo aumento, no solamente para el uso de hospitales, sino también dirigida a fines comerciales (el plasma se utiliza en una cantidad importante de productos farmacéuticos). Asimismo, las transfusiones japonesas están lejos de cubrir una demanda creciente.
Desde otro ángulo, en Sudáfrica, a causa de las leyes racistas, la sangre de los negros no puede servir a los blancos y se encontró la manera de utilizarla de otro modo. Los mineros de color están obligados a una transfusión de medio litro de sangre cada 56 días, con la excusa que podría servir en caso de accidentes, etc. Es una sobreabundancia que el comercio exterior de Sudáfrica no duda en utilizar. El Japón, de hecho, está entre los partners principales, ocupando el segundo lugar después de USA.

The *Asahi Shimbun* of Nov. 10, 1984 reported that Japanese drug companies have begun importing blood plasma for the first time from the Republic of South Africa. In just six months, between March and September 1984, the total amount reached 820 Kg worth 355 million yen (about U$ 1.5 million).

South Africa is notorious for its apartheid policy. Twenty million black people suffer unemployment and hunger, and are deprived of every right by the white regime. In the «homelands» where nearly 10 million blacks have been forcibly sent, the number of medical doctors is one per 45,000 people, and 50 out of 100 children die before they reach five years old.

Why does Japan buy human blood from South Africa?

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Japan imports blood for nutritive tonics

The blood imported is not fresh blood necessary for operations or traffic accident victims. At one time blood for transfusions came from that sold for money. However, when the then U.S. Ambassador Edwin Reishauer was stabbed in the chest by a right-wing terrorist in March 1964 and received a blood transfusion, he caught hepatitis. This caused social concern. Thus, in August the same year, blood buying was prohibited. Since then, the blood donation system operated by the Japanese Red Cross Society's (Nisseki) blood donor center has been enforced.

In Japan, Nisseki's blood mobiles appeal to the people on the street for blood donations, and in 1983, 7.6 million people donated blood. The blood donation ratio in Japan in 6.5 per cent, the fourth highest in the world. Also, due to progress in medical technology, blood transfusions have become unnecessary for bleeding of less than 1000 cc., thus donations provide more than enough blood for transfusions.

In spite of this, the commercial buying and selling of blood still exists. Two drug companies, Green Cross Corporation and Nihon Seiyaku, have seven blood gathering centers in big cities including Tokyo, Osaka and Kobe where they buy blood from unemployed workers and others at 4,000 (about U$ 17) for 400 cc. The total amount gathered per year reaches 45,000 to 63,000 liters. In addition to this, a large amount of blood is imported from abroad from such places as South Africa.

The purchased blood is processed by the drug companies into human blood fractions and made into the materials needed for drugs for cancer and burns as well as for colds and nutritional tonics. In other words, the use of the blood ranges widely from expensive medicines for cancer and serious burns to luxury drugs such as cold medicines and nutritive tonics. Recently the latter's use has dramatically increased; according to a survey by the Health and Welfare Ministry, 37 per cent of the 900 hospitals throughout Japan are using purchased blood fro tonics.

As a resul, the blood collected in Japan is far less than the demand. In Japan in 1983, domestic blood supplied only 12 per cent of the amount required, the rest came from imports, the majority from the United States. Green Cross Corporation, the largest import company, established a 100-per cent subsidiary, Alpha Therapheutic Corporation in Los Angeles, California in 1978. In addition to its own 20 blood gathering centers throughout the U.S., the company purchases blood through other private blood donor centers in various parts of the country. Most of the donors are immigrants from areas of the Third World such as Mexico and Puerto Rico.

However, due to the prevalence of a new disease, AIDS, in the United States, some of the blood donor centers were closed and supply of blood from the U.S. decreased. Thus, to cover the shortage, Mexico and South Africa appeared as new suppliers in 1984.

The amount of blood imported has increased 20-fold in the last ten years. Using FY1979 as 100, the index showed 206 in FY1984. In FY1983 241,208 liters of blood were imported. If this amount is divided by 200 cc which is the amount of blood taken at one time, the blood of a total of 1.16 million foreign people is imported to Japan. As the amount of imported blood plasma has steadily increased, it has resulted in unjustifiable behavior i.e., the importing of blood from apartheid-ruled South Africa.

At present, Japan's blood consumption both for transfusions and for drug materials amounts to 3.5 million liters. Since the total amount of blood collected in the world is 10 million liters, Japan's consumption accounts for about 35 per cent of that of the entire world: Japan is number one in terms of blood consumption.

Blood is not a regular commodity. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), it is defined as an internal organ, and both WHO and the International Red Cross have warned Japan to use domestically-supplied blood.

Blood forcibly drawn from «modern slave labor»

In response to the above-mentioned *Asahi Shimbun's* report, the South African Consulate in Tokyo sent a letter to the editorial department of the Asahi. It reads in part: «In South Africa, all blood is donated freely and voluntarily .... the South African authorities concerned gave permission that the surplus albumin which was produced by the National Blood Fraction Center be sold on the world market.»

About the same time, Inoue Issei, a Socialist Party representative, on the floor of the Commitee Session on Audits of the House of Representatives, asked questions based on the *Asahi* report. Inoue claimed that to import blood from apartheid-ruled South Africa violates moral law and that the Japanese government must prohibit it.

In answer to this, an official of the Health Ministry in charge of this matter stated that the government issues a license to blood importers, but does not oblige them to clarify from where they import. Therefore, the government is not in a position to know from which country blood is imported. However, since the blood imported from South Africa is blood plasma donated freely and voluntarily, the ministry does not consider that there is any moral problem. Also, since the Japanese government recognizes trade with South Africa, there seems to be no problem if blood is included among the trade items.

At present in the Diet two issues are under deliberation: one to expose the name of blood importers, and the other, that blood plasma should be treated as a part of human body and not as a conventional commodity. Thus, the moral responsability of importing blood from apartheid South Africa must be questioned. According to a survey conducted by PARC, in South Africa blood is racially segregated under the apartheid government. Therefore, the blood of whites is transfused only to other whites. Meanwhile, 800,000 black mine workers are forced to give blood; 500 cc. every 56 days on the

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pretext that blood is needed for transfusions at the time of an accident. The rate of accidents at the mines in South Africa is the highest in the world. However, in fact, many of the black workers who were injured died without getting satisfactory treatment at a hospital. Accordingly, there is a large amount of surplus of unused blood which is processed into plasma by the National Blood Fraction Center, which is run by the whites, and used for export.

It is obvious that the blood plasma imported from South Africa comes from the blood drawn forcibly from the black mine workers without compensation. The ILO, defining the mine workers of South Africa as «modern slave labor», passed a resolution denouncing South Africa, and expelled the country from the organization. It is inhumane to import blood forcibly drawn from the blacks working under slave labor conditions and use it for tonics for the rich and well-fed Japanese. In addition, the profit gained by the Japanese purchase goes into the pocket of the whites.

The unjustifiable act of Japan importing blood from South Africa is a culmination of a series of Japanese moves in support of apartheid as can be seen in 1984 in political economic and sports circles.

Various Japanese moves in support of apartheid

In June 1984 48 Diet members of the Liberal Democratic Party formed the Japan-Republic of South African Friendly Parliamentarian League. LDP Vice-President Nikaido Susumu assumed the chairmanship and Ishihara Shintaro became the secretary general. The aim of this organization is to normalize Japan's diplomatic relationship with the Republic of South Africa and to pressure the Foreign Ministry to mutually open airline services. Diplomatic relations with South Africa have been limited to consular level since 1968 when Japan broke off relations according to a United Nations resolution.

The Japan Anti-Apartheid Movement sent an open letter to the league claiming that it supports apartheid. When representative Ishihara responded to it, he completely ignored the apartheid issue, saying that «South Africa is a country which produces rare metals which Japan needs. For economic necessity a friendly relationship is needed.» Representatives of the South African Foundation, a notorious private front organization of the South African government, visited Japan in September 1983 and negotiated with some firms, the foreign ministry and Diet members to strengthen economic relations. The foundation also set up an agent in Japan, the Springbok Club which publishes press releases. If the foundation opens and office in Tokyo, it will become its fifth office following those in London, Paris, Washington and Bonn.

On the sports scene, in early December 1984 Aoki Isao, a professional golfer, participated in an international golf tournament which was held in South Africa.

The Japanese government banned sports and cultural exchanges with South Africa in 1974 in order to avoid international criticism against increasing Japan's economic relations, and pledged to do so at the U.N. Since then, whenever Japan has been criticized by the Black African countries fro increasing trade with South Africa, the Japanese government always points out that sports and cultural exchanges are prohibited.

However, when Aoki Isao decided to participate in the South African golf tournament lured by its exorbitant prize, U$ 1 million for the first prize and U$ 50,000 for the lowest, the Foreign Ministry not only did not take any action against it, but it did not even send a letter to Aoki to inform him of the prohibition. The Japanese government broke its international pledge to ban sports exchanges with South Africa.

Japan, the largest trade partner for South Africa

As far as trade is concerned, in September 1974 the Japanese government pledged at the United Nations that although Japan has to trade with further increase the amount with South Africa. However, in reality Japan's trade with South Africa has shown a remerkable increase since then.

In 1974 Japan's export to South Africa amounted to U$ 957 million, and import U$ 763 million, totalling U$ 1,722 million. In 1983, the amount exported was recorded at U$ 1,738 million and import at U$ 1,587 million, totalling U$ 3,325 million; thus the trade between 1974 and 1983 doubled. When compared with 1962 when trade between the two countries began, it had grown twenty times in twenty years.

Japan's trade with South Africa accounts for only 1.2 per cent of its total world trade, but for South Africa, Japan is the second largest trade partner after the United States. In FY1982 Japan became the largest trade partner for South Africa.

Japan exports industrial products such as machinery and steel including automobiles, tape recorders and office equipment, and imports mineral resources such as iron ore, coal, nonferrous metals and agricultural products such as sugar.

To rationalize Japan's trade with South Africa, the Japanese business circles are always using excuse that South Africa is the only country in the free world which produces rare metals and that Japan's industry needs them.

However, Japan's dependence on rare metals from South Africa is political and arbitrary. Let us take chromium ore, a leading rare metal, as an example. In 1971 when the white UDI-Rhodesia was under the economic sanction of the U.N. Security Council, Japan was criticized as «a sanction bastard.» This was because Japan was importing 360,000 tons of chromium ore illegally from Rhodesia under the Smith regime under the pretence that is was produced in South Africa. The import of chromium ore from South Africa in the same year amounted to 350,000 tons, making a total amount of one million tons imported into Japan. Japan, then, did not honestly respond to criticism, but merely said that it was a statistical mistake. The

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steel industry which consumed the chromium ore defended itself saying that it was because the ore produced in Rhodesia was far superior to that of South Africa.
However, after black Zimbabwe was born in 1980, Japan completely stopped importing chromium ore from that country. In 1982 Japan negotiated with South Africa to reduce the price of chromium ore and contracted to import one million tons. Despite the fact that the domestic stainless steel marked was depressed, the import contract was concluded because the price was cheap. This resulted in Japan's complete dependence of chromium ore from South Africa. The reason given for not importing from Zimbabwe was that its railway conditions were poor.
Japan smuggled chromium ore from outlawed Rhodesia under white rule ignoring international criticism, but then when the blacks took power, it completely switched to apartheid South Africa and imported inferior one. This fact shows that Japan trades with a country only because it is under white control, and has no intention of trading with Black Africa.
Japan's consumption of chromium ore accounts for 12 per cent in the world. In view of the fact that Japans world share of the GNP is 9.8 per cent and its population is only 2.6 per cent, a 12 per cent share of chromium ore is excessive.
Generally speaking rare metals such as chromium are consumed for munitions industry. Japan, however, is under a peace constitution where the ratio of munitions industry should be low. In other words, there should be no need to import one million tons of chromium ore. There is no basis for the statement that «we have to trade with South Africa, since it is a country that produces rare metals.» The same thing can be said of platinum of which Japan's share is abnormally high — 35 per cent. South Africa is the largest supplier of platinum for Japan, and Japan's dependence of platinum from South Africa is as high as 61 per cent. The amount of platinum imported from South Africa has tripled in the last ten years. Japan has arbitrarily increased the platinum import far faster than the GNP growth rate.
Another example is aluminum. The Japanese aluminum industry imported bauxite totally from abroad to produce two million tons of aluminum ingot annually in the early 1970s; however due to the oil crunch in the fall of 1973 the price of electricity soared and Japan lost out to the United States and Canada which use cheap hydropower and natural gas. At present, the annual production of aluminum ingot remains at 300,000 tons. The industry has made new overseas investments in such places as in Asahan in Indonesia and in Amazon in Brazil and plans to produce 600,000 tons of aluminum ingots annually.
Meanwhile, many Japanese, aluminum refineries, having an annual production capacity of 1.7 million tons, either curtailed production or were closed. The Niigata refinery of the Nippon Light Metal Co., which produced 87,000 tons annually and was equipped with the most modern equipment, was closed. The factory was taken apart in 1980, and sold to a joint venture of the South African state-run Industrial Development Corporation and AluSwiss. This was not a direct investment which the Japanese government prohibits, but was obviously a plant export, going over the limit of ordinary commodity trade. In the Third World there are many countries which depend on bauxite export. There is no particular reason why this refinery had to be sold to South Africa. The reason is solely that South Africa is a white-dominated country as was the case for chromium ore.
In the mid 70s IBM of the United States invested in South Africa, but it was pressured to disinvest since it would be aiding the computerization of apartheid. Hitachi of Japan, however, began to sell large-scale computers to South Africa in 1979, and sold 18 units in only theree years. Hitachi's computer export showed a high growth rate in the last three years, and average of 75 to 100 per cent a year as compared with the previous year, and far exceeded the sales of IBM. The secret of Hitachi's success was that it exported at a price 30 per cent cheaper than IBM's products.

National campaign «to save black Africa from hunger»

Since the summer of 1984 the Japanese government and mass media suddenly began a nationwide campaign «to save black Africa from hunger.» The foreign Ministry proposed a «starvation lunch» program, a lunch consisting only of a piece of toast and a glass of milk once a month. The money saved by the lunch is sent to the African refugees, and this is practiced even at the United Nations. Newspapers and television stations have appealed to the public for donations. Literally for the first time the Japanese have shown an interest in the suffering of other people and many have offered money, rice, food, blankets, clothes, etc. Several newspapers have each collected about U$ 1 million per month.
The foreign ministry further designated the month between mid-September and mid-October as «African month,» and sponsored various events including a black African film festival and a symposium funded by the Japan Foundation. It is needless to say that the ministy suppressed any discussion of the apartheid problem of South Africa claiming that it was «political.»
In November, foreign Minister Abe visited African countries suffering from drought including Ethiopia and called for assistance to Africa at the U.N. This was the first time that the Japanese government took the initiative internationally for assistance to countries outside of Japan's economic interest.
The Japanese are unusually excited about the hunger campaign for Africa. One reason for this is to dodge Black African's criticism of Japan's relationship with apartheid South Africa.
It is symbolic that in this hunger campaign the questions to review the rich Japanese society, e.g., «Why are

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they starving?» or «Where have the food or clothes the Japanese are sending to Africa come from?» are completely kept away as they are «political.
On the other hand, the government and mass-media are intentionally concealing the fact that Japan, a non-white country, is not only supporting apartheid but strengthening it.

(«AMPO», Tokyo, 1985)

IL CHI È DEL SUDAFRICA

ANC (African National Congress)
Fondato nel 1912 come prima organizzazione politica dei neri è la maggiore organizzazione del movimento di liberazione. Legata al partito comunista sudafricano, è «fuorilegge». Il documento più importante: la Carta della Libertà del 1955.

AZAPO (Azanian People's Organization)
Fondata nel 1977 come organizzazione successiva del Movimento della Coscienza Nera; è l'unica organizzazione politica dei neri considerata legale; a partire dal suo IV° Congresso nel Dicembre 1984, si ritiene il partito d'avanguardia della classe operaia nera su posizioni socialiste.

AZASO (Azanian Students' Organization)
Associazione di studenti e insegnanti. Fa parte del Fronte Democratico Unito.

Black Consciousness Movement
Movimento per la Coscienza Nera, a ispirazione radical-nazionalista.

Black Sash
Organizzazione di donne bianche liberali.

COSAS (Congress of South African Students)
Associazione di insegnanti e studenti fondata nel 1979; membro del UDF; nel settembre 1984 ha promosso la campagna per il diritto all'educazione.

CUSA (Council of Unions of South Africa)
Il maggior sindacato non razzista (nero) dei lavoratori dell'industria; fa parte del National Forum e dell'UDF; ha iniziato un processo di unificazione con il FOSATU

FCWU (Food and Canning Workers' Union)
Sindacato non razzista (nero), ha iniziato un processo di unificazione con il CUSA

FOSATU (Federation of South African Unions)
Confederazione sindacale non razzista (nera), ha iniziato un processo di unificazione con il CUSA

GAWU (General African Workers' Union)
Associazione sindacale non razzista nera; sta lavorando per l'unificazione con il CUSA e il FOSATU.

NAAWU (National Automobile and Allied Workers)
Sindacato dei lavoratori neri dell'industria automobilistica; fa parte del FOSATU.

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NF (National Forum)
Alleanza anti-apartheid fondata nel giugno 1983, di cui fanno parte l'AZAPO e la Cape Action League; nel suo manifesto si legge: «La lotta contro l'apartheid rappresenta per noi solo il punto di partenza dei nostri sforzi per la liberazione. L'apartheid e il capitalismo razzista saranno abbattuti. La classe operaia nera con la sua coscienza rivoluzionaria è la forza trainante della nostra lotta».

NIC (National Indian Congress)
Organizzazione etnica della popolazione di origine indiana che si orienta verso l'ANC.

NUM (National Union of Mineworkers)
Il NUM ha organizzato in due anni 100.000 dei 480.000 minatori neri in un sindacato industriale non razzista; il 17 settembre 1984 è riuscito a organizzare il primo sciopero nazionale dopo il 1946.

NUSAS (National Union of South African Students)
Associazione di insegnanti e studenti bianchi. Fa parte dell'UDF

National Party
Partito nazionalista dei Boeri; negli anni quaranta si ispirò al fascismo; è dal 1948 il partito di governo. Sulla questione della riforma razziale è diviso in due correnti: una «illuminata» e un'altra estremamente rigida.

PFP (Progressive Federal Party)
Partito liberale all'opposizione. Come soluzione dell'apartheid propone una federazione di nazionalità

SAAWU (South African Allied Workers' Union)
Sindacato non razzista (nero); in processo di unificazione con il CUSA e il FOSATU

SACP (South African Communist Party)
Partito comunista sudafricano filo-sovietico. Fondato nel 1922, ma illegale dal 1950. Legato all'ANC.

SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions)
Fondato nel 1955; si ispira alla linea dell'ANC e fa parte del Fronte Democratico Unito.

TIC (Transvaal Indian Congress)
Organizzazione etnica della popolazione indiana, recentemente ricostituita. Fa riferimento all'ANC.

(«Ansätze» n. 7, FRG, 1985, traduzione: IDOC)

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13 Mandela Street, London NW1 ODW

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF)
64 Essex Road, London N1 8LR

End Loans to South Africa (ELTSA)
134 Wrottesley Road, London NW 10

Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR)
22 Coleman Fields, London N1 7AF

Wales Anti-Apartheid Movement
43 Glenroy Street, Boath, Cardiff CF2 3JX, Wales

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Ceaa-Iepala
Calle Villalar, 3, Madrid 1

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Comitato di Coordinamento Contro l'Apartheid
c/o MOLISV, piazza Albania, 10, 00153 Roma

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Action Committee on Southern Africa (AKZA)
Blijde Inkomstraat 115, 3000 Leuven

Anti-Apartheid Beweging Nederland
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Komite Zuidelijk Afrika
Oudesijds Achterburgwal 173, 1012 DJ Amsterdam

Werkgroep Kairos
Corn. Houtmanstraat 19, 3572 LT Utrecht

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Committee on South African War Resistence (COSAWR)
Postbus 543, 1000AN Amsterdam

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Anti-Apartheid Bewegung der Deutschen Schweiz
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Mouvement Anti-Apartheid Suisse (MAAS)
15, rue Lévrier, 1201 Genève

Program to Combat Racism (PCR)
WCC, 150 route de Ferney, 1211 Genève 20

DENMARK

Kirkernes Raceprogram
Klovermacksvej 4, 8200 Aarhus N

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Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR)
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Anti-Apartheid Bewegung Oesterreich
Postfach 146, A-1061 Wien

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20 Beechpark Road, Fox Rock, Dublin

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Swedish Committee for the Isolation of South Africa (ISAK)
Barnangsgatan 23, 11641 Stockholm

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Informationsstelle Südliches Africa (ISSA)
Blücherstr. 14, 5300 Bonn 1

AKAFRIK
August-Bebel-str. 62, 4800 Bielefeld 1

Anti-Apartheid Bewegung
Blücherstr. 14, 5300 Bonn 1

Evangelische Frauenarbeit
Unterlindau 80, 6000 Frankfurt am Main

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Mouvement Anti-Apartheid
44, rue d'Hauteville, 75010 Paris

Mouvement Anti-Apartheid
46, rue Vaugirard, 75006 Paris

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World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa
P.O.Box 2, Lindeberg Gaard, Oslo 10

The Norwegian Council for Southern Africa
Etterstadsletta 3, Oslo 6

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199 Av. Molière, 1060 Bruxelles

Aktie Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika
Maria Theresiastraat 93, 9000 Leuven

Comité contre le Colonialisme et l'Apartheid
14 Av. Beau Vallon, 1410 Waterloo

USA

American Committee on Africa (ACOA)
room 402, 198 Brodway, New York, N.Y. 10038

The Washington Office on Africa
110 Maryland Ave. Ne., Washington, DC 20002

Southern Africa Media Centre
630, Natoma Street, San Francisco, CA 94103

Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa
339, Lafayette Street, New York, N.Y. 10012

Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR)
475 Riverside Drive, room 566, New York, N.Y. 10115

PORTUGAL

Cidac
r. Pinheiro Chagas, 77, 2 esp., Lisboa

ALTERNATIVE COMMUNICATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

«Media Development» No. 3, UK, 1985, English, 40 pp. (IDOC 46548)

This issue of Media Development shows the role communication can play in the long, arduous and costly process of liberation of black South Africans.
«Communication is dangerous. Especially whistling and singing and physical contact. Preventing blacks from communicating with each other, or for that matter, curtailing communication between freedom-loving democrats in South Africa, has been one of the pillars of maintaining the status quo of apartheid», is written in the editorial. The history of the black press shows that the alternatives to the apartheid media are more complex than first thought. They involve not only goals but ideology and methods. They work towards genuine democracy, both as political goals and as method for doing things. They are advocacy media in the best tradition of terms-mobilising people to work for social justice, for a new cohesion among tribes and racial groups, a new stake in the future, and lasting peace emerging from the present chaos.
The first article «Communication between black and white — the future liberation of South Africa» is a topic that relates to cultural differences, economic contradictions, political and ideological aspects, the question of industry as a common ground for dialogue and the significance of the communication media. The preservation of group identity is closely related to the issue of culture in South Africa where each group has its own traditions, language, custums, socio-political institutions, and a collective historical experience. In order to survive, each group should preserve its own culture.

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The richness of alternative media in SA is described in «The many facets of alternative media». If they appear in the form of newspapers, graffiti, music, dramas, posters, audio tapes, video films, speech, print or poetry are all used to shout the word of liberation and tell the dreams of the new order where justice and equality before God and one another shall prevail.
«How small media can organise communities» and «Barometers of the liberation movement: a history of South Africa's alternative press» give an overview on the rich and old tradition on the alternative press in SA in order to attempt not only to inform and to educate, but also to raise critical awareness. Through the alternative press, people's organisations have been popularised as a political force. Local struggles have been linked to national and, more recently, international struggles. Coverage of local campaigns has instilled in people the hope and the belief that they can change their conditions.
As a special example on opposition publishing, Media Development describes the case of Ravan Press. Founded in 1972, Ravan Press grew out of SPRO-CAS (the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society) and suffered in the early years constant harrasments and many of its titles were banned. Nowadays this publishing house work with ideas, reflecting them, focusing them and refracting them. They are in contact with other organizations and groups to rise and audience outside of the commercial bookshop and to reach blacks in a wider way. They maintain a wide publishing programme, literature as well as a magazines, educational material and literacy, children books, social and historical studies etc.
«Progressive film and video in South Africa» is an article on cultures of resistance developed recently through the use of films and videos, which have become an aid to wider political education.
A short description on eight plays and two films by South African writers who are determined to reveal the plight of their fellow human beings can be read in «Life on stage: a sampling of black theatre».
The South African government is trying to coerce and control information flows. The ways in which it tries to do this is the subject of the article «Coercion, control and censorship».
Finally there is a good bibliography on the international debate on media and communication.

AUSLAENDISCHE INVESTITIONEN IN SUEDAFRIKA PARTNER DER APARTHEID?

«EMW-Informationen» No. 62, July 1985, FRG, German, 70 pp.
(IDOC 46541)

After its National Conference in June 1985 the South African Council of Churches published a statement on disinvestment and other forms of economic pressure against South Africa.
Other churches all over the world were being asked to stimulate international pressure against South Africa to promote peace and justice in this country.
The SACC statement demands and calls for discussion on disinvestment and boycott in the churches and development groups all over the world.
In order to support such requirement this special issue of «EMW Informationen» publishes: the SACC statement, a declaration of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), a statement of the same ICCR on the 12 US key corporations in South Africa and their demands to them, a statement of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., a statement of the American catholic missionaries at a press conference on the 20th of May in 1985 during the opening of a special compaign against apartheid in South Africa.
Furthermore, a statement of the General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church which describes the activities of the most important US transnational corporations and lists the demands of this organization against apartheid is published. The last christian contribution of this section is a statement published by 17 US bishops against hunger and apartheid in Africa, especially in South Africa.
Then follows an article analysing very clearly foreign investments and their consequences on working places and employment in South Africa.
The original speech was given by Steve Gelb of the University of Witwatersrand in the commission of the department for justice and reconciliation of the South African Council of Churches.
A letter of the main department for justice and society of the South African Council of Churches brings arguments in favour of the disinvestment debate and the possibilities for European communities to support solidarity against apartheid.
One article shows the international context of capital in South Africa. It gives a short overview of the economic history in South Africa, the high profit of western and eastern industry combined with and rooted in the apartheid system. Action initiatives against apartheid organized by churches, groups and governments in the USA and Western Europe are listed.
Finally there are some examples of activities of industries (banks in the USA, the automobile industry in South Africa, Ford Motor Co., General Motors Corp., Mobil Corporation) and their reaction to the boycott campaign.

THEMENSCHWERPUNKT: SUEDLICHES AFRIKA

DER APARTHEIDSTAAT 1985
FREIHEITSCHARTA CONTRA BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS
ZWANGSUMSIEDLUNG-DIE HAESSLICHSTE SEITE DER APARTHEID
«Blaetter des iz3W» No. 126, FRG, 1985, German 18 pp.
IDOC 46544
LEBEN UND WIDERSTAND SCHWARZER FRAUEN IN SUEDAFRIKA
«Blaetter des iz3W» No. 126, FRG, 1985, German, 3pp.
IDOC 46546

Issue 126 of the magazine «Blaetter des iz3W» is dedicated to South Africa. It presents an analytical description on the recent economical crisis in South Africa and its consequences on employment especially for black people, living costs and inflation rate.
The boycott campaign against South Africa in USA and in some European countries seems to begin to have its effects. The economic regression has forced P.W. Botha to adopt fiscal measures (cutting of income, reducing of employment, increase of taxes, etc.) as well as to reform the apartheid legislation. He

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has tried to find a balance between these political choises without losing political and economic power. The «socalled» reforms of apartheid are to be seen in this context. A historical overview of the apartheid policy and legislation of the government and the organization of the resistance supported by the South African Council of Churches and the Catholic Church shows the struggle of the black, coloured and asian native people against apartheid.

The second article gives an anlysis of the two biggest leagues of the anti-apartheid movement, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the National Forum (NF). Their differences, their aims and their policy, their relationship with the trade unions and their role in the anti-apartheid struggle.

The third article focuses on the banning policy of South Africa which is the very core of the apartheid policy. On the base of the SA legislation, the white minority government has resettled between 1960 and 1980 over 3.5 million people (mainly black). The ideology and the aims of these removals are described in this article in a chronological way. It includes the multifarious ways of violence used by the government against communities who try to resist forced removals.

These articles are complemented with a map of South Africa showing the different countries, the homelands and giving figures on the population.

The role of SA resources in the world context. Historical chronology on the legislation of apartheid; statistics on race distribution.

The last article is dealing with the life and the resistance of black women in SA. It describes the life of women in the homelands, the rights of women in the society with special references to the family rights and the work rights. The women who are suffering under different ways of discrimination, exploitation and oppression as black as worker and as women themselves in the cities as well as on the land put up a spontaneous and organized resistance although they have not been part of the official organization of resistance.

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