342 politics majority.ApartfromagradualtransformationoftheState apparatusitselfwhichdoesnotconcernushere,nationalizationsaretheessentialinstrumentstobeutilized. Theexpropriationofbanksandkeyindustrieswouldde- privethebourgeoisieofpositionswhich,thoughtheynolonger alowittodominatetheState,stilenableittosabotageagov- ernmentofwhichitdoesnotapproveandtosupportthe domesticandforeignenemiesoftheworking-classparties. Thereforenationalizations,especiallyfortheCP,shouldmake itpossiblethatthecoupd'état,i.e.,theculminationofthe legalroadtopower,willnotunleashprofoundsocialupheaval andcivilwarbutwillratherbetheliquidationofafeeble adversarywhosebasealreadyissapped.Inotherwords,the nationalizationsshouldalowthecoupd'étattotakeplace underconditionssimilartothoseinGermanywhen.theNazis tookpowerin1933.(NoteinpassingthatCommunistpoli- ciesrequirethecoupd'étatnottotakeplacebeforethepower ofFranceisstrongenoughtoalowadefenseagainstAnglo- Saxonintervention.) Itisevidentthatthenationalizationscanplaytherole asignedtothembytheworking-classpartiesonlyif (1)they comprisethebankingsystemandkeyindustriesand(2) thedecisivepositionsfalltothesepartiesandnottotheirenemeis—inshort,onlyifthenationalizationscorespondtothe definitiongivenintheCPandSPjointmanifestoofMay2, 1945:(1)removaloftheenterprisefromownershipbyprivate capital(withcompensationexceptfortraitors);(2)removal ofprivatecapitalfrommanagerialposts;(3)participation ofworkers'delegatesi.e.,menfromtheCPandSPunions, especialytheformerinmanagement. DeGauleandtheMRP,thoughtheyhaveacceptednation- alizationforthereasonsexplainedabove,trytoprotectbig busniessinterestsasmuchaspossibleandtoputbusinessmen intothekeyposts.Theyaimtocreateexecutiveorgansfor thedefenseof"nationalgrandeur"ratherthanofcapitalism. Thebigfight,therefore,hasbeenovertherelativesizeofthe scopeofnationalizationandtheformofadministration;the rateofcompensationhasbeenasecondaryissue. NATIONALIZATIONTODATE Sinceallthenationalizationssofarhavebeentheresultof parliamentarymajoritydecisions,theyarecompromiseswhich showthechangingpower-balancebetweenthethreegreat parties. TheCP-SPprogramcaledforthenationalizationofthe banks,theinsurancecompanies,keyindustries,andpartof thecommunicationssystem.Uptonowthefolowinghave beennationalizedinadditiontocertainautomobileandaircraftfactories:thecoalminesintheNorthernDepartments andthePasdeCalais,byadecreeofDecember13,1944, promulgatedbytheFirstProvisionalGovernment(underthe PresidencyanduncontestedauthorityofGeneraldeGaulle); theBanquedeFranceandthefourlargebanksofdeposit,by thelawofDecember2,1945oftheFirstParliamentaryGovernmentoftheFourthRepublic(underthePresidencyofde Gaulebutinwhichhisinfluencewassmaler);andfinaly gasandelectricity,insurancecompaniesandallcoalmines (undertheGouingovernmentinwhichtheworking-class partiesenjoyedpredominanceforthefirsttime). Onecangetapictureoftheworking-classparties'idea ofnationalizationifoneconsidersthemeasurestakenduring BibliotecaGinoBianco thefirstdaysaftertheliberationinregionsthatwereasyet withoutcontactwiththecentralgovernment.Thesemeasures concernedaconsiderablenumberofsmalandmedium-size enterprisesaswelassomelargeones,amongthemtheBerliet automobilefactoryinLyonwhichemploys5000workers.In althesecases,thereasonadvancedfortheeliminationofthe capitalistownersortheirrepresentativeswas:collaboration withtheenemy.Theowners,eitherinflightorarested,were notreplacedbyotherrepresentativesofprivatecapitalnorby highcivilservants,butbynewmenwhohadcomeupinthe ResistanceandowedtheirascendancetotheCPortothe unionbureaucracywhichalmostinalcaseswasmadeupfrom theranksoftheCP.Thenewadministrationwasorganizedin formsunknownundercapitalism.Thereorganizationofthe enterprisewasdecidedatnegotiationsbetween,ontheone hand,working-classorganizations(which,duringthatperiod, practicalymeanttheCPsincetheSPhadonlylittleim- portance)and,ontheother,representativesofdeGaule,i.e., ofthestilldisorganizedStateoftheFourthRepublic.The Communistshadadistinctadvantageduringthesenegotiationsandthefactoriesfellintotheirhandsthroughtheinter- mediaryoftheCommunist-dominatedunions,andthisalthoughtheuniondelegateshadonlyaconsultativevoiceinthe boardofmanagers. ThesituationwasquitediferentinplaceswheretheCom- munistshadtodealwithanalreadyconsolidatedstateapparatusandwheretherelationsofpowerwerefavorabletothe Gaulists.Thiswasthecase,e.g.,forthelargestFrenchautomobilefactory,theRenaultworksinParis(35,000workers beforethewar,25,000workersnow).Althoughuniondelegatesaremembersoftheboardofmanagementandthushave therighttovote,theyremainaminoritywithoutanyreal influenceondecisions.Inthetripartiteboardofmanagement inwhichthemembersaswellasthedirectorofthefactoryare nominatedbythegovernment,theStaterepresentativesare thedecisiveelement.SincetheywerenominatedbyadeGaule government,theydonotrepresentworking-classorganiza- tions.Thisshowswhyitissoveryimportantforthosewho caryoutthepolicyofnationalizationstohavethegovern- mentintheirhands. TheGaulistsdefendedtheirpointofviewmostsuccessfuly duringthenationalizationsofthecoalminesintheNorthand thePasdeCalais.Theuniondelegatesremainedcompletely outsideoftheboardsofmanagement.Theyonlybecamemembersoftheconsultativecommittees,whereastheoldmanagers nearlyalwaysretainedtheirpositionsthoughtheynowdependedontheStateinsteadofonprivatecapital.Innocase weretheyreplacedbynewmen.Theyfurthermorekepttheir functionsintheboardsofmanagementofnon-nationalized largeenterprises.Here,fromthepointofviewoftheGaullists, managementwasindependablehands.(Theexpropriation measuresfurthermoreremainedincomplete,butthisisnotthe placetogointotoomuchdetail.) Inaccordancewiththeirincreasedimportanceinthe2nd deGaulegovernment,theworking-classpartiessucceededin wrestingmoreimportantconcessionsfromtheGaullistsduring thenationalizationofthebanks.It istruethatinthiscase alsotheformerpresidentsandgeneraldirectorsremainedin theirpostsandcontinuedtoparticipateinthemanagementof banksandothernon-nationalizedbigenterprises.Butacompleteexpropriationwasdecreedandtheuniondelegatesbe- camemembersoftheboardsofmanagementwithfullrights
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